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This study provides evidence on the impact of a new quality management 
practice on indicators of worker and firm performance using personnel 
data and assembly line data from a large garments manufacturer in 
Pakistan. The analysis suggests that there was a significant improvement 
in worker productivity and a significant reduction in the number of 
quality defects made by workers. However, the impact of the 
implementation of the new quality management practice on the 
productivity of the firm varies by assembly line. The implementation of 
the new quality management practice decreases the productivity of very 
basic and complex lines while increases the productivity of basic lines 
that produce the most complex products within the basic line category. 
Employee turnover at the firm is also reduced after the implementation 
of the new management practice, and this reduction is the greatest for 
workers in the shortest tenure category as compared to workers with 
longer tenures. Hence, workers who are still in the process of 
accumulating information on the job match are less likely to turnover 
after the implementation of the new practice. There are two important 
gender differentials found in the analysis. Firstly, the hazard rate of 
turnover for females was found to be significantly lower than the hazard 
rate of males in the initial years of employment, after which no significant 
difference was found in the hazard rate. Secondly, the implementation of 
the new quality management increases the productivity and earnings of 
females by a greater magnitude as compared to males but reduces the 
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Aims and Motivation  
In order to develop a viable theory of the firm, it is important to 
understand the internal incentive structure of firms as it determines how 
individuals behave in an organisation (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988). 
This research is motivated by a research strategy known as insider 
econometrics which uses micro level data on worker, worker groups and 
firms to analyse the impact of management practices on productivity of 
firms. One of the questions that insider econometrics addresses is 
whether a new management practice increases productivity? And why a 
certain practice may not have the same impact on entities within the 
same organisation (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009). This issue can be 
addressed by identifying the causes of variation in the impact of new 
management practices between workers or workers teams or firms within 
the same industry. Building on this theme, this research uses data from 
a large-scale garments manufacturer in Pakistan to investigate the 
impact of a new quality management practice on various measures of 
worker level and firm level performance. The use of data from the 
readymade garments sector is relevant as the textile sector accounts for 
over a half of Pakistan’s exports (Pakistan, 2018). The readymade 
garments sector is at the top of the value chain in the textile sector and 
enhancing productivity in this sector can contribute to higher economic 
growth.  
One interesting feature of the garments industry of Pakistan is the way 
in which the quality defects of stitched garments are checked. In most 
firms, quality supervisors check the bundles stitched by the operators, 
and send the garment for re-work if a quality defect is found or if the 
quality standard specified by the buyer is not met. Quality is checked 
twice, there are in-line supervisors who constantly move around the line 
and inspect workers and later the garments stitched by the workers are 
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inspected again by another supervisor at the end table of each line. 
Improving the quality of production throughout the assembly line is 
important as any defects should be rectified earlier in the stage of sewing 
otherwise if the defective garments continues through the assembly line 
then the cost of re-doing the garment is greatly increased. However, 
typically no reward or penalty is given to workers based on the quality of 
work and workers are usually paid piece rates (payment according to the 
number of pieces stitched). The incentive effect created by paying piece 
rates to workers often leads to a quantity-quality trade-off which has been 
mentioned in the past (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Paarsch and 
Shearer, 2000; Chaudhry and Faran, 2015).  
One local firm implemented a new quality management practice to 
motivate workers to strike a balance between quantity and quality, while 
keeping piece rates intact. In this initiative, every time an in-line quality 
supervisor checks the pieces stitched by an operator, he/she places a 
card on the machine. Various cards are used to denote different quality 
levels maintained by each worker. The cards are ranked: a green card 
indicates that the worker is maintaining sufficient quality, a red card 
indicates that the worker has made serious quality defects and a yellow 
card indicates that the worker needs additional monitoring or is under 
observation. If a worker gets a red card, production at that point is 
stopped until the problem is resolved, and the worker is strictly 
monitored until he/she can get the task done in the right manner.  
The cards are visible to all workers on the factory floor and the new 
practice facilitates better management of the factory floor as supervisors 
can immediately identify problematic workers and can help eliminate any 
bottlenecks quickly. Interaction between individuals in the workplace 
may lead to peer pressure, as workers compare themselves with their co-
workers and may experience the pressure of matching up to the 
performance of their peers (Cornelissen, Dustmann and Schönberg, 
2017; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). Hence, this new 
quality management practice may also bring in an element of peer 
pressure onto the factory floor.    
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The operator who makes the least quality defects per line is also 
presented with a monetary reward once a month, however the reward is 
set only for certain operations. The reward accounts for 5 percent to 15 
percent of the worker’s salary. The reward is ranked for each assembly 
line; the worker who makes the least quality defects on each line receives 
the first prize and gets a 15 percent bonus, the worker who comes second 
gets a bonus of 10 percent and the worker who comes third is rewarded 
with a 5 percent bonus. The idea behind this practice is to introduce 
differentiation between co-workers and recognize workers per the 
standards maintained. Consequently, this attaches a status to each 
operative and rewards the best worker. The unique aspect of this practice 
is that it aims to enhance quality and quantity simultaneously as when 
a worker spends less time on re doing defected pieces, this translates into 
higher productivity as there is more time to work on new pieces. 
Moreover, Fukunishi and Yamagata (2014) suggest that several 
industries in low income countries have simultaneously upgraded 
product quality and experienced productivity growth, but there is a 
dearth of research on the sources of productivity enhancement at the firm 
level. 
Four important features of the unique data set used in this research sets 
it apart from previous studies.  First, I use data from the personnel 
records of a large readymade garments manufacturer over a 2.5 year 
period. The firm records all data electronically which minimises errors. 
The dataset allows us to analyse daily performance of workers such as 
productivity and quality defects. Using this data, the research builds 
upon the idea that rewards for quality (or penalties for low quality) can 
be provided to workers in addition to paying piece rates which will help 
minimise the quantity-quality trade-off (Heywood, Siebert and Wei, 2013; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). The research uses data only on workers who 
were present at the firm before and after the implementation of the new 
quality management practice to test whether there is a significant 
difference between the productivity and quality defects of these workers 
before and after the implementation of the new quality management 
practice. The research follows a similar methodology to that used by 
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Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005). However, they used firm level 
average quality figures to show that the quality of production did not 
change significantly after the intervention which did not clarify the 
impact on the quality of production at the worker level. Our data set is 
more detailed as we use quality data of individual workers. 
The research also draws motivation from the work on management and 
firm performance by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007, 2010) who 
differentiate between good and bad management practices. Good 
management practices are defined as practices that contribute positively 
to the productivity of the firm. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) identified 
that empirical research on the causal effects of management practices on 
firm performance is at an early stage and the lack of availability of firm 
level data is one of the obstacles in investigating the impact of 
management practices on firm performance. More specifically, one 
measurement issue is the unavailability of direct measures of outputs 
and inputs (Syverson, 2011).  The second feature of this data set is that 
it fills in this void as high-quality firm level data is available which 
provides us with direct measures of inputs and outputs of each assembly 
line at the firm. This allows us to test the impact of the new quality 
management practice on the productivity of the firm by assembly line. 
The assembly lines at the firm vary by production complexity as some 
lines produce basic garments and some produce complex garments. The 
complexity of production within a line also varies. The research follows 
the idea by Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) who provide evidence 
that the impact of new human resource management practice on 
assembly lines varies with the complexity of production. Hence, the 
research also aims to explore whether the impact of the quality 
management practice differs within and across lines due to the variation 
in the complexity of production. As the data focuses on a narrow 
production process, this eliminates sources of heterogeneity that are 
found in more aggregate or heterogeneous samples. 
The research also takes motivation from the theory of Lee and Mitchell 
(1994) which suggests that shocks at the workplace are likely to impact 
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employee turnover. A shock is described as any positive, negative and 
neutral expected or unexpected event that shakes the employee out of 
steady state and initiates feelings about leaving the job. For example, 
shocks due to negative feedback during informal or formal performance 
appraisals have been recognised (Allen and Griffeth, 1999) and practices 
that aim to enhance performance increase the number of quits and 
dismissals as the enhanced standard may expose individuals who do not 
match up to the criteria of the new practice (Batt and Colvin, 2011). There 
is limited empirical work on the effects of new management practices on 
turnover; hence, this research will fill in this gap.  Therefore, the third 
feature of the dataset is that it contains information on the duration of 
employees with the firm and using this information, the research will 
empirically test the impact of the new quality management practice on 
employee turnover. The research also draws its motivation from the job 
matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979) and aims to test whether the impact 
of the new management practice is different for workers with shorter 
tenures as compared to workers with relatively longer tenures. A strong 
relationship between the shirking behaviour of workers and turnover was 
established in the past (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Data on productivity, 
defects rate and absenteeism will be used to analyse the impact of 
shirking on employee turnover. The research also aims to analyse 
whether the implementation of the new quality management practice 
impacts the relationship between these three variables and turnover. 
The fourth feature of the data set is that it allows us to analyse gender 
differentials. The justification for hiring female workers in the garments 
sector is derived from the nimble fingers hypothesis, where the 
orientation of women towards precise tasks emerges from their 
traditional designation at home and performing tasks like sewing (Elson 
and Pearson, 1981; Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1983; Joekes, 1987) and 
survey results also indicate that females produce better quality work as 
compared to males (Haque, 2009). Hence, the research aims to 
investigate whether there are any gender differentials in productivity and 
quality defects at the firm. 
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Gender differentials in turnover have been analysed in the past. Viscusi 
(1980) mentions that conclusions drawn from data sets that use a diverse 
set of job characteristics may not be useful. Pakistan has one of the 
world’s largest labour force. It faces many challenges in providing suitable 
employment opportunities to its labour force. However, industrial firms 
often find it difficult to find workers with the skill sets they require, which 
suggests a mismatch between demand and supply of skills. Females are 
often denied equal opportunities to education and training as males, so 
they mostly end up in low skilled jobs. The low female participation in 
Pakistan is also a hurdle to economic growth.  However, the data set we 
use can give us useful results about gender differences as all males and 
females are at the same level in the hierarchy of the firm and we also 
control for tasks that the workers perform. The experimental economics 
literature has suggested that females are more averse to competition but 
most of these findings have been based on laboratory experiments 
(Bertrand, 2011). The implementation of the new quality management 
increases competition at the workplace, therefore this research will 
further add to the literature on whether gender preferences play any role 
in labour market outcomes. 
 
Structure and Content of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 
This chapter uses personnel data to investigate whether the new quality 
management practices can motivate workers to meet targets while 
maintaining sufficient quality and keeping piece rates intact. 
The data set used in this chapter only contains workers who worked at 
the firm before and after the implementation of the new practice. The 
sample covers 648 workers (300 females and 348 males) over 782 days. 
Various fixed and random effects models were estimated to analyse the 
impact of the new quality management practice on worker productivity, 
earnings and quality defects. The results show that the productivity and 
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earnings of workers increased after the implementation of the new quality 
management practice. While the productivity of workers increased, the 
number of quality defects were significantly reduced. Gender differences 
were also found in the impact of the new quality management practice.  
The magnitude of the impact of the new quality management practice on 
productivity and earnings of females was greater as compared to males. 
Females were significantly less productive and earned less than males 
before the implementation of the practice, hence the new practice also 
reduces the productivity and earnings gender gap.  
Interestingly, females made significantly lower quality defects as 
compared to males before the implementation of the new management 
practice. However, after the implementation of the practice, there was a 
reduction in the number of quality defects made by females but  females 
now made significantly higher quality defects as compared to males. The 
quality management practice seems to target and minimise the shirking 
behaviour of workers as it has a greater impact on reducing the quality 
defects made by males who were making more quality defects before the 
intervention as compared to females, while the impact of the practice is 
of a smaller magnitude on the relatively more careful and quality 
conscious females. External interventions bring in two effects: the 
disciplining effect and the crowding out effect. Both these effects can co-
exist, and the benefit of the intervention depends upon the relative 
magnitudes of these effects. The crowding out effect is likely to be 
stronger for females as compared to males, however the overall impact of 
the intervention cannot be ignored as the implementation of the new 
practice significantly reduces the quality defects made by both males and 
females. Hence, rewards can be attached to piece rates and therefore it 
should be assumed that quality will be compromised for quantity. 
 
Chapter 3 
The chapter aims to investigate the impact of the new quality 
management practice on the line level productivity of the firm. As the 
assembly lines at the firm produce products of different complexity and 
17 
 
the complexity of production within an assembly line also varies, the 
chapter also aims to analyse whether the impact of the new quality 
management practice varies by the complexity of production. The daily 
line level production (the number of garments stitched) at each assembly 
line was chosen as the dependent variable and the data sample covers 
867 days and 9 assembly lines. Fixed effects models were used to 
estimate the impact of the new quality management practice on the 
production at the firm. We provide evidence that the impact of the new 
quality management practice varies by the complexity of production 
which is in line with Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007). One of the 
specifications shows that the implementation of the new quality 
management practice reduces the productivity of the firm, but the 
magnitude of the reduction is greater for lines that produce complex 
products. Most of the other specifications that show a more detailed 
picture of productivity for each assembly line indicate that the 
implementation of the new quality management practice increases the 
productivity of basic lines that produce the most complex products within 
the basic line category, but the new quality management practice reduces 
the productivity of other basic lines and complex lines. We also find 
evidence that the impact of the new quality management practice also 
varies by the change in the complexity of production. This effect also 
differs by assembly line as some specifications show that a change in the 
complexity of production after the implementation of the new 
management practice has a dampening impact on productivity while 
some specifications show that this effect is insignificant. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter analyses the impact of the new quality management practice 
on worker turnover and tests whether there are any gender differentials 
in turnover. A piece-wise discrete time survival model has been chosen 
for the analysis as tenure increments in number of discrete days. The 
observation window consists of a total of 852 working days. An 
unbalanced data set containing 769,491 worker-day level observations 
covering 1406 workers and 852 working days was used in this chapter. 
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The  data sample contains workers that were employed by the firm on 1st 
August 2013 and workers who started working at the firm during the 
observation window.  
The estimated results indicate that the implementation of the new quality 
management practice reduces turnover at the firm. This research 
provides results in line with the relationship suggested by Weiss (1984), 
such that a higher expected utility at the current job is likely to decrease 
turnover. The lack of job alternatives combined with the potential 
increase in job attachment due to the recognition and rewards provided 
by the new management practice may explain the reduction in turnover 
at the firm. However, the magnitude of the impact of the practice is lower 
for workers with relatively longer tenures and highest for workers in the 
shortest tenure category who are still in the process of accumulating 
information about the job match.  
Overall, we do not find evidence that worker effort denoted by 
performance indicators such as quantity produced and quality defects 
are significant predictors of turnover but shirking behaviour such as 
absenteeism is found to have a significant positive relationship with 
turnover. However, only one specification suggests that before the 
implementation of the new management practice, workers with higher 
quality defects are more likely to turnover, but, after the implementation 
of the new quality management practice, workers with higher quality 
defects are less likely to turnover.  
The estimates reveal an important gender difference i.e. the hazard rate 
of turnover for females were found to be significantly lower than the 
hazard rate of males in the initial period on the job, after which no 
significant gender difference was found in the hazard rate. These results 
highlight gender differentials in the job matching process. Financial 
hardship and fewer job alternatives due to restrictions on the mobility of 





Chapter 2  
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter uses personnel data from a large-scale garments 
manufacturer in Pakistan to investigate whether innovative management 
practices can motivate workers to meet targets while maintaining 
sufficient quality and keeping piece rates intact. 
Extensive work has been done on how quality maybe compromised when 
workers are paid piece rates i.e. pay is dependent upon the quantity of 
output produced by workers as opposed to being paid fixed wages where 
a fixed salary is set per day or per month. However, there is a need to 
study the role that management practices can play in the workplace to 
induce industrial workers to put in their best efforts in a piece rate 
setting. 
Two strands of literature motivate the research; Firstly, the work on 
monetary incentives and worker productivity (Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 
1986; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005) and secondly, the notion 
that individuals crave status and have a desire to be recognized (Besley 
and Ghatak, 2005; Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 2007; Kosfeld and 
Neckermann, 2011; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007).  
The research further elaborates the idea by Heywood, Siebert and Wei 
(2013) that rewards for quality (or penalties for low quality) can be part 
of piece rates and as a consequence, it should not be assumed that 
quality will be sacrificed for quantity.  
The study is also of relevance as the textile sector accounts for over a half 
of Pakistan’s exports (Pakistan, 2018). As the readymade garments sector 
is at the top of the value chain, it is essential for developing countries, 
like Pakistan, to look for opportunities to increase manufacturing 
productivity to achieve higher economic growth. Macroeconomic issues 
in the garments industry have been studied in the past (Nabi and Hamid, 
2013; Fukunishi and Yamagata, 2014). Moreover, Fukunishi and 
Yamagata (2014) suggested that several industries in low income 
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countries have simultaneously upgraded product quality and 
experienced productivity growth, however, the sources of productivity 
enhancement need to be investigated at the firm level. Chaudhry and 
Faran (2015) used a descriptive analysis to explore whether the quantity-
quality trade off exists under the piece rate system in the garments 
industry of Pakistan, where there seems to be no alternative way to fulfil 
production targets.  
One interesting and unexplored phenomenon in the Pakistani garments 
sector is that quality supervisors check the bundles stitched by the 
operators and send the garment for re-work if a quality defect is found or 
if the quality standard specified by the buyer is not met. Quality is 
checked twice, there are in-line supervisors who constantly move around 
the line and inspect workers and later the garments stitched by the 
worked are inspected again by another supervisor at the end table of each 
line. However, typically workers are neither penalized for making a high 
number of quality defects nor are they rewarded for reducing quality 
defects.  
One local firm implemented a new quality management practice to 
motivate workers to strike a balance between quantity and quality, while 
keeping piece rates intact. In this initiative, every time an in-line quality 
supervisor checks the pieces stitched by an operator, he/she places a 
card on the machine. Various cards are used to denote different quality 
levels maintained by each worker. The cards are ranked: a green card 
indicates that the worker is maintaining sufficient quality, a red card 
indicates that the worker has made serious quality defects and a yellow 
card indicates that the worker needs additional monitoring or is under 
observation. If a worker gets a red card, production at that point is 
stopped until the problem is resolved, and the worker is strictly 
monitored until he/she can get the task done in the right manner. 
The cards are visible to all workers on the factory floor and the new 
practice facilitates better management of the factory floor as supervisors 
can immediately identify problematic workers and can help eliminate any 
bottlenecks quickly. This new quality management practice may bring in 
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an element of peer pressure onto the factory floor. Interaction between 
individuals in the workplace may lead to peer pressure, as workers 
compare themselves with their co-workers and may experience the 
pressure of matching up to the productivity of their peers (Cornelissen, 
Dustmann and Schönberg, 2017; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and 
Moretti, 2009). 
The operator who makes the least quality defects per line is also 
presented with a monetary reward once a month, however the reward is 
set only for certain operations. The reward can account for 5 percent to 
15 percent of the worker’s salary. The reward is ranked for each assembly 
line; the worker who makes the least quality defects on each line receives 
the first prize and gets a 15 percent bonus, the worker who comes second 
gets a bonus of 10 percent and the worker who comes third is rewarded 
with a 5 percent bonus. The idea behind this practice is to introduce 
differentiation between co-workers and recognize workers per the 
standards maintained. Consequently, this attaches a status to each 
operative and rewards the best worker. The unique aspect of this practice 
is that it aims to enhance quality and quantity simultaneously. Workers 
at the firm are paid piece rates throughout the study. 
Some evidence about a related practice is provided by Lazear (2000) who 
looked at an auto glass company where the quality of windshield 
installation improved after workers were paid piece rates. The worker who 
made the quality defect was expected to reinstall the windshield and had 
to pay the firm for the replacement glass before any paying jobs were 
assigned to him. Moreover, re-doing work was costly to the worker, 
therefore, the worker was more careful while doing it the first time. In our 
case, the same worker is expected to re-do the defected pieces and may 
incur a cost in terms of the earnings that he/she could have earned by 
working on a new piece. However, the firm reported that the quality 
defects were high, and workers were not motivated enough to get the 
pieces done correctly the first time. The aim of the new quality 
management practice is to motivate workers to get the task done correctly 
the first time and minimize re-work. 
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To identify the impact of the new quality management practice, the daily 
output, daily earnings, and daily quality defects of the same worker are 
observed before and after the quality management practice was started. 
This research follows a similar methodology to that used by Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul (2005). They compared productivity of workers who 
picked fruit under piece rates and relative incentives (worker’s pay was 
dependent upon the ratio of individual productivity to average 
productivity among all workers on the same day and field) and reported 
that the productivity of workers was significantly higher under piece 
rates. The database used to record the productivity of workers and 
misclassification of fruit was different, hence, the dataset could not 
match the quality of fruit picked with the productivity of each worker.  
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) used an aggregate firm level figure 
to show that piece rate pay did not have an adverse impact on the quality 
of fruit picking but any changes in the quality of fruit picking at the 
worker level remained ambiguous. Average figures do not give a clear 
picture of whether the quality of fruit picking remained the same among 
all workers or increased for some workers and decreased for some. The 
analysis in this chapter reflects upon the changes in quality defects using 
data of individual workers before and after the introduction of the new 
quality management practice as quality data is recorded during the 
production process. The lack of reliable firm level data is an obstacle to 
carrying out research at the firm level, however the comprehensive data 
set used in this study gives us an opportunity to look inside the black 
box of firm behaviour. The rich data used in the study makes this 
research unique; such a scenario has not been analysed in the past in 
such detail. The data also makes it possible to look at the varying effects 
of the intervention for men and women. 
A linear random effects model was used to estimate the impact of the new 
quality management practice on productivity and earnings and a negative 
binomial random effects regression illustrates the impact of the practice 
on quality defects. The estimated results provide evidence in line with the 
principal agent theory.  
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This chapter is organised as follows; Section II presents the literature 
review, Section III describes the data and methodology, Section IV 

























II. Literature Review 
A cornerstone of research in personnel economics is that workers 
respond to incentives (Prendergast, 1999). Mayo (1933) stressed upon the 
idea that workers are motivated by both non-monetary and monetary 
incentives, such ideas are now being used in personnel economics (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2011). The notion that individuals desire to be 
distinguished from others has been recognized (Robson, 1992; Zizzo, 
2002; Frey, 2007; Larkin, 2011) and is gaining popularity in field 
experiments. For example, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2011) 
mention that new field experiments to motivate employees are being 
created and one of them is providing non-monetary rewards in the form 
of status or social recognition.  
The following sections shed light on the literature on monetary incentives, 
non-monetary rewards, and the impact of various incentive schemes on 
worker productivity. A brief section on the principal agent theory and the 
crowding out hypothesis was also included. The final section considers 
how field experiments are used in the literature. 
II.A. Piece Rates vs Fixed Wages 
The decision to pay piece rates or salaries to workers depends upon how 
much weight the firm gives to quality, quantity and other factors such as 
asymmetric information, sorting considerations and monitoring costs 
(Lazear, 1986). The age earning profiles created by the human capital 
theory, explained by Becker (1962) and the shirking model presented by 
Lazear (1981) have similar implications, but they differ significantly on 
the issue of pay for performance compensation schemes. Lazear (1981) 
predicts that workers who are paid piece rates should have a flatter age-
earnings profile than workers who are paid time rates. The reason is that 
piece rates are used in occupations where workers are easy to monitor 
and shirking will lead to immediate dismissal. Piece rates are normally 
used in jobs where the variance in output and hence income is relatively 
high. Agency problems should also not be prevalent as there is a direct 
link between pay and performance. The human capital theory argues that 
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there is no reason to believe that skill acquisition would be less profitable 
for workers in jobs which pay piece rates in comparison to those jobs that 
pay time rates. Hutchens (1987) noted that piece rate jobs usually involve 
doing repetitive tasks which are conducive to monitoring and tend not to 
have job characteristics such as pensions, long job tenures, and 
comparatively higher wages for senior workers. 
There is evidence that piece rate workers are often considered to be more 
productive than workers who are paid fixed wages (Lazear, 2000; Shearer, 
2004). Articles in Blinder (1990) also suggested that pay for performance 
mechanisms can motivate individuals to increase their effort levels. 
Freeman and Kleiner (2005) explain through a case study of an American 
shoe manufacturing firm that switching to piece rates leads to a rise in 
worker productivity.  
Performance related pay also plays an important role for firm profitability. 
When pay is tied to performance, firms can improve the quality of workers 
as high quality workers select jobs that offer performance based schemes 
(Lazear, 1986; Lemieux, Macleod and Parent, 2009; Grytten and 
Sorensen, 2003). Jones, Kalmi and Kauhanen (2010) found evidence that 
team productivity significantly increased when teams of workers received 
performance related pay.  
Gielen, Kerkhofs and van Ours (2010) presented an empirical analysis of 
the productivity and employment effects of the pay for performance 
compensation scheme and reported an increase in productivity of firms 
of approximately 9 percent. They attributed this change partly to the 
incentive effects generated by pay for performance schemes and partly to 
worker sorting. Booth and Frank (1999) used data from the British 
Household Panel Survey to assert that performance related pay is 
associated with about 9% higher wages for men and 6% for women. Seiler 
(1984) confirmed the hypothesis that workers who are paid incentives 
experience higher but more dispersed earnings than those workers who 
are paid time rates. The incentive effect partly consists of the effort effect 
and partly of the higher risk borne by the worker.   
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The evidence that piece rates lead to an improvement in productivity 
shows one side of the coin. Problems related to piece rates have often 
been a subject of interest. One issue is that in the presence of asymmetric 
information, workers may be reluctant to share productivity 
enhancement methods as an overall increase in productivity may 
decrease piece rates (Roy, 1952; Gibbons, 1987). Another one is that 
workers exert too much effort on tasks that generate performance pay, 
which eventually leads to a misallocation of tasks. Some examples of this 
include workers concentrating too much on quantity rather than quality, 
inadequate maintenance of productive tools and lack of willingness to 
cooperate with the firm and its employees (Moen and Rosen, 2005; Baker 
1992; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). If the cost of effort for a worker for 
two activities is the same, the agent will be indifferent as how he/she 
allocates his/her time between both activities. However, if the principal 
offers a higher return for one task as compared to the other, then the 
agent will have an incentive to focus on the task that generates the higher 
return even if the principal prefers an equal allocation of time between 
both tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Paarsch and Shearer (2000) 
also present a similar finding that incentive effects created by monetary 
compensation schemes might compromise on quality by enhancing 
quantity.  
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007, 2009) reported evidence that 
managers direct their efforts towards high quality workers after a 
performance bonus package contingent on the average productivity of low 
tier workers was introduced. The multi-tasking concerns raised by 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) were also incorporated into the social 
experiment; managers were not paid performance bonuses if the 
percentage of damaged fruit rose by more than 2% as compared to the 
pre-established figure at the firm. 
The quantity quality trade-off associated with piece rates has also been 
observed in the garments industry of Pakistan. Makino (2012) reveals 
that the poor performance of the garments industry of Pakistan in the 
post MFA (Multi-Fibre Arrangement) period maybe attributed to the 
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practice of paying piece rates to workers. The Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
was an agreement on textile goods and readymade garments that was 
active between 1974 and 2004. It imposed quotas on textile products that 
developing countries could export to developed countries.  
Chaudhry and Faran (2015) observed that the quantity-quality trade off 
exists under the piece rate system in the garments industry of Pakistan 
but there seems to be no alternative way to fulfil production targets. 
Chaudhry and Faran (2016) further studied the manufacturing process 
of an identical pair of denim jeans produced in three different factories. 
Large factories that export garments tend to pay piece rates to workers 
that are calculated using the standard minute value (the time it takes to 
produce one garment) and have concluded that smaller firms can save 
labour costs by paying wages based on stitching times and by adopting 
some of the technologies used by large exporting firms.  
In contrast to the argument that the quantity quality trade off exists 
under piece rates, Lazear (2000) provided evidence that quality improved 
after an auto glass company switched to piece rate pay. Bandeira, 
Barankay and Rasul (2005) found the first evidence on the comparison 
between relative incentives and piece rates. The productivity of an 
average worker in a fruit farm is reported to be 50% higher when workers 
are paid piece rates as compared to when workers are paid according to 
relative incentives (pay is contingent upon the ratio of individual 
productivity to average productivity of the farm). They used an aggregate 
measure of quality to show that after piece rates were implemented, there 
was no significant effect on the quality of fruit picked on the farm.  
Milgrom and Roberts (1995) are of the view that piece rates can function 
optimally when they are tied to incentives. Heywood, Siebert and Wei 
(2013) build upon a similar concept presented by Lazear (1995) that piece 
rates contingent on quality and quantity can help firms minimize the 
quantity-quality trade off. Rewards for quality (or penalties for low 
quality) can be part of piece rates and it should not be assumed that 
quality will be sacrificed for quantity. The results emphasize that worker 
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characteristics and attitudes have a significant impact on the quantity-
quality outcome. For example, males have a higher error rate than 
females and males prefer piece rates more than females do.  
II.B. Monetary vs Non-Monetary Incentives 
The role of monetary incentives has been studied to a large extent in the 
past and, there is ample empirical evidence that status considerations, 
where individuals benefit from receiving higher wages than their peers, 
play an important role in the workplace (Frank, 1985). Workers care 
about what employers think about them as this will influence future 
payments and promotion prospects (Holmström, 1999). 
The human need for appreciation and recognition is a vital force behind 
motivating individuals (Maidani, 1991; Besley and Ghatak, 2005) and 
Maslow (1987) and Alderfer (1972) further elaborated that these needs 
maybe fulfilled through public recognition.  Agents care about their social 
status and principals often use this concern as a way to influence agents’ 
output. This status maybe achieved through monetary or non-monetary 
payoffs or could also be a combination of both (Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 
2007). Firms that use rewards contingent on employee performance also 
have higher payoffs, ceteris paribus (Besley and Ghatak, 2008). Stajkovic 
and Luthans (1997) share a similar finding; monetary rewards and social 
recognition are effective tools to improve average performance of 
manufacturing and service firms. Auriol and Renault (2008) used a 
framework where social recognition was a scarce resource in an 
organisation and introducing differentiation between employees in a 
dynamic setting proved to be a powerful tool to motivate workers. 
Extensive research related to motivational theories suggest that there is 
a correlation between employee behavior and the desire for recognition 
(Crandall and Wallace, 1997; Patton, 1999). Skinner (1969)  presented 
the reinforcement theory; individuals behave in accordance with the 
consequences of their actions. People tend to repeat rewarding behavior 
and avoid punishable actions. Markham, Scott and McKee (2002) used 
this reinforcement theory to illustrate the success of a public recognition 
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program which improved worker attendance. Wiley (1997) used data from 
employee surveys to establish that good wages, job security, full 
appreciation for work, promotion and growth, and interesting work were 
the most important factors for motivation of employees. 
Linking attendance to recognition of employees has found to be a 
successful way of improving attendance (Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2012). 
In contrast, Silva, Duncan and Doudna (1981) presented a study of 20 
female workers which showed limited success of recognition in achieving 
reduced absenteeism.  
However, in some cases, monetary incentives do not necessarily produce 
the desired effects. For example, Titmuss (1970) and Mellström and 
Johannesson (2008) argue that people with altruistic motives resent the 
use of monetary payments, hence, material incentives have a negative 
impact on altruistic behaviour such as blood donation. 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) emphasized that although economists 
in the past have focused more on monetary incentives in labour relations, 
however, workers in organisations also value non-monetary incentives. 
Workers gain utility from being respected by their employers and fellow 
colleagues. Employers can help employees gain the recognition they 
desire by controlling the information about an employee that is available 
to others and by sharing the traits that gain respect for an employee in 
an organisation. Deci (1971) and Luthans and Stajkovic (1999) present a 
similar idea that appreciation of employees instead of monetary rewards 
is a powerful device in motivating subjects to perform tasks.  
 
Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) further developed the point raised by 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) that status and social recognition are 
strong incentives for agents to improve their work effort, however, an 
optimal mix of incentives would consist of a combination of monetary 
awards and non-monetary awards. Stajkovic and Luthans (2003) also 
reported results in line with Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) that social 
recognition with a combination of monetary rewards and feedback can 
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have a significant impact on task performance. Ashraf, Bandiera and 
Jack (2014) have reported that sales agents who were given non-
monetary rewards were more successful than those who were given 
financial margins on the quantity sold.  
Subjects tend to compare themselves with individuals of similar calibre. 
Variations in reference groups may help to explain the differences in 
ambition, for example, females tend to compare themselves with females 
while low ability workers tend to compare themselves with workers of 
similar ability. Firms can benefit from such interpersonal comparisons to 
induce subjects to improve work effort levels. It may be more beneficial 
for firms to introduce promotion-based tournaments that reward winners 
rather than penalise losers. Segregated tournaments create a levelled 
playing field; hence subjects exert higher effort in segregated 
tournaments than in mixed tournaments as males and females may have 
different ambition levels. Gaps in male-female performance may be 
explained by differences in ambition without invoking discrimination or 
differences in other opportunities and abilities. Females are less status 
seeking than males and, despite having high ability, may fail to climb up 
the corporate ladder (Ederer and Patacconi, 2010). Falk and Knell (2004) 
and Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) have also found heterogeneity 
with respect to status seeking behaviour, in particular gender and 
country differences. 
Large peer effects were observed in low skilled occupations where 
individuals can monitor each other’s output (Cornelissen, Dustmann and 
Schönberg, 2017). Mas and Moretti (2009) observed a similar finding 
such that when a faster clerk replaced a slower clerk, the productivity of 
the shift increased not only because of the faster clerk but because other 
clerks also became more efficient.  
Dur (2009) suggested that even if low wages are being offered, the 
management can persuade workers to stay with the firm if the attention 
that the employees deserve is being given to them. Nagin et al. (2002) also 
31 
 
agree that management’s empathy while dealing with employees may 
reduce opportunistic behaviour in the workplace. 
II.C. Agency Theory vs. Crowding Out Hypothesis   
There are mixed views on the way external interventions are likely to 
impact worker performance. External intervention may crowd out, crowd 
in or leave intrinsic motivation unaffected (Frey, 1997). The Principal-
Agent theory suggests that an external intervention is likely to improve 
worker performance as it increases the marginal cost of shirking or 
increases the marginal benefit of performing (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Frey and Jegen (2001) suggest that the 
outcome suggested by the agency theory would hold if an external 
intervention increases intrinsic motivation, hence the effect of the 
disciplining effect is strengthened by the crowding in effect. Lazear (2000) 
also reported evidence that monetary incentives will increase output of 
workers.  
Social Psychology presents an alternative view known as the crowding 
out hypothesis that suggests that an increase in monitoring by the 
principal can lead to a reduction in effort by the agent. The disciplining 
effect supported by the agency theory and the crowding out effect may 
co-exist. The disciplining effect is dominant when an impersonal or 
abstract relationship exists between the agent and principal, for instance, 
if employees are controlled by the parent company. The crowding out 
effect is likely to hold if the relationship between the principal and agent 
is personal and psychological contracts are of importance (Frey, 1993). 
Barkema (1995) used data on 116 managers in medium sized Dutch 
firms and reported a negative effect of monitoring on the manager’s 
performance when the principal is a CEO but a positive effect when the 
manager is supervised impersonally by a parent company. 
 
Dickinson and Villeval (2008) provide evidence in line with the agency 
theory, however, they also support the hypothesis by Frey (1993) such 
that the crowding out effect will outweigh the disciplining effect when a 
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reduced social distance between the principal and the agent exists. In 
this case, the crowding out effect is observed in an impersonal 
relationship when the principal’s payoff is dependent on the agent’s 
output. The agent reciprocates intense monitoring by reducing output, 
while this behaviour was not observed in fixed payoff treatments. 
II.D. Field Experiments and Regression Analysis 
Falk and Ichino (2006) illustrated through a controlled field experiment 
that peer effects exist as the behaviour of students who worked alone was 
found to be significantly different from the behaviour of students who 
worked in pairs. The average output of students that worked in pairs was 
found to be higher. When less productive students were paired with 
highly productive students, overall productivity also went up. Peer effects 
may also be present in cases where workers are paid piece rates, as they 
may care about their own productivity and the productivity of their peers. 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2009) refer to a research strategy known as ‘insider 
econometrics’. The strategy uses micro level data on workers and aims to 
address questions related to the impact of new management practices on 
the productivity of firms.  The simplest regression for obtaining estimates 
of the impact of a management practice on productivity, or any other 
dependent variable such as quality of the product, or the downtime of an 
assembly line will include control variables implied by the production 
function, a dummy variable which equals one when the management 
practice is present, work specific fixed effects and a common time trend.  
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2011) explain that field experiments 
within firms are usually done at the worker level. The benefit of having a 
control group and a treatment group is that common trends can be taken 
care of by employing a difference in difference estimator. The problem 
arises when the control and treatment groups cannot be geographically 
isolated and the control group might react to the differential treatment, 
while firms also might not be willing to treat workers differently within 
the same vicinity.  
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Shi (2010) conducted a randomized control trial which aimed to compare 
productivity under piece rates and fixed wages for workers involved in 
tree thinning in an orchard in Washington. The firm had multiple sites, 
however, the workers exchanged information about being treated 
differently with the result that there was resentment from workers who 
were not being paid piece rates. 
List, Sadoff and Wagner (2010) mentioned that applying the treatment to 
all agents at a chosen time can eliminate the problem experienced by Shi 
(2010). The benefit of applying the treatment to all agents increases 
statistical power and the effect of the treatment can be estimated by 
comparing the same agent before and after the treatment which will 
remove unobserved heterogeneity. The cost of this approach is that the 
estimates might be biased due to unobservable determinants of changes 
in behaviour. This can be resolved by collecting a long time series data 
before and after the treatment and control periods or if seasonality seems 
to be a problem, then data can be collected when the treatment was not 
available, to purge estimates of variation due to naturally occurring 
fluctuations.  
Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and Salanié (2003) noted an important 
empirical identification problem, such that the incentive contracts might 
be endogenous to firm’s performance. The methodology employed by 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2007 and 2009) has addressed this 
challenge; the exogenous change in incentives created by the natural field 
experiment, with detailed personnel data and a fixed number of 
individuals precisely identifies the causal effect of incentives on worker 
and firm productivity.  
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2007) investigated the effect of an 
exogenous change in managerial incentives on average worker 
productivity. The compensation mechanism of managers was changed 
from fixed wages to performance pay contingent on the average 
productivity of low tier workers. The methodology employed in this case 
is similar to the one used by Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005). The 
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effect of the change in incentives is captured by a dummy variable that 
equals one when the performance bonus was introduced and zero 
otherwise. 
II.E. Gender Differences 
 
Various explanations for the gender wage differentials have been studied 
in the past. Productivity differences due to the gender differences in 
labour force attachment as females assume household responsibilities 
under the traditional division of labour (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; 
Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; Angelov, Johansson and Lindahl, 
2016; Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan, 2015) were first explained by Mincer 
and Polachek (1974). It has been argued that as women spend more time 
on household responsibilities and childcare than men do, women tend to 
have high turnover rates and are more likely to have a more 
discontinuous pattern of labour force participation. The human capital 
acquired by females might depreciate as females take time off from work 
for childcare. Decisions related to child rearing, may also induce females 
to delay training until they re-join their workplace. Hence, on average 
females will receive less training than males. Women tend to accumulate 
less total work experience, job specific experience and seniority as 
compared to men (Polachek, 1981; Barron, Black and Loewenstein, 1993; 
Corcoran and Duncan, 1979). The time and effort that females spend on 
housework may induce a lower effort into market jobs, hence productivity 
and wages are lower (Becker, 1985). Sorting decisions may also play a 
vital role in the gender wage gap as women may take up lower paying jobs 
that are compatible with the work and home schedules and may have a 
higher rate of absenteeism in order to care for children if they are ill 
(Mincer and Polachek, 1974). In the case of Nordic countries, there is a 
high rate of female labour force participation, but females often take up 
roles that are less intense since women are more involved in child care, 
hence it creates a glass ceiling as females do not reach the best paying 




Gender discrimination is widely considered to be another factor leading 
to the gender wage gap. Discrimination is divided into two categories, one 
that can arise from preferences of employers (Becker, 1957) and one that 
arises when workers are unable to indicate their true productivity. Men 
and women may be treated differently due to the expected differences in 
their productivity. The expected productivity of women might be lower 
due to other household responsibilities associated with women, hence 
they may be paid a lower wage (Aigner and Cain, 1977). However, as 
workers accrue tenure at a particular firm, they will be able to indicate 
their true productivity; hence, the gender wage gap should be expected 
to become smaller with tenure and age (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). 
Exclusion of females from male dominated occupations may depress 
wages in female dominated occupations due to excess supply of females 
(Bergmann, 1974). 
 
There is evidence of gender discrimination as the gender pay differential 
was found to be significantly larger than the gender productivity 
differential (Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 1999; McDevitt, Irwin and 
Inwood, 2009). On the contrary, there is evidence that the lower 
productivity of females explains the lower wage that they received in three 
cases of manufacturing (Cox and Nye, 1989; Hellerstein and Neumark, 
1999). 
 
The traditional division of labour that results in the differences in work 
experience acquired by both genders is one explanation for the gender 
wage gap. Psychological attributes and non-cognitive skills account for 
one of the latest explanations of the gender differences (Blau and Kahn, 
2017). A part of the male-female wage differential that is unexplained by 
the differences in human capital can be accounted for by the differences 
in psychological attributes (Semykina and Linz, 2007; Nyhus and Pons, 
2012). 
 
Personality Traits such as self-esteem may contribute to a worker’s 
productivity, acting like other variables that affect human capital wage 
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regressions. Gender differences in the return to five personality traits 
(extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, openness to experience and 
conscientiousness) could account for 5 percent of the gender wage gap, 
after controlling for other human capital variables (Mueller and Plug, 
2006). For males, earnings were positively associated with antagonism 
(the opposite of agreeableness), emotional stability (the opposite of 
neuroticism) and openness to experience. For females, earnings were 
associated with conscientiousness and openness to experience.  
 
Females are found to be more agreeable than males (Bertrand, 2011; 
Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001). Agreeableness refers to being more 
trusting, compliant, modest, straightforward, sympathetic, and acting in 
accordance with the interest of others. Agreeableness accounts for the 
greatest difference in gender earnings as men received a wage premium 
for being more antagonistic (Mueller and Plug, 2006). A sample of Dutch 
employees also shows that personality traits such as agreeableness and 
intellect explain the gender wage gap. Intellect is positively related to the 
wages of males (Nyhus and Pons, 2012). Agreeableness has a negative 
impact on the wages of women, as it hints at women being less effective 
in bargaining wages as compared to males (Babcock and Laschever, 
2003; Nyhus and Pons, 2012). 
 
Women were found to be more conscientious than men were (Mueller and 
Plug, 2006; Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006). Positive correlation 
between conscientiousness and job performance has been reported 
(Barrick and Mount, 1991). Females seem to have better ‘people skills’ 
and hence the importance of interpersonal interactions in jobs is likely to 
positively affect wages of women Borghans, Ter Weel and Weinberg 
(2014). 
 
The rapid global growth of female labour force participation has been 
attributed to the growth in the services and low-cost manufacturing 
sectors. A preference for females emerged in labour intensive exporting 
countries as the firms took advantage of female stereotypes such as 
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nimble fingers, acceptance of low wages and poor working conditions 
(Elson and Pearson, 1981). The justification for hiring female workers in 
the garments sector is  also derived from the ‘nimble fingers’ hypothesis, 
where the orientation of women towards precise tasks emerges from their 
traditional designation at home and performing tasks like sewing (Elson 
and Pearson, 1981; Joekes, 1987; Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1983).  
 
Male and female students were asked to solve mazes under two 
compensation schemes: piece rates and a tournament scheme. Under the 
piece rate, each student is paid according to the mazes he/she solves and 
under the tournament scheme, only the student who solves the highest 
number of mazes is paid. No gender differences were observed in 
performance when students were paid piece rates, but males increased 
their performance in the tournament setting as males solved 40 percent 
more puzzles as compared to females. As the tournament scheme is more 
uncertain, this may reflect gender differences in risk aversion. However, 
a third scheme is implemented in which the tournament winner is 
selected at random, under this scheme no gender difference in 
performance was found. An important finding was that females perform 
as well as males if they are competing against females only. The 
performance gap in the tournament setting was attributed to the relative 
failure  to maintain a  high level  of performance when competing against 
males (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003). 
  
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) suggests that women are less likely to 
choose more variable pay schemes as compared to men as they have less 
of a taste for competition. Dohmen and Falk (2011) also provide evidence 
that women are less likely to opt for variable compensation schemes, 
however they find that this result becomes statistically weak after 





Extensive evidence has shown that individuals respond to monetary and 
non-monetary incentives, however there is no clear consensus on 
whether firms should use monetary or non-monetary rewards. The use 
of non-monetary incentives is gaining popularity in field experiments 
related to firms and employees, while some authors have suggested the 
use of both monetary and non-monetary incentives. Multi-tasking 
problems may persist with monetary schemes such that workers may 
only focus on the quantity of production and not on the quality. Other 
ways have been suggested to motivate workers to maintain quality and 
quantity, such as tying piece rates with rewards for quality. There is 
limited use of innovative management strategies in a piece rate setting in 
the past to address the quantity-quality trade off, and it would be 






















III. Data and Methodology 
 
III.A. Context 
Personnel data was analysed from a large scale vertically integrated 
denim garments production facility in Pakistan. It is located in Pindi 
Bhattian, Hafizabad district, Pakistan1. The dataset has not previously 
been used for research. The dataset was acquired through personal visits 
to the firm. The firm agreed to share the information upon the 
understanding that the data will only be used only for research purposes 
and will not be shared with any other party such as competitors and 
buyers etc. 
 
Under the production system of the firm, each worker is given a 
specialised task and the garment takes shape along the assembly line. 
Each line has a small parts, a front, a back and an assembly 1 and an 
assembly 2 section. There are screens along the assembly lines, which 
indicate the target achieved by each line and the percentage that needs 
to be completed. The firm has an average of 1400 to 1500 stitching 
operators present on the assembly line per day. 
The level of qualification for all stitching operators must be completed up 
to middle school or an equivalent level of training from religious schools 
(madrassas) is also acceptable. Different production processes require 
different training periods which range from 5 weeks to 16 weeks.  
 
Workers are hired based on an aptitude test which analyses an 
individual’s ability to see, touch and make decisions. For example, colour 
selection and placement of materials in the correct manner on the 
machine. The workers are categorised into two grades: S5 grade level and 
S4 grade level. S5 grade level workers are machine operators. S4 grade 
level workers perform non-machine tasks such as thread trimming. 
 
1 The nearest garments production facility to this firm is approximately 64 kilometres away. The firm does 
not operate in a cluster so the distance may hint at some geographical immobility for labour. 
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Workers are hired mostly from villages within a 30-kilometre radius of 
the firm. The norm in Pakistan is to hire male stitching operators and 
only 24 percent of the stitching operators are female in the woven 
garments industry (Haque, 2009; Makino, 2012)2. This firm has a higher 
female participation rate, as 40% of the stitching operators are female. 
Workers are paid piece rate plus an attendance allowance throughout the 
period of the study. 
 
Data on output per worker and quality defects per worker are recorded 
electronically. This is unusual in a country like Pakistan, as either most 
of the other firms collect data manually or those firms which collect data 
electronically, do not collect quality data per worker.   
Each worker has a unique ID and there is a barcode attached to each 
bundle. Each worker is responsible for his/her own bundle, hence the 
data is recorded at the individual level. A bundle contains 25 to 30 pieces 
of the garment which is to be stitched. The worker scans the barcode and 
his/her ID on the reader attached to each machine after the bundle is 
completed. This ensures that the worker is paid for the correct quantity 
of pieces and the payments are recorded with minimum error. 
III.B. Organisation of Production at the Firm 
As the firm is a vertically integrated unit, it buys cotton as raw material 
and sells finished garments. We will now introduce the stages of 
production. Workers at the firm are stage specific and the new quality 
management practice was introduced only in the sewing department( 
stage three of production). 
Firstly, the cotton goes through the spinning and weaving process and 
then it is finished and inspected at the Fabric Finishing and Grading 
department. The firm can use 85% to 90% of its fabric to produce 
garments, and the surplus is sold to other garment manufacturers3.  
 
2 The study by Haque (2009) reports this figure based on 150 garment factories. 
3 Source: Personal Interview with Vice President of the firm. 
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The second stage of the manufacturing process is cutting. The firm uses 
an automated machine to spread dozens of layers of fabric on a table so 
that the pieces can be cut simultaneously. The firm cuts all pieces for a 
garment from the same roll as there could be variations in the shade of 
fabric from roll to roll especially when the garment goes through chemical 
washes. A pattern is designed for cutting using Computer Aided Design 
(CAD) software. The software sets the pattern of the different pieces of the 
garment on the fabric. However, workers in the CAD section also 
rearrange the pattern set by the software to further minimise fabric 
wastage. The pattern is then laid over the fabric for cutting.  
Before the fabric is cut, it is inspected for defects, and if some defects are 
found, that portion of fabric is cut out from the roll. One of the key 
indicators of any garments manufacturer’s performance is the cut to ship 
ratio i.e. the ratio of the number of pieces cut to the number of pieces 
shipped.  The cut to ship ratio of the firm is around 103% to 105%, 
however it may rise to 107%, depending on the customer4. The firm 
usually cuts more pieces than the pieces required by the supplier, to keep 
a cushion in case there are some defected garments at the end of the 
process and some more garments may need to be stitched. After the fabric 
is cut, it is divided into bundles and transferred to the stitching unit.  
The third stage of the production process is sewing. Under the production 
system of the firm, each worker produces a part of the garment and the 
garment takes shape along the assembly line. Each line has a small parts, 
a front, a back and an assembly 1 and an assembly 2 section. At the first 
stage small parts are produced to be ready for the back and front section. 
The front and back of the jeans are stitched individually but then the 
front and back is assembled during assembly 1 and assembly 2 to 
complete the garment. As production operations are interdependent, a 
bottleneck at any stage can reduce the productivity of the line. There are 
screens along the assembly lines, which indicate the target achieved by 
each line and the percentage that needs to be completed. 
 




Line balancing is an important aspect of the way production is organised. 
The firm has an extensive industrial engineering department. The task of 
the industrial engineers is to set targets and balance the assembly line to 
minimise bottlenecks and idle time of workers. The industrial engineers 
visit the factory floor from time to time to monitor progress. The key 
measure used to balance the line is the standard minute value (SMV). 
The standard minute value is the time it takes to complete one process 
or more commonly referred to as an operation of the garment. Fewer 
stitching operators are allocated to operations that have a low SMV and 
more stitching operators are allocated to operations with a higher SMV. 
Along the assembly line, it is common to see more than 2 workers working 
on the same operation side by side. The total SMV i.e. the total time it 
takes to produce one garment along the line is calculated by adding up 
the SMV of each operation.  
The supervisory structure of the assembly lines consists of quality 
supervisors and production supervisors. Each line has 5 sections, hence 
there are 5 quality supervisors at the end of each section, 2 quality 
supervisors for random in-line quality checking and 2 quality supervisors 
at the end of the line. The allocation of workers on the line is determined 
by the Industrial Engineering department but supervisors have some 
authority in moving operators around the line. They rely on their informal 
knowledge of the skill of each worker to help balance the line in case a 
few workers are absent. Industrial engineers regularly visit the floor, on 
average once every hour, hence the supervisors often discuss the status 
of production with them. Issues such as breakdown of machines are 
discussed among supervisors and machines are transferred across lines 
with the approval of the production supervisor of the respective line. Any 
disciplinary issues that arise within the assembly lines are also handled 
by the production supervisors. Production managers are responsible for 
approving targets and resolving unforeseen incidents on the lines. 




The international standards of SMV were set by a consortium from the 
German, Swiss and Austrian National Associations, however, the firm 
uses an adjusted version of the SMV that is known as SAM (Standard 
Adjusted Minute). The SAM is calculated by giving bundle, machine, and 
personal allowances to the worker. In most cases, it is assumed that the 
worker will work at 80% capacity. For example, if the SMV of an operation 
is 0.15 minutes and the target for that order is 3000 garments, as the 
factory is in operation for 480 minutes per shift, if 100% efficiency is 
assumed then the worker can produce 3200 garments in 480 minutes 
i.e. (480/0.15). However, the factory assumes 80% efficiency and the 
worker will be able to produce 2560 pieces i.e. (3200*0.8). The firm uses 
a certain criterion to allocate the number of workers to each order. The 
number of required workers for each order is calculated by dividing the 
order size by the number of pieces the worker will be able to produce in 
one shift. In this example, 3000 divided by 2560 which gives 1.17. As the 
number of required workers is calculated to be 1.17, only one worker 
would be allocated to this task. If the SMV of an operation was 0.24, then 
the number of required workers would be 3000/1600 which would give 
us 1.88. Hence the actual number of workers allocated for this task would 
be 2. 
Dry and wet processes are the last stage of production and account for 
the largest share of value addition of denim garments. These include 
washing the fabric, and processes that damage the garment so that it 
looks more fashionable. The processes include stone washing, sand 
blasting, hand scrapping, permanent wrinkles, whiskers, application of 
potassium permanganate.  Retails tags are attached after the garment 
goes through all the processes and the garments are shipped. The firm 
produces around 300 styles of denim garments and has the capacity to 
perform 200 different denim washes. Finished items include skirts, 
shorts, jeans, and trousers. 
III.C. Descriptive Statistics 
Daily data from the firm was collected on the quantity of pieces produced 
by each worker, quality defects made by each worker, payment received 
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by each worker, age of each worker, tenure of the worker, standard 
minute value of the task performed by the worker, and gender of the 
worker. Pay only includes the piece rate portion of earnings and does not 
include the attendance allowance and the incentive received through the 
new quality management practice. The number of working hours at the 
firm are fixed, and a worker only works one shift which consists of 480 
minutes. The dataset has not been previously used for research. The 
structure of the dataset is similar to the one used by Bandiera, Barankay 
and Rasul (2005). However, they used firm level average quality figures 
to analyse the quality of production before and after the intervention. Our 
data set is more detailed as we use quality data of individual workers. 
Previous studies on the garments sector such as Makino (2012) did not 
control for the stitching speed of workers while comparing the earnings 
of males and females, however we control for the kind of task performed 
by each worker. 
The motivation behind introducing the new quality management practice 
was to incentivize workers to reduce quality defects as well as improve 
productivity as fewer quality defects mean that workers have to spend 
less time on re-work so the extra time can be spent on stitching new 
pieces. The new quality management practice was implemented on 15th 
September 2014. The new quality management practice was announced 
the same day it was implemented. The data collection period is from 1st 
August 2013 to 30th May 2016 and this period was chosen due to 
practical considerations. 
The sample of workers is restricted to 648 workers who were a part of the 
workforce of the firm throughout our period of interest i.e. from 1st August 
2013 to 30th May 2016. However, there were days when some of these 
workers were absent from the factory and were not observed5. The 
missing day-level observations for such workers were dropped out of the 
working sample. The working sample consists of 462,362 worker-day 
level observations, covering 648 workers and 782 days in total. Workers 
 
5 The factory supervisors reported various causes of absenteeism of workers. Some reasons include illness, 
caring for a sick child or an elderly member of the family, wedding in the family, and death in the family. 
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were observed for 316 days before the quality management practice was 
introduced and 466 days after the quality management practice was 
implemented. The working sample contains 183,539 worker-day level 
observations before the quality management practice was in place and 
278,823 worker-day level observations after the quality management 
practice was implemented. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
     
 Mean Minimum Maximum Observations 
Dependent Variables     
Log Quantity 6.66 0 9.60 462362 
Log Pay 5.52 0 7.20 462362 
Quantity 780.0 1 14764.0 462362 
Pay 250.0 1 1339.0 462362 
Quality defects 0.16 0 32.0 462362 
Independent Variables     
Tenure 5.11 0.33 21.16 462362 
Age 28.11 18.60 55.73 462362 
Capacity utilization 89.29 32.67 121.98 462362 
Standard Minute Value 26.1 3.18 75.0 462362 
 
Table 2.2: After-Before Differences in the Mean of Dependent Variables 
 After Before Difference 
    
Log of Quantity 6.74 6.54 0.200*** 
   (72.38) 
    
Log of Pay 5.60 5.40 0.200*** 
   (93.06) 
    
Quality Defects   -0.159*** 
 0.10 0.26 (-41.70) 
Observations 278823 183539 462362 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for key variables. The 
average of log quantity is 6.66 and log pay is 5.52, which corresponds to 
an average of 780 pieces of garments stitched per day and an average 
earnings of 29.63 Pak Rupees per day. The minimum tenure of a worker 
at the factory is 4 months and the maximum is 21.16 years. The average 
tenure at the firm is 5.11 years. The average capacity utilization of the 
firm is 89.29 percent. The minimum capacity utilization is 32.7 percent 
and the maximum is 121.98 percent. The firm reported that there have 
been instances when daily production was above the designated 
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targets/capacity.  A worker at the firm makes an average of 0.16 defects 
per day which means that on average 0.16 pieces per worker do not meet 
the quality standards set by the firm and need to be redone. The 
minimum age of a worker is 18.6 years and the maximum age is 55.73 
years, while the average age is 28.11 years. The mean of the standard 
minute value (the time it takes to complete a task) is 26 seconds; a task 
at the factory can take a minimum of 3.18 seconds and a maximum of 
75 seconds. 
Table 2.2 describes the differences in the mean of dependent variables 
before and after the introduction of the new quality management practice. 
All differences in the mean of dependent variables have been found to be 
statistically significant. Before the implementation of the new quality 
management practice, the mean of log quantity was 6.54, corresponding 
to an average of 665 pieces stitched per worker each day. After the 
implementation of the quality management practice, the average pieces 
stitched rises to 812. This signifies an increase of 22 percent. Workers 
earned an average of 221 Pak Rupees each day before the new quality 
management practice was implemented. However, the implementation of 
the quality management practice makes a significant difference to the 
average earnings of workers as workers make an average of 270 Pak 
Rupees per day. There is also a significant difference between the average 
quality defects made before and after the implementation of the quality 
management practice. Workers made an average of 0.3 quality defects 
before the quality management practice was introduced, however, after 
the introduction of the practice workers make an average of 0.1 defects 









Table 2.3: Unconditional Differences in Variables by Gender 
    
 Mean of Females Mean of Males Difference 
Log of Quantity 6.57 6.75 0.183*** 
   (67.51) 
    
Log of Pay 5.42 5.61 0.194*** 
   (92.21) 
    
Defect 0.13 0.19 0.0675*** 
   (18.02) 
    
Age 26.96 29.12 2.158*** 
   (125.85) 
    
Tenure              4.41 5.72 1.313*** 
   (116.39) 
N 215171 247191 462362 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.3 describes the differences in the mean of key variables by gender 
using data from the entire data collection period i.e. from 1st August 2013 
to 30th May 2016. All differences have found to be statistically significant.  
The average log quantity for males is 6.75 that corresponds to a 
production of 854 pieces per day. The average log quantity for females is 
6.57 which corresponds to 713 pieces produced per day. The average log 
pay for males is 5.61 while for females is 5.42. The figures correspond to 
average earnings of 273.1 Pak Rupees and 225.8 Pak Rupees per day 
respectively. Females make an average of 0.13 quality defects per day 
while males make an average of 0.19 quality defects. The average age and 
tenure of females is 26.96 years and 4.41 years respectively. For males, 
the average tenure and age is 5.72 years and 29.12 years respectively.  
 
Table 2.4: Mean for Males Before and After 
 After Before Difference 
 Males Males  
Log of Quantity 6.82 6.64 0.181*** 
   (50.00) 
Log of Pay         5.68 5.50 0.181*** 
   (64.30) 
Quality Defects 0.11 0.30 -0.192*** 
   (-33.04) 
    
Observations 149035    98156  
 
t statistics in parentheses 




Table 2.5: Mean for Females Before and After 
 After Before Difference 
 Females Females  
Log of Quantity 6.65 6.43 0.223*** 
   (52.88) 
    
Log of Pay 5.50 5.28 0.222*** 
   (68.58) 
    
Quality Defects 0.07 0.20 -0.122*** 
   (-25.51) 
Observations 129788 85383  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the mean of dependent variables for males 
and females before and after the introduction of the practice. The mean 
of dependent variables for males and females are significantly different 
before and after the implementation of the new quality management 
practice. Before the introduction of the quality management practice, the 
mean of log quantity for males is 6.64, while for females is 6.43. These 
figures correspond to an average of 765 pieces produced by males per day 
and 620 pieces produced by females per day. After the introduction of the 
quality management practice, the number of pieces stitched by males 
increases to 915 per day while for females it rises to 772 per day. This 
indicates an increase in average daily production of 19.6 percent for 
males and 35 percent for females. 
 
Males earned average earnings of 244.6 Pak Rupees before the 
implementation of the management practice, while females earned an 
average of 196.3 Pak Rupees per day. After the implementation of the 
practice, males earned an average of 292.9 Pak Rupees per day, while 
females earned an average of 244.6 Pak Rupees. This shows an increase 
in average earnings of males by 19.6 percent and of females by 24.6 
percent.  
Males made an average of 0.3 quality defects per day while females made 
an average of 0.1 quality defects per day before the quality management 
practice was introduced. After the introduction of the practice, males and 
females both make an average of 0.1 quality defects per day. This 
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indicates a decrease of 66.6 percent in the average number of quality 
defects per day for males, while a decrease of 50 percent in the average 
number of quality defects made by females. 
Worker’s pay and quantity produced will be estimated separately because 
although pay is directly proportional to quantity, it does not necessarily 
mean that workers who produce more garments will also earn more. The 
reason is that all workers do not perform the same task. Complicated 
tasks have a higher piece rate as compared to relatively simple tasks. 
Hence, workers who perform complicated tasks are paid more as 
compared to workers who perform simple tasks. 
 
III.D. Distribution of Dependent Variables 

















Figure 2: Histogram of Log Pay 
 
 
The distribution of log quantity and log pay is continuous, which 
indicates that they can be modelled using continuous regression 
methods. Fixed effects or random effects can be used to model 
continuous dependent variables on a set of independent variables. 
 
Assume the following linear model 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where the independent variable is 𝑌𝑖𝑡 such as log quantity and  𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a k-
dimensional vector of explanatory variables. The intercept term 𝛼𝑖 
captures the effects of those variables that are peculiar to the i-th 
individual and are time invariant. 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the error term. If we treat 𝛼𝑖 as an 
unobserved random variable that is correlated with the observed 
regressors 𝑋𝑖𝑡 then the model above can be referred to as a fixed effects 
model. Fixed effects estimate how changes within an individual across 
time affect their outcomes and disregard information about differences 
between individuals.  
The within estimator for 𝛽 can be written as: 
















𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (2) 
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The random effects model given in equation 2 assumes that the intercept 
for all individuals are different but are drawn from a distribution with 
mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎𝛼
2, hence the individual effects 𝛼𝑖 are treated as 
random. The assumption is that these drawings are independent of the 
explanatory variables. The error term consists of a time invariant 
component 𝛼𝑖  and a remainder component 𝜇𝑖𝑡.  𝛼𝑜 is the intercept term 
and t denotes time. 
The between estimator for 𝛽 is shown below: 
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The feasible random effects GLS estimator for 𝛽 as shown below can be 
written as the weighted average of the within and between estimator: 
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The advantage with fixed effects is that it can control for time invariant 
unobserved characteristics like gender or ethnicity. However, fixed effects 
cannot estimate the effects of time invariant characteristics. Random 
effects can be used for measuring the impact of time invariant variables, 
but the method maybe biased as it will not be able to control for time 
invariant omitted variables. The research question and interest in 
estimating time invariant characteristics are important factors to choose 
between fixed or random effects. However, when T is large and 𝜓 










Figure 3: Histograms of Quality Defects 
 
 
The distribution of the quality defects data is discrete. The variable 
quality defects varies from zero to a maximum of 32 quality defects made 
by workers per day. The histogram was  created for defects greater than 
zero. However, there are 442,690 observations (95.7 percent of the 
observations) in the sample where quality defects equal zero. The Poisson 
regression can be used to model count data.  The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 
is the number of count of events of interest and  𝑋𝑖 is the vector of 
independent variables that determine 𝑦𝑖.  
The basic Poisson regression model specifies that 𝑦𝑖 given 𝑋𝑖 is Poisson 






    where 𝑦𝑖=0,1,2,… 
 
and 𝜆𝑖 𝑖𝑠 the mean parameter  
𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝑋𝑖] = 𝜆𝑖 = exp (𝑋𝑖
′𝛽). 
 
The specification is called the exponential mean function. In the statistics 
literature, the model is also called a log-linear model, because the 
logarithm of the conditional mean is linear in the parameters: ln 𝐸[𝑦𝑖 |𝑋𝑖] =
𝑋𝑖
′𝛽. The model assumes that the mean and variance are equal. Data 
almost always reject the restriction that the variance equals the mean, 





An alternative model to be considered is the negative binomial model, 
which relaxes the assumption that mean will always equal the variance 
but maintains the assumption that mean is exp(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽) and the variance is   
𝜔𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝜆𝑖
𝑝
. 𝛿 is the dispersion parameter. The analysis is restricted to 
2 special cases (NB1 and NB2) where 𝑝=1 and 𝑝 = 2, in addition to the 
Poisson case when 𝛿 = 0. In both cases the dispersion parameter 𝛿 is a 
parameter to be estimated. 
 
For the panel data specification of the Poisson model, individual specific 
effects enter multiplicatively rather than additively. The mean for such a 
model is specified below: 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖] = 𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡 |𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖  ] = 𝛼𝑖exp (𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) 
  
𝛼𝑖 here is defined as the individual specific effect. In the fixed effects 
Poisson, 𝛼𝑖 are correlated with the regressors 𝑋𝑖 just like in the linear case 
given in equation (2). Poisson fixed effects still has the condition that 
variance should equal mean. For Poisson random effects, 𝛼𝑖 are random 
individual effects. The Poisson random effects has the distribution of 
negative binomial NB2 where 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡] = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 and  𝑉[𝑦𝑖𝑡] = 𝜆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖𝑡
2/𝛿. 𝛿 
denotes the over dispersion parameter. 
 
In a fixed effects negative binomial case, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is identically and 
independently distributed NB1 with parameters 𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡 and 𝜙𝑖. The mean is 
𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡/𝜙𝑖 and variance is (
𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝜙𝑖
) ∗ (1 +
𝛼𝑖
𝜙𝑖
). 𝛼𝑖 is the individual specific effect 
and 𝜙𝑖 is the dispersion parameter. 
 
An important restriction of this model is that 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜙𝑖 can only be 
identified up to the ratio of  𝛼𝑖/𝜙𝑖. This model has been criticised for not 
being a true fixed effects (Allison and Waterman, 2002). If  
 𝛼𝑖
𝜙𝑖
= 𝜗 then the 
conditional mean would be 𝜗𝜆𝑖𝑡 and 𝜗 is absorbed in the intercept, hence 




In a random effects negative binomial case,  𝑦𝑖𝑡 is independently and 
identically distributed NB2 with parameters 𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡  and 𝜙𝑖 , where the  
mean is 𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡/𝜙𝑖 and variance is (
𝛼𝑖𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝜙𝑖
) ∗ (1 +
𝛼𝑖
𝜙𝑖






 is a beta distributed random variable with parameters (a,b). The 
difference between the negative binomial random effects and the Poisson 
random effects is that the negative binomial allows randomness both 
across individuals and time. Hence, the negative binomial random effects 
model allows the variance of the effects to differ in the within and between 
dimensions which is similar to the specification of the disturbance term 
in the linear case given in equation (3). 
III.E. Empirical Methodology 
There is a need to understand the reason why a particular practice may 
prove to enhance performance among some entities while not among all. 
Performance is not necessarily output per hour but can also be gauged 
by the quality of production or service provided (Ichniowski and Shaw, 
2009). There have been various empirical studies on the effects of 
incentives schemes and management practices on performance of 
employees (Lazear, 2000; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005; 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003; Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi, 1997; Knez and Simester, 2001). An equation for earnings 
was included to see whether productivity changes translate into changes 
in earnings or not. 
The methodology of this research follows a similar approach used by 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005). They observed daily productivity 
of workers on a fruit farm before and after the implementation of piece 
rates. The data sample contains 10,215 worker-field-day level 
observations, covering 142 workers, 22 fields, and 108 days in total. 
Workers were paid according to relative incentives for the first 54 days 
and according to piece rates for the remaining 54 days.  
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The following panel data regression was used to measure the impact of 
the change in incentives (from relative incentives i.e. pay was dependent 
upon how the worker has performed as compared to his/her co-workers 
to piece rates). 
 𝑌𝑖𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑓 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑓𝑡 + 𝜂𝑍𝑓𝑡 + 𝜅𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑓𝑡 (3) 
Worker fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 capture time invariant determinatants of 
productivity such as innate ability. Field fixed effects  𝜆𝑓 capture time 
invariant determinants of field level productivity such as soil quality and 
plant spacing. 𝑃𝑡 represents a dummy variable which equals one when 
piece rates are in place and zero when relative incentives are in place. 𝑋𝑖𝑓𝑡 
represents worker’s picking experience, 𝑍𝑓𝑡 represents field life cycle 
(defined below), 𝑡 represents the farm level trend and 𝜇𝑖𝑓𝑡 is the 
disturbance term 
Worker picking experience is defined as the number of days the worker 
has picked fruit on the farm and the field life cycle is defined as the nth 
day the field is in operation divided by the total number of days the field 
has operated over the season. The field life cycle is intended to capture 
the trend in productivity that takes place within each field as the field 
depletes over time. The productivity of workers was found to be 50% 
higher under piece rates as compared to under relative incentives. 
The data structure used in this research is like the data set used by 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) as they also used daily data on 
workers before and after the intervention and used a dummy variable in 
the regression analysis to analyse the impact of the intervention. 
However, the type of intervention that Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 
studied (2005) is different to what is being studied in this research as 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) looked at the impact of the 
introduction of piece rates on worker productivity. However, the workers 
in our study were paid piece rate throughout the period of study while we 
are investigating the impact of a new quality management practice on 
worker productivity, earnings and quality defects.  
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The following panel data regressions are estimated to investigate the 
effect of the quality management practice on the output, earnings, and 
the number of quality defects of workers at the firm. 
𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑡 + 1𝑖𝑡  (4)  
 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the number of pieces produced by worker i on day t; 𝑃𝑡 is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the new quality management practice is in 
place and zero otherwise; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the tenure of the worker; 𝐶𝑡 is the 
capacity utilisation of the firm; 𝛾𝑖 represents the individual effect; 1𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term). 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜙1𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙3𝑋𝑖𝑡
2 + 2𝑖𝑡  (5) 
(𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the payment received by worker i on day t;  2𝑖𝑡 is the error term) 
 
 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = exp(𝛾𝑖 + 𝜓1𝑃𝑡 + 𝜓2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓3𝑋𝑖𝑡
2 + 3𝑖𝑡 ) (6)   
(𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the expected number of quality defects of each worker; 3𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term) 
 
𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑖𝑃𝑡  +
𝛽9𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑡 + 4𝑖𝑡  (7)  
 
(𝐴𝑖 is the age of each worker; 𝐺𝑖 is a dummy variable which equals one if 
the worker is female and zero when the worker is male; 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 is the 
standard minute value of the operation performed by worker i; 𝑡  is the 
firm level linear time trend and 4𝑖𝑡 is the error term). 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜙1𝑃𝑡 + 𝜙2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙3𝑋𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜙4𝐶𝑡 + 𝜙5𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙6𝐴𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜙7𝐺𝑖 + 𝜙8𝐺𝑖𝑃𝑡 +
𝜙9𝐺𝐿𝑖 + 𝜙10𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 + 𝜙11𝑡 + 5𝑖𝑡  (8)  
(𝐺𝐿𝑖  represents the grade level of the worker ; 5𝑖𝑡 is the error term) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = exp (𝛾𝑖 + 𝜓1𝑃𝑡 + 𝜓2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓3𝑋𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜓4𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓5𝐴𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜓6𝐺𝑖 +
 𝜓7𝐺𝑖𝑃𝑡+ 𝜓8𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 + 𝜓9𝑡 + 6𝑖𝑡 ) (9)   
( 6𝑖𝑡 is the error term) 
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Equations 4, 5 and 6 provide a basic model of the impact of the new 
quality management practice which is estimated using fixed effects and 
random effects. Equations (4) to (6) were estimated after splitting up the 
data by gender while equations (7) to (9) include a gender dummy. 
Splitting up the sample by gender provides differential effects on all 
variables while using the gender dummy is a more restrictive version as 
it provides a differential effect on only the variable for the new quality 
management practice. Equations 7, 8 and 9 estimate the impact of the 
new quality management practice include other variables such as gender, 
standard minute value, age, grade level of the workers and estimate the 
equation using random effects.  
Tenure of the worker (𝑋𝑖𝑡) is defined in terms of years. Productivity of a 
worker increases as he/she accumulates skills on the job (Becker, 1962). 
The age (𝐴𝑖) of each worker is defined in terms of years. A quadratic term 
for age is added as  studies related to piece rate workers show that office 
workers are productive even at older ages, while the productivity of 
factory workers fell after the age of 55 (Mark, 1957; Kutscher and Walker, 
1960). A quadratic term for tenure was added as Mincer (1974) defined 
that completion of school education does not correspond to completion of 
investment in human capital. Earnings increase with age as individuals 
invest in human capital over time. Investments are concentrated at 
younger ages but continue to grow at a diminishing rate throughout an 
individual’s life. The growth rate of earnings is a function of the amount 
invested and of the rate of return. Earnings are dependent upon the 
investment profile of an individual and the investment profile is a concave 
function of work experience. The earnings curve represents productivity 
changes throughout an individual’s lifetime; hence, both the tenure-
productivity and tenure-wage profile should increase at a diminishing 
rate. 
Capacity utilisation (𝐶𝑡) refers to the usage of the installed productive 
capacity of the firm. It is measured as the actual output divided by the 
maximum output that can be produced by the firm. Capacity utilisation 
is defined in percentage terms. An increase in capacity utilisation of the 
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factory is expected to have a positive impact on output. An interaction 
term between gender (𝐺𝑖) and the quality management practice (𝑃𝑡) was 
added which allows the effect of the quality management practice to vary 
by gender. The standard minute value (𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖) is the time it takes to 
complete a task and is measured in seconds. The standard minute value 
remains constant over time as the worker performs the same task over 
the period of observation.  The payment (𝐼𝑖𝑡) received by worker i on day t 
is calculated as the product of daily output of the worker and the piece 
rate set by the firm. Tenure of the worker and capacity utilisation are 
expected to have a positive relationship with earnings.  The grade level 
(𝐺𝐿𝑖) of the worker is a dummy variable which equals one when the grade 
is S4 and zero when the grade is S5. This has only been included in the 
pay equations and not in the productivity equations as the grade level 
determines the piece rate of the worker and is not a determinant of 
productivity. 
During factory visits, it has been observed that production supervisors 
often place more experienced workers with workers who are new to the 
factory or who are struggling with a process. Also, a common practice is 
to make a worker observe an experienced worker perform a complex 
operation until the worker understands how to do the job correctly. It is 
expected that with more experience, the expected number of quality 








Table 2.6: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Productivity by Gender 
Dependent variable: log of worker’s productivity (number of garments produced per day) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




































Tenure 0.172*** 0.0883*** 0.219*** 0.127*** 0.169*** 0.0916*** 0.217*** 0.128*** 
 (0.00355) (0.00363) (0.00405) (0.00414) (0.00347) (0.00354) (0.00401) (0.00409) 
         
Tenure-squared -0.00674*** -0.00651*** -0.00805*** -0.00765*** -0.00671*** -0.00632*** -0.00811*** -0.00750*** 
 (0.000182) (0.000180) (0.000269) (0.000265) (0.000180) (0.000178) (0.000265) (0.000261) 
         
Capacity utilization  0.00804***  0.00885***  0.00798***  0.00881*** 
  (0.0000943)  (0.000107)  (0.0000938)  (0.000106) 
         
Constant 6.073*** 5.798*** 5.828*** 5.407*** 6.087*** 5.775*** 5.829*** 5.391*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0410) (0.0411) 








Gender Male Male Female Female Male Male Female Female 
Number of 
Observations 
247191 247191 215171 215171 247191 247191 215171 215171 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2.6 presents the fixed effects and random effects estimates of the 
impact of the implementation of the new quality management practice on 
worker productivity by gender using the specification of equation 4. The 
advantage of using a fixed effects estimator is that it controls for omitted 
time-invariant variables. Fixed effects and random effects both show that 
the impact of the quality management practice is greater for males as 
compared to females6. One point to be noted is that workers were paid 
piece rates throughout the period of the study. Column (1) shows that 
the introduction of the new quality management practice increases the 
productivity of males by 5.7 percent, while column (3) shows that the 
implementation of the practice increases the productivity of females by 
2.7 percent. After including the variable for capacity utilisation, the 
magnitude of the increase in productivity for males is now 9.8 percentage 
points and for females is 7.15 percentage points. Column (2) reveals that 
an additional year of work experience at the firm increases the 
productivity of males by 8.8 percent but at a diminishing rate of 0.65 
percent. Column (4) indicates that an additional year of experience at the 
firm increases the productivity of females by 12.7 percent but at a 
diminishing rate of 0.77 percent. Capacity utilisation has a positive 
impact on worker productivity, a one percent increase in capacity 
utilisation increases the productivity of males by 0.8 percent and of 
females by 0.88 percent. 
Fixed effects do not allow the inclusion of age, tenure and time trend 
together as these variables are linearly related. Table 2.7 presents the 
random effects estimates of the impact of the new quality management 
practice on worker productivity. The number of time periods in this study 
is large, hence the random effects estimates are based on the within-
person variation. The coefficients estimated by random effects and fixed 
effects are similar and there is little bias from using random effects7. 
Random effects were preferred since we can include further controls and 
 
6 The Hausman test prefers fixed effects (see table 1 in appendix A). 
7 The result that fixed effects and random effects estimate similar coefficients for the dummy variable for the 
quality management practice can be seen in table 3 in appendix A. 
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in particular consider gender differences in productivity before and after 
the intervention.  
Table 2.7: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Productivity 
Dependent variable: log of worker’s productivity (number of garments produced per day) 
 (1) (2) 
 Log of Quantity Log of Quantity 





Tenure 0.131*** 0.126*** 
 (0.00594) (0.00591) 
   
Tenure-squared -0.00587*** -0.00559*** 
 (0.000188) (0.000185) 
   
Age 0.0780*** 0.0790*** 
 (0.00823) (0.00814) 
   
Age-squared -0.00133*** -0.00134*** 
 (0.000119) (0.000118) 
   
Female -0.124*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0299) 













   
Time trend 0.0451*** -0.0379*** 
 (0.00452) (0.00456) 
   
Capacity utilization  0.00842*** 
  (0.0000708) 
   
Constant 5.976*** 5.313*** 
 (0.138) (0.137) 
Model Random Effects Random Effects 
Number of Observations 462362 462362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The estimated results of equation 7 are presented in table 2.7. Column 
(1) reveals that the introduction of the quality management practice 
increases productivity of male workers by 3.72 percent and the 
productivity of females by 5.1 percent8. Capacity utilisation was added as 
an explanatory variable in column (2) and the results reveal that the 
 
8 Column (2) was used to analyse the main results for table 2.7. 
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introduction of the quality management practice is still positively related 
to productivity and remains statistically significant at the 1% level. 
However, the magnitude of the increase in productivity of male workers 
is now around 7.9 percentage points and of female workers is 9.4 
percentage points. 
The result that the introduction of the quality management practice is 
positively related to productivity is in line with the notion that tighter 
monitoring by the principal will induce workers to improve work effort 
levels (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Prendergast, 1999). The gender 
differences in the impact of the quality management practice may hint at 
one of the differences in psychological attributes between men and 
women. Females are found to be more agreeable than males (Bertrand, 
2011; Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001; Mueller and Plug, 2006; Nyhus and 
Pons, 2012). Agreeableness in this case refers to females being more 
compliant as compared to males. 
The gender dummy in column (2) indicates that females produce 12.5 
percent less than males before the quality management practice was 
implemented. The introduction of the quality management practice has 
an incremental impact on the productivity of females, and it reduces the 
gender productivity gap. The introduction of the quality management 
practice reduces the gender productivity gap by 1.48 percent, but females 
still produce 11 percent less as compared to males. Females usually put 
in more time and effort on housework as compared to males, hence this 
may induce a lower effort into market jobs (Becker, 1985). 
An additional year of tenure increases productivity by 12.6 percent but 
with diminishing returns of 0.6 percent per annum. The return to 
experience becomes zero at about 11.3 years of tenure9.  
Capacity utilisation has a positive impact on worker productivity, a one 
percent increase in capacity utilisation increases worker productivity by 
0.84 percent. An additional year of age increases productivity by 7.9 
 
9 The turning point has been calculated using column (2) of table 2.7. .𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 0.126𝑇 − 0.0059𝑇2;0.126 −




percent but at a diminishing rate of 0.13 percent per year. The turning 
point for age is 29.4 years, hence after the age of 29.4 years, age has a 
negative impact on productivity10. 
Worker’s perform the same task over the period of observation, however, 
the coefficient for the standard minute value indicates that a task that 
takes an additional second is likely to reduce the output of workers by 
3.3 percent. 
Table 2.8: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Worker's Pay 
Dependent variable: log of worker’s pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 













Tenure 0.171*** 0.218*** 0.161*** 0.209*** 
 (0.00353) (0.00403) (0.00329) (0.00388) 
     
Tenure-squared -0.00672*** -0.00801*** -0.00680*** -0.00819*** 
 (0.000182) (0.000268) (0.000173) (0.000252) 
     
Constant 4.939*** 4.684*** 4.992*** 4.716*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0119) (0.0204) (0.0212) 




Gender Male Female Male Female 
Number of 
Observations 
247191 215171 247191 215171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The estimated results of equation 5 are presented in table 2.8. Fixed 
effects and random effects were used to estimate the impact of the 
implementation of the new quality management practice on worker’s pay 
by gender11. Column (1) indicates that the implementation of the quality 
management practice increases the earnings of males by 5.7 percent.  An 
additional year of tenure increases the earnings of male workers by 17.1 
percent but at a diminishing rate of 0.67 percent. Column (2) reveals that 
the implementation of the quality management practice increases the 
earnings of females by 2.73 percent. An additional year of tenure 
increases the earnings of females by 21.8 percent but at a diminishing 
rate of 0.8 percent. Fixed effects do not allow the inclusion of age, tenure 
 
10 𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 0.079𝐴 − 0.00134𝐴
2; 0.079 − 0.00268𝐴 = 0; 𝐴 = 29.4. 
11 The Hausman test shows that fixed effects are preferred in this case (See table 1 in appendix A). 
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and time trend together as these variables are linearly related. Table 2.9 
presents the random effects estimates of the effect of the implementation 
of the new quality management practice on worker’s pay. These results 
are preferred since we can include other variables and consider gender 
differences in worker’s pay before and after the intervention. 
 
Table 2.9: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Worker's Pay 






































Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.9 illustrates the estimated results of equation 8. The earnings of 
male workers increase by 3.7 percent after the new quality management 
 (1) 
 Log of Pay 







































was implemented while the earnings of female workers are expected to 
increase by 5.1 percent. A point to be noted is that the introduction of 
the quality management practice is positively related to both productivity 
as shown in table 2.7, see column (2) and worker’s pay. Our estimates 
indicate that workers earn more by improving effort levels. 
The gender variable in column (2) of table 2.7 indicates that females are 
12.5 percent less productive than males before the new practice was 
implemented; however, the male-female earnings gap is around 16 
percent before the introduction of the quality management practice. 
However, after the introduction of the practice, females are 11 percent 
less productive as compared to males and earn 14.6 percent less than 
males. 
The result that females earn less than males is in line with Makino (2012) 
who revealed that female stitching operators in Pakistan earn 18.2 
percent less than males after controlling for factors like education, 
experience, marital status, type of firm, city, and work hours. However, 
the estimates do not consider the stitching speed of workers.  
We have included a variable for SMV which controls for the task 
performed by workers. There are 230 different tasks performed by 
workers in our sample.12. As shown in table 2.7, a task that tasks an 
additional second decreases the output of workers by 3.3 percent, 
however, table 2.9 shows that a task that takes an additional second 
increases worker’s pay by 0.38 percent. 
An additional year of tenure increases earnings by 13.3 percent but with 
diminishing returns of 0.6 percent per annum. The return to tenure 
becomes zero at 11.5 years13. An additional year of age increases earnings 
by 7.4 percent but with a diminishing rate of 0.13 percent per year. The 
turning point for age is approximately at 28.1 years14, after which age 
has a negative impact on worker’s pay. 
 
12 These 230 tasks were divided into 45 groups according to the standard minute value such that if two tasks 
have the same standard minute value then the piece rate is the same.  Although most of the tasks are 
performed both by males and females but task group 1,5 and 14 are performed only by females and task 
group 7,11,12,18 and 25 are performed only by males (see table 2 in appendix A). 
13 𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 0.133𝑇 − 0.00597𝑇
2; 0.133 − 0.01158𝑇 = 0; 𝑇 = 11.5. 
14 𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 0.0743A − 0.00132𝐴




Table 2.10: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Quality Defects (Poisson) 
Dependent Variable: quality defects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Quality Defects Quality Defects Quality Defects Quality Defects 












Tenure -0.274*** -0.375*** -0.230*** -0.331*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0204) (0.0144) (0.0201) 
     
Tenure-squared -0.00195** 0.00431*** 0.000495 0.00569*** 
 (0.000774) (0.00132) (0.000706) (0.00120) 
     
Constant   0.494*** -0.0505 
   (0.153) (0.158) 
/     
lnalpha   1.351*** 1.487*** 
   (0.0675) (0.0743) 
Model Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects Random Effects 
Gender Male Female Male Female 
Number of 
Observations 
224553 176583 247191 215171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Ln alpha refers to the log transformed dispersion parameter mentioned for the Poisson random effects model 
in section III.C. ln_r and ln_s refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the dispersion is assumed 
to follow a Beta (r, s) distribution. 
The estimated results of equation 6 have been reported in tables 2.10 and 
2.11. Table 2.10 illustrates the impact of the new quality management 
practice on the expected number of quality defects made by workers 
using a Poisson random and fixed effects model15. Columns (1) and (2) 
indicate that the implementation of the quality management practice 
decreases the expected number of quality defects of males by 44 percent16 
and the expected number of quality defects of females by 38.7 percent 
respectively. An additional year of tenure decreases the expected number 
of quality defects of males by 2417 percent at a diminishing rate of 0.2 
percent. An additional year of tenure decreases the expected number of 
quality defects of females by 31.3 percent but an increasing rate of 0.43 
percent. 
 
15 Hausman test illustrates that fixed effects are preferred (see appendix A). 
16 The coefficient has been interpreted as when the dummy variable for the new quality management 





Table 2.11: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Quality Defects 
(Negative Binomial) 
Dependent variable: quality defects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Quality Defects Quality Defects Quality Defects Quality Defects 













Tenure 0.0467*** 0.179*** 0.0466*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0148) (0.0107) (0.0147) 
     
Tenure-squared -0.00445*** -0.00902*** -0.00438*** -0.00908*** 
 (0.000613) (0.001000) (0.000607) (0.000989) 
     
Constant -2.412*** -3.120*** -2.414*** -3.121*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0439) (0.0353) (0.0437) 
/     
ln_r   0.0640 -0.0574 
   (0.0783) (0.0887) 
     
ln_s   -0.478*** -0.771*** 
   (0.0745) (0.0842) 




Gender Male Female Male Female 
Number of 
Observations 
224553 176583 247191 215171 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Ln alpha refers to the log transformed dispersion parameter mentioned for the Poisson random effects model 
in section III.C. ln_r and ln_s refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the dispersion is assumed 
to follow a Beta (r, s) distribution. 
 
Table 2.11 uses a similar functional form as table 2.10 and estimates the 
impact of the quality management practice on the expected number of 
quality defects using a negative binomial fixed effects and random effects 
model18. Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the implementation of the 
quality management practice decreases the expected number of quality 
defects of males by 26.1 percent and of females by 27.5 percent. An 
additional year of tenure increases the expected number of quality defects 
of males by 4.7 percent at a diminishing rate of 0.5 percent. However, for 
females an additional year of tenure increases the expected number of 
quality defects by 18 percent but at a diminishing rate of 0.9 percent. 
There are other covariates that were included to estimate the quality 
defects equation in table 2.12. These estimates are preferred since they 
allow us to include other controls and analyze gender differences before 
 
18 Random effects were preferred by the Hausman test.  
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and after the introduction of the new quality management practice. 
Table 2.12: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Quality Defects 
Dependent variable: quality defects  
 (1) (2) 
 Quality Defects Quality Defects 




Tenure 0.0188 0.0459*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0102) 
   
Tenure-squared 0.00106 -0.00222*** 
 (0.000873) (0.000584) 
   
Age 0.0600 0.0796*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0194) 
   
Age-squared -0.00125** -0.00124*** 
 (0.000565) (0.000312) 
   
Female -0.131 -0.0726** 
 (0.145) (0.0290) 













   
Time trend -0.329*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0174) 
   
Constant -3.177*** -5.147*** 
 (0.647) (0.284) 
   
Ln alpha 1.103***  
 (0.0495)  
   
ln_r  -0.0891 
  (0.0578) 
   
ln_s  -0.568*** 
  (0.0568) 
 
Log Likelihood -179697.95 -105408.64 
Model Poisson Random Negative Binomial 
Random 
Number of Observations 462362 462362 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Ln alpha refers to the log transformed dispersion parameter mentioned for the Poisson random effects model 
in section III.C. ln_r and ln_s refer to ln(r) and ln(s), where the inverse of one plus the dispersion is assumed 




The estimated results of equation 919 are illustrated in table 2.12. The 
Poisson random effects and negative binomial random effects models 
both were run for the model specified in equation 9. A large increase in 
the log likelihood was observed when the negative binomial random 
effects were estimated. The Poisson regression model shows that ln alpha 
is significant, indicating that over dispersion exists and Poisson was not 
the correct specification for the model. The negative binomial random 
effects model has an advantage over the Poisson random effects model as 
it allows the variance of the effects to differ in the within and between 
dimensions. Hence, the negative binomial random effects specification, 
see column (2) was chosen to interpret the results.  
The estimates for quality defects paint a slightly different picture as 
compared to the estimates for productivity and earnings. After the 
implementation of the new quality management practice, the expected 
number of quality defects made by males decrease by 14.7 percent20. The 
magnitude of the impact of the quality management practice for females 
is less than that of males, as the expected number of quality defects made 
by females decrease by only 4.27 percent. 
The average number of quality defects made by females were 7.1 percent 
lower than the average number of quality defects made by males before 
the quality management practice. This finding can be linked to one of the 
differences in personality traits of males and females; females are found 
to be more conscientious than males (Mueller and Plug, 2006; Goldin, 
Katz and Kuziemko, 2006)21.Positive correlation between 
conscientiousness and job performance has been reported (Barrick and 
Mount, 1991). Conscientiousness refers to being more organized, dutiful, 
disciplined, and deliberate. The result is also in line with the findings of 
 
19 Equation 9 was also estimated using random effects where the dependent variable is not the number of 
quality defects made but defects is a proportion of output produced(defect/quantity) for each worker. The 
results do not change much as the signs for the coefficients for the quality management practice, female, 
interaction term between the quality management practice and female, standard minute value and time 
trend remain the same and are significant. However, tenure, tenure-squared, age and age-squared are not 
significant in this case. The results are available in table 2.12A in appendix A. 
20 The coefficient has been interpreted as when the dummy variable for the new quality management 
practice equals one, it brings about a  (𝑒−0.158 − 1 = −0.147) × 100% change in the average number of quality 
defects. 
21 Factory supervisors of the firm also confirm that females generally make fewer quality defects as they pay 
more attention to detail and precision and this differentiation maybe attributed to the differences in innate 
abilities and personality traits of men and women. 
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Heywood, Siebert and Wei (2013) such that males have a higher error 
rate than females. 
Female participation in the garments industry of Pakistan is lower in 
Pakistan when compared to other garment manufacturing economies. 
Hiring female operators on a fixed wage is common in China and 
Bangladesh while hiring male workers on piece rates is common in 
Pakistan (Makino, 2012). The justification for hiring female workers is 
also derived from the ‘nimble fingers’ hypothesis, where the orientation 
of women towards precise tasks emerges from their traditional 
designation at home and performing tasks like sewing (Elson and 
Pearson, 1981; Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1983; Joekes, 1987).  
The results are also in line with the findings of Haque (2009) who revealed 
that managers of garment firms think that females produce better quality 
work, waste less time and are more loyal, honest, and punctual than their 
male colleagues. However, the efficiency rate which is based on stitching 
speed is lower for females than males. Managers prefer female stitching 
operators if firms can fetch orders for medium to high quality garments 
because the quality of work provided by females compensates for their 
low stitching speed.  
The quality management practice has a dampening effect on the 
performance of females as compared to males in terms of quality defects. 
After the introduction of the practice, the average number of quality 
defects made by females were 3.3 percent higher than the average 
number of quality defects made by males. Two alternating theories seem 
to be at work here. An external intervention is expected to improve effort 
levels of a self-interested agent, as he/she would minimise the possibility 
of a sanction if caught shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Prendergast, 
1999; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, the crowding out hypothesis 
derived from social psychology (Frey, 1993) illustrates an alternative view; 
an external intervention may reduce an agent’s self-esteem as the worker 
may feel that his/her intrinsic motivation is not being appreciated hence 
would reduce effort. Agents who have high intrinsic motivation may also 
see external interventions as a sign of distrust.  
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The quality management practice seems to target the shirking behaviour 
of males as it has a greater impact on reducing the quality defects made 
by males but has a lower impact on females who were making relatively 
fewer quality defects before the implementation of the practice. 
Generally, both the disciplining and crowding effect are active; external 
intervention may have two opposing effects on the performance of 
workers. The benefit of the intervention to the principal depends upon 
the relative magnitudes of both the effects (Frey and Jegen, 2001). The 
worsening of the relative performance of females after the implementation 
of the practice supports the crowding out theory. The crowding out effect 
seems to be stronger for females as compared to males. However, the 
disciplining effect of the new management practice seems to be dominant 
as the implementation of the new quality management practice decreases 
the expected number of quality defects made by females and males. 
It was expected that workers with more experience would produce fewer 
quality defects, however the results indicate that an additional year of 
tenure increases the expected number of quality defects by 4.6 percent 
but with a diminishing rate of 0.23 percent per annum. The return to 
tenure becomes zero after accumulating 10.2 years of experience at the 
firm22. An additional year of age increases the expected number of quality 
defects by 8.28 percent but at a diminishing rate of 0.13 percent. The 
defects equation shows that the turning point for age is 31.8 years23. 
 
The coefficient of the standard minute value variable shows that a task 
that takes an additional second is likely to increase the expected number 
of quality defects by 4.6 percent, indicating that the longer a task takes, 





22 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = exp (0.0459𝑇 − 0.00222𝑇
2); 0.0469 − 0.0046𝑇 = 0; 𝑇 = 10.2. 
23 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = exp(0.0796𝐴 − 0.00124𝐴




This research provides evidence of the impact of an innovative quality 
management practice by comparing worker’s performance in terms of 
productivity and quality defects before and after the implementation of 
the practice. The estimated results complement the principal-agent 
theory.  
The research follows a similar methodology to that used by Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul (2005). They used firm level average quality figures 
to show that the quality of production did not change significantly after 
the intervention; however, this does not clarify how the quality of 
production at the worker level changed. Our research analyses data on 
the quality defects of individual workers at a garments factory to show 
that the quality defects made by all workers were significantly reduced 
after the implementation of the new quality management practice. 
Although the magnitude of the impact varies between men and women. 
The detailed data set analysed in this study is unique as it has never been 
used for empirical work before and allows us to analyse gender 
differences in productivity and quality defects. 
The estimates reveal that the productivity of female workers increases by 
9.4 percent, while the productivity of male workers significantly increases 
by 7.9 percent after the quality management practice was introduced. 
This increase in productivity also translates into higher earnings for both 
males and females. The earnings of females increase by 5.1 percent after 
the implementation of the practice while the earnings of males increase 
by 3.7 percent. Females earned 16 percent less than males before the 
quality management practice was implemented. The introduction of the 
quality management practice also reduces the gender earnings gap. 
Female workers made significantly lower quality defects than male 
workers before the quality management practice was introduced. 
However, the introduction of the management practice has an adverse 
impact on the performance of females with regards to the number of 
quality defects as females make 3.3 percent more quality defects than 
males. The adverse effect on the performance of females can be linked to 
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the crowding out hypothesis (Frey, 1993), as external interventions 
maybe seen as signals of distrust and hence induce agents to reduce 
effort levels. The crowding out effect is stronger for females than for 
males. However, the overall impact of the practice on quality defects 
cannot be ignored as the average number of quality defects made by male 
workers are expected to decrease by 14.7 percent while the expected 
number of defects of females are expected to decrease by 4.27 percent. 
The quality management practice seems to target and minimise the 
shirking behaviour of workers as it has a greater impact on reducing the 
quality defects made by males who were making more quality defects 
before the intervention as compared to females, while the impact of the 
practice is of a smaller magnitude for females. 
It has often been mentioned that piece rates lead to a misallocation of 
tasks as workers concentrate on quantity rather than quality. However, 
this study confirms that the payment mechanism does not have to 
change to motivate workers to perform better and incentives attached 
with piece rates can improve quality and quantity simultaneously. 
Availability of information on how changes in productivity or quality 
defects after the implementation of the new practice translate into the 
profit of this firm would be an advantage to motivate other firms to 
introduce motivational practices on the assembly line. 
One of the limitations of the study is that there is no control group. 
However, throughout the period of observation, the technology used by 
the operators, other management practices at the firm, number of hours 
worked, compensation mechanisms remained the same, hence our 
estimates are reliable. Currently there is a wide gap between academia 
and the industry in Pakistan. Government policies to disseminate 
academic research on management practice would be helpful in bridging 
the gap between academia and industry. Information on the success of 
management practices may incentivise other firms to come up with firm 
specific management practices and help the garments industry improve 





Table 1: Hausman Test 













34.61 55.9 13.51 17.90 
 Quality Equations 
 Poisson (Random vs 
Fixed)- 
Negative Binomial 
Fixed vs Random 
 Male Female Male  Female 
Chi-
squared 
130 98.9 3.42 6.58 
 Pay equations   
 Male Female   
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Table 2: Piece Rate by Tasks 





82389 Gap Zipper 1 0.053 0.05 Female 
13608 Att. Rt. Fly to zip 2 0.068 0.06 Male 
102130 Att. Rt. Fly to zip 2 0.068 0.06 Female 
102269 Att. Rt. Fly to zip 2 0.068 0.06 Female 
4421 Att. Zip to left fly 2 0.068 0.06 Male 
7391 Att. Zip To Left Fly 2 0.068 0.06 Male 
12125 Att. Zip to left fly 2 0.068 0.06 Female 
111427 Att. Zip to left fly 2 0.068 0.06 Female 
7498 Fold & serge left fly 3 0.074 0.07 Male 
70625 Fold & serge left fly 3 0.074 0.07 Female 
120744 Fold & serge left fly 3 0.074 0.07 Male 
123060 Serge Flap 3 0.074 0.07 Male 
61118 Serge Round Left & Right Flies 
& bottom 
3 0.074 0.07 Male 
123539 Button Hole 4 0.075 0.07 Male 
131417 Button Hole 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
12727 Button Hole & Stud 4 0.075 0.07 Male 
61102 Button Hole & Stud 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
102296 Button hole & Stud 4 0.075 0.07 Male 
110143 Button Hole /stud 4 0.075 0.07 Male 
61588 Button Hole and Stud 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
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123643 Button Hole Flap 4 0.075 0.07 Male 
130060 LoopTacking 4 0.075 0.07 Male 
70457 Mark Emb 4 0.075 0.05 Female 
60758 Serge round Lft Fly 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
111201 Serge watch Pkt Mouth 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
62068 Tack Loop With Shell 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
131394 Tack Loop With Shell 4 0.075 0.07 Female 
11638 Att. Slider & stopper 5 0.115 0.10 Female 
120382 Att. Slider & stopper 5 0.115 0.10 Female 
123072 Align fusing waist band 6 0.12 0.11 Male 
121697 Cut band corners 6 0.12 0.11 Female 
130081 Cut band corners 6 0.12 0.11 Male 
120290 Mrk Btn Hole 6 0.12 0.11 Female 
131484 Make & Fuse Loop-5 /Cut 
Loop 
7 0.125 0.11 Male 
62225 Make & fuse loops 7 0.125 0.11 Male 
110283 Make & fuse loops 7 0.125 0.11 Male 
80146 Make & Fuse Loops-6 & Cut 7 0.125 0.11 Male 
120318 Make & Fuse Loops-6 & Cut 7 0.125 0.11 Male 
81953 Att Stud 8 0.13 0.12 Male 
120967 Att. Stud 8 0.13 0.12 Male 
130055 Att. Stud 8 0.13 0.12 Female 
131337 Top Stich Wb Bottomside 8 0.13 0.12 Female 
81027 Bartack at inseam Crotch 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
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100821 Bartack at inseam Crotch 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
122941 Bartack at inseam Crotch 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
122669 Bartack Fly 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
9706 Bartack Fly-2 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
92249 Bartack fly-2 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
110107 Bartack Fly-2 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
131354 Bartack inner sides 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
111571 Bartack Label 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
110801 Bartack Label-1 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
63621 Bartack lable 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
111204 Bartack lable 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
130730 Bartack lable 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
60137 Bartack Pkt Bag 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
130065 Bartack Pkt Bag 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
11178 Bartack sides 9 0.14 0.13 Male 
61949 Bartack Sides 9 0.14 0.13 Female 
3554 Att Waist Label 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
3945 Button Hole-2 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
12931 CBE 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
101400 CBE 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
9838 Close Band End 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
123014 Close Band End 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
100387 Close band end &cuff end 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
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6748 Close Band Ends 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
71148 Close band ends 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
110613 Close band ends 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
120458 Hem Watch Pkt 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
70948 Hem watch pkt (Chain) 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
120555 Hem watch pkt (Chain) 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
131288 Hem Watch Pkt (DNLS) 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
7791 Hem watch pkt (Mnl SNCS) 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
110983 Hem watch pkt (Mnl SNCS) 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
130097 Label Packing 10 0.15 0.11 Female 
130759 Label Packing 10 0.15 0.11 Female 
131329 Label Packing 10 0.15 0.11 Female 
102397 Label Tacking 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
130054 Label Tacking 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
123544 Marking Bottom 10 0.15 0.11 Male 
110111 Press watch pkt 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
81904 Press watch Pkts (Left Top 
side) 
10 0.15 0.14 Female 
10207 Serge Right Pnl Till Crotch 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
110046 Serge Right Pnl upto crotch 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
101901 Serge Right Pnl with Fly 10 0.15 0.14 Female 
120490 Serge Right Pnl With Fly 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
130101 Serge Right Pnl With Fly 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
130792 Tack Slit 10 0.15 0.14 Male 
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81819 Turn Garment 11 0.161 0.11 Male 
101919 Turn Garment 11 0.161 0.11 Male 
130082 Bartack Inner Side-2 12 0.175 0.16 Male 
92105 2nd seam J 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
102498 2nd seam J 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
8801 Att. Leather Patch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
9627 Att. Leather Patch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
80639 Att. Leather Patch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
100035 Att. Leather Patch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
120286 Att. Leather Patch 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
11560 Bartack Fly (Outer) 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
120973 Bartack Fly-2 (inner+outer) 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
111746 Bartack Hip stitch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
131313 Bartack Hip Stitch 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
130028 Bartack secure chain 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
130032 Bartack secure chain 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
130039 Bartack secure chain 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
130740 Bartack secure chain 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
120452 Bartack Wt Pkt-2 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
120719 Bartack Wt Pkt-2 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
130768 Diagonal Cut 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
7383 J Stich 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
12930 J Stich 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
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131316 J Stich 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
120082 J stitch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
131355 J stitch 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
122906 Join Crotch 2nd Seam 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
110196 Leather Patch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
123538 Marking Bottom Slit 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
111955 Mock stitch bk pkt 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
101180 Press Placket 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
123403 Serge Bone BK.PKT Strips 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
131338 Serge Bone BK.PKT Strips 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
120498 Stay Frnt pkt 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
12261 Stay Front Pkt 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
13724 Stay Front Pkt 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
90451 Stay Front Pkt 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
123073 Stay Front Pkt 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
120262 Stay front pkt (Top only) 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
131443 Stay front pkt (Top only) 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
131387 Tack Bottom 13 0.2 0.18 Female 
130721 2nd seam croch 13 0.2 0.18 Male 
130755 Att. Binding to Lft& Right Fly-
1 
14 0.225 0.20 Female 
71567 Paste fusing to out band 15 0.23 0.21 Male 
101208 Paste fusing waist band 15 0.23 0.21 Male 
102509 Paste fusing waist band 15 0.23 0.21 Female 
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120542 Paste fusing waist band 15 0.23 0.21 Female 
130040 Paste fusing waist band 15 0.23 0.21 Female 
130042 5 point Band Marking 16 0.24 0.17 Female 
100382 Mark Hi Low & Fell Shoulder 16 0.24 0.17 Female 
131414 Marking collar and band 16 0.24 0.17 Male 
130084 Marking for Finished loops 16 0.24 0.17 Male 
131284 Marking for Finished loops 16 0.24 0.17 Female 
130108 Marking for Finished Loops-5 16 0.24 0.17 Male 
122323 Slit Cut and unpick  thread 16 0.24 0.22 Female 
100980 Tack  Band Ends 16 0.24 0.22 Male 
120521 Tack  Band Ends 16 0.24 0.22 Male 
111166 Unpick chain sleeve 16 0.24 0.22 Female 
123076 2nd seam  watch Pkt (Mtrd) 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
101187 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
12770 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
70966 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
102088 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
102264 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
102274 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
102557 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
110010 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
110011 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
120977 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
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122931 2nd Seam Back Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
123018 2nd Seam Flap 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
122493 2nd seam top flap 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
13606 2nd Sean Watch Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
122688 Att strips(2) to bk pkt bag 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
123525 Att strips(2) to bk pkt bag 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
110114 Att watch Pkt (Mtrd) 1st seam 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
111165 Att watch Pkt (Mtrd) 1st seam 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
122523 Att watch Pkt (Mtrd) 1st seam 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
110101 Att Wt Pkt-Mittered-Left-2 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
111941 Att Wt Pkt-Mittered-Rt-1 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
122670 Att Wt Pkt-Mittered-Rt-1 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
60905 Att. Rt. Fly to zip/ Fly hole 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
120284 Att. Rt. Fly to zip/ Fly hole 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
131318 Att. Rt. Fly to zip/ Fly hole 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
4721 Att. Stud- Mnl 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
131302 Bartack @ Slit 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
71451 Fold & Att Zip To Right Fly 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
122963 Fold & Att Zip To Right Fly 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
7461 Fold & Attach Zip to RT Fly 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
101033 Join Crotch 1st seam 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
92462 Join Crotch Ist Seam 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
100704 Keep label in poly bag and 
tcking 
17 0.25 0.23 Female 
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120413 Ovr lock Arm Hole 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
112010 Sew Collar and Turn 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
120195 Sew Collar and Turn 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
120543 Show Stitch @ Wt Pkt 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
123555 Sleeve close and side 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
130812 Sleeve close and side 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
110110 Straigt Cut 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
123007 Top Collar 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
81760 Top Stitch Bone Pkt and Set 
Strip 
17 0.25 0.23 Male 
111425 Top Stitch Bone Pkt and Set 
Strip 
17 0.25 0.23 Female 
101159 Top Stitch Yoke 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
120956 Top Stitch Yoke 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
121373 Tuck  plaket from Neck and 
turn 
17 0.25 0.23 Female 
71508 Tucking and Att. Rt. Fly to zip 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
81710 Turn Bone 17 0.25 0.23 Male 
130131 Turn Bone 17 0.25 0.23 Female 
10588 Att.Woven Label 18 0.26 0.23 Male 
12933 Edge stitch 19 0.27 0.24 Female 
81319 Edge stitch 19 0.27 0.24 Female 
102697 Edge stitch 19 0.27 0.24 Male 
110068 Edge stitch 19 0.27 0.24 Male 
131468 Edge stitch 19 0.27 0.24 Male 
84 
 
1260 Edge Stitch Left Fly 19 0.27 0.24 Female 
111575 Edge Stitch Left Fly 19 0.27 0.24 Female 
90144 Set & Top Stitch Left Fly 19 0.27 0.24 Male 
3546 Top Stitch Right Fly 20 0.275 0.25 Female 
70299 Top Stitch Right Fly 20 0.275 0.25 Male 
120207 J/Stitch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
1665 Join Crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
2131 Join Crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
7390 Join crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
11175 Join crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
11600 Join crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
71420 Join Crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
130696 Join crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
71424 J-Stitch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
82188 J-Stitch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
111200 J-Stitch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
131332 J-Stitch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
101178 Set Crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Female 
4157 Topstitch crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
70845 Topstitch crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
120585 Topstitch crotch 21 0.28 0.25 Male 
2828 Topstitch Rt. Fly & Hem 
crotch 
21 0.28 0.25 Male 
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9529 Topstitch Rt. Fly & Hem 
crotch 
21 0.28 0.25 Male 
92247 Topstitch Rt. Fly & Hem 
crotch 
21 0.28 0.25 Male 
101173 Topstitch Rt. Fly & Hem 
crotch 
21 0.28 0.25 Male 
111466 Topstitch band 22 0.289 0.26 Male 
123037 Topstitch band 22 0.289 0.26 Female 
130771 Topstitch band 22 0.289 0.26 Female 
101341 Att. Yokes 23 0.29 0.26 Male 
102076 Att. Yokes 23 0.29 0.26 Female 
111172 Att. Yokes 23 0.29 0.26 Female 
130094 Att. Yokes 23 0.29 0.26 Male 
130557 Att. Yokes 23 0.29 0.26 Female 
131301 Att. Yokes 23 0.29 0.26 Female 
12759 Join Yoke 23 0.29 0.26 Male 
130021 Att Wt Pkt-Mt 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
111564 Att. Facing Cover 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
120519 Att. Facing Cover 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
121388 Att. Facing Cover 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
82454 Att. Facing to Pkt Bag 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
102688 Att. Facing To Pkt Bag 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
130098 Att. Facing To Pkt Bag (cover 
stitch) 
24 0.3 0.27 Female 
10093 Att. Facing To Pkt Bag SNLS 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
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101399 Att. Facing To Pkt Bag(Cover) 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
61134 Att. Fly stud 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
6721 Att. Revits 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
72086 Att. Revits 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
92558 Att. Revits 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
90115 Att. Rivits-4 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
90823 Att. Rivits-4 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
123008 Att. Rivits-4 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
123015 Att. Rivits-4 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
10247 Att. Watch Pkt 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
7923 Att. Watch pkt (Mitered) 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
81505 Att. Watch pkt (Mitered) 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
92002 Att. Watch pkt (Mitterd) 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
100820 Att. Watch pkt (Mitterd) 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
71398 Att.Watch Pkt 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
131314 Att.Watch Pkt 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
131289 Cut & turn bone opening 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
121379 Cut corner  and Turn Flap 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
123045 Cut corner  and Turn Flap 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
102838 Cutt Corner and turn slit 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
122118 Cutt Corner and turn slit 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
102066 First Seam 7" 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
81316 Hem back pkt (LS)/Helper 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
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101923 Hem back pkt (LS)/Helper 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
81705 Hem Bk Pkt 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
11004 Hem Bk Pkt (SNLS) 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
11197 Hem Bk Pkt (SNLS) 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
123012 Hem Bk Pkt (SNLS) 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
63441 Hem Bk Pkt CS (Mnl) 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
111988 Hem Wt Pkt Mouth and bk Pkt 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
82409 Hip Stitch 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
131431 Hip Stitch 24 0.3 0.27 Male 
102263 HipStitch 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
120623 Top Stitch Back Tab 24 0.3 0.27 Female 
121548 Marking for attach bk pkt 25 0.32 0.23 Male 
60942 Top Stitch Inseam 26 0.345 0.31 Male 
120339 Top Stitch Inseam 26 0.345 0.31 Male 
130115 Top Stitch Inseam 26 0.345 0.31 Female 
102812 2nd Seam 7 inch 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
123089 3rd Seam 7 inch 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
111838 Allign patch and Bottom Stitch 
Bone Pkt and secure side 
27 0.35 0.32 Male 
71458 Back seam 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
100819 Back seam 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
122973 Back seam 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
130053 Back seam 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130727 Back seam 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
88 
 
101002 Bartack back pkt 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130011 Bartack back pkt 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
8544 Bartack Bk Pkt 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
120307 Bartack Bk Pkt 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
12409 Bartack Bk Pkt-4 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
90124 Bartack Bk Pkt-4 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
111957 Bartack Bk Pkt-4 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
131462 Bartack Bk Pkt-4 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130132 Bartack Bone 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
63341 Hem back pkt (DNCS) 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
11932 Join Seat Seam 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
122978 Join Seat Seam 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
123050 Join Seat Seam 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
131069 Join Seat Seam 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
123059 Make Slit at Hem Bottom Side 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
102678 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
111565 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
120734 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
121190 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
123020 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130061 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
130089 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
131494 Press band crease 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
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101864 Press band edge 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
130069 Press band edge 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
61221 Press busted 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
81328 Press busted 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
101917 Press busted 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
110098 Press Busted 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
122926 Press busted 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
130019 Press busted 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130038 Press Busted 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
122980 Press Busted Seam 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
130719 Seat Seam 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
61406 Set flap 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
123547 Set Flap 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
123551 SN 27 0.35 0.32 Male 
131390 SN 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
123047 Turn band corners 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130076 Turn band corners 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130088 Turn band corners 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
130012 Turn Band Ends 27 0.35 0.32 Female 
61059 Bartack Belt Loops-5 (AUTO) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
91983 Bartack Belt Loops-5 (AUTO) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
102270 Bartack Belt Loops-5 (AUTO) 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
60206 Bartack loops (Auto) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
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92470 Bartack loops (Auto) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
102248 Bartack loops (Auto) 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
110279 Bartack loops (Auto) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
122443 Bartack loops (Auto) 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
123061 Bartack loops (Auto) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
100977 Bartack sleeve, Hanger loop 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
13761 Hem Bottom 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
12006 Hem Bottom- 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
1756 Hem Bottom SNCS 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
13320 Hem Bottom SNCS 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
90572 Hem Bottom SNCS 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
1331 Hem bottoms 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
102260 Hem bottoms 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
111980 Hem bottoms 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
130041 Hem bottoms 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
100258 Hem bottoms (Lock) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
100381 Hem bottoms (Lock) 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
101686 Hem bottoms (Lock) 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
122938 Hem bottoms (Lock) 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
3526 Hem Bottom-SNLS 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
61740 Hem Bottom-SNLS 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
120349 Join back Pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
131293 Join Back Pkt Pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
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101920 Join band pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
102961 Join band pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
120438 Join Band Pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
121278 Join Band Pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
123025 Join band pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
111506 Make Pleat @ Bk Pnl 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
13840 Serge Back Panel 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
100028 Serge Back Panel 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
110473 Serge Back Pannel 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
120613 Serge Back Pkt Pcs 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
13487 Serge Back Pnl 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
13342 Serge bk panel 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
102831 Serge bk panel 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
120668 Serge bk panel 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
122921 Serge bk panel 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
130051 Serge bk panel 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
101650 Serge Bk Pnl from outside 28 0.4 0.36 Female 
121246 Serge Bk Pnls 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
122441 Top stitch bone 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
123550 Top stitch bone 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
123552 Top stitch bone 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
123563 Top stitch bone 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
12064 Topstitch Inseam 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
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130703 Topstitch Inseam 28 0.4 0.36 Male 
10210 Close Pkt Bag (Safety) 29 0.42 0.38 Female 
91409 Close Pkt Bag (Safety) 29 0.42 0.38 Male 
120070 2nd Seam Sleeve Placket 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
123561 Att. Strip & pkt bag to panel 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
82486 Bottom Seam Collar 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
71564 Fold & Top stitch Out 
side(Front) 
30 0.45 0.41 Female 
120436 Fold & Top stitch Out 
side(Front) 
30 0.45 0.41 Female 
120957 Fold & Top stitch Out 
side(Front) 
30 0.45 0.41 Male 
82186 Join Front Pcs 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
123023 Join Front Pcs 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
92176 Join Yoke Safety 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
101155 Join Yoke Safety 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
100029 Seat Seam Safety 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
12135 Set Front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
12280 Set Front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
60136 Set Front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
62924 Set Front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
63123 Set front pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
90123 Set front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
100715 Set Front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
102530 Set Front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
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110614 Set front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
111479 Set front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
121266 Set front pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Female 
122444 Set front pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
130036 Set front Pkt 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
120202 Top stitch Bk pkt Flap 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
130765 Top stitch Bk pkt Flap 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
123577 Top stitch bone Top side 30 0.45 0.41 Male 
121376 Att. Front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Female 
12589 Fold & Top stitch Out side 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
8584 Top st front plaket 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
4346 Turn & Top Stitch front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
6468 Turn & Top Stitch front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
111641 Turn & Top Stitch Front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
120014 Turn & Top Stitch front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
120264 Turn & Top Stitch front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
13674 Turn & topstitch frnt pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
100088 Turn & topstitch frnt pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
120749 Turn & topstitch frnt pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
121440 Turn & topstitch frnt pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
122528 Turn & topstitch frnt pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Female 
131285 Turn & topstitch frnt pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Female 
4275 Turn and Top stitch Front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Female 
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102826 Turn and Top stitch Front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
111421 Turn and Top stitch Front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Female 
120557 Turn and Top stitch Front Pkt 31 0.466 0.42 Male 
92098 Press Bk Pkt 32 0.48 0.43 Female 
102511 Press Bk Pkt 32 0.48 0.43 Female 
121267 Press Bk Pkt 32 0.48 0.43 Female 
122672 Press Bk PKt 32 0.48 0.43 Male 
123044 Press Bk Pkt 32 0.48 0.43 Female 
123029 Prs Bk Pkt 32 0.48 0.43 Male 
12766 Att. Facing SNLS 33 0.5 0.45 Male 
61446 Att. Facing SNLS 33 0.5 0.45 Female 
82252 Att. Facing SNLS 33 0.5 0.45 Male 
123051 Att. Facing SNLS 33 0.5 0.45 Male 
130698 Att. Facing SNLS 33 0.5 0.45 Female 
121288 Make Crease Band 33 0.5 0.45 Female 
130017 Make Crease Band 33 0.5 0.45 Female 
61897 Hem bottoms (Chain stitch) 34 0.53 0.48 Male 
62605 Hem bottoms (Chain stitch) 34 0.53 0.48 Female 
102830 Hem bottoms (Chain stitch) 34 0.53 0.48 Female 
63141 Hem Bottom-SNCS 34 0.53 0.48 Male 
101727 Hem Bottom-SNCS 34 0.53 0.48 Female 
123554 Set Bone strip with bk pnl 35 0.55 0.50 Male 
131385 Set Bone strip with bk pnl 35 0.55 0.50 Female 
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8550 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Male 
11177 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Male 
60980 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Male 
62742 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Male 
63625 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Female 
70802 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Female 
80888 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Male 
111874 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Male 
121480 Top stitch waistband Bottom 
side 
35 0.55 0.50 Female 
61971 Close Inseam 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
122318 Close Inseam 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
130772 Close Inseam 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
100430 Close Inseam (Safety) 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
130063 Close Inseam (Safety) 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
130070 Close Inseam (Safety) 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
102516 Close Inseam(Safety) 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
102259 O/L Inseam (16 SPI) 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
102262 O/L Inseam (16 SPI) 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
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110834 O/L Inseam (16 SPI) 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
12130 Secure Top & Side 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
12633 Secure Top & Side 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
60174 Secure Top & Side 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
123005 Secure Top & Side 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
120486 Secure top and sides 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
120610 Secure top and sides 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
120616 Secure top and sides 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
120762 Secure top and sides 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
11066 Serge front panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
82210 Serge front panel 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
100827 Serge front panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
102093 Serge front panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
120621 Serge front panel 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
130093 Serge front pnl from side 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
60583 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
81501 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
92185 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
92306 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
102492 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
102652 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
120330 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
122908 Serge Rt. Panel 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
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10031 Top Stitch Bk Pkt 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
131399 Topstitch sdies 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
81376 Topstitch sides 36 0.58 0.52 Male 
130014 Topstitch sides 36 0.58 0.52 Female 
122975 Att. Rivits-12 37 0.6 0.54 Female 
130074 Bone Pkt(SN) 37 0.6 0.54 Male 
6696 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Male 
11596 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Male 
82034 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Female 
92183 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Male 
101842 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Female 
110532 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Male 
111023 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Female 
120018 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Male 
122919 Att. Back Pkt (Auto) 38 0.621 0.56 Female 
12620 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
70806 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Female 
70986 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
80104 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
80566 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Female 
91989 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
101142 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
110625 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
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111731 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
122445 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
130738 Fell Inseam 39 0.64 0.58 Male 
3219 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
5513 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
8798 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
71914 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
71984 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
90380 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
102140 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
120174 Close out seam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
100380 Close Out Seam Busted 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
120437 Close Out Seam Busted 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
120755 Close Out Seam Busted 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
122925 Close Out Seam Busted 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
12978 Close Outseam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
100710 Close Outseam (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
91753 Close Outseam (Safety) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
100428 Close Outseam (Safety) 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
101777 Close Outseam Outseam-
Busted( from Pkt Bag) 
40 0.7 0.63 Male 
123000 Close Outseam Outseam-
Busted( from Pkt Bag) 
40 0.7 0.63 Male 
123086 Close Outseam(Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
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121415 Close Outsem (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
130663 Close Outsem (Busted) 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
61416 Close Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
80904 Close Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
101177 Close Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
101183 Close Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
120297 Close Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
131339 Close Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
10034 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
12247 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
13118 Set band to Shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
91488 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
92380 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
101728 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
102305 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
120487 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
123035 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
123048 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
123141 Set band to shell 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
122920 Set Band With Shell 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
63249 Top Stitch Outseam-DNCS 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
120117 Top Stitch Outseam-DNCS 40 0.7 0.63 Male 
122992 Top Stitch Outseam-DNCS 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
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130770 Top Stitch Outseam-DNCS 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
131303 Top Stitch Outseam-DNCS 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
123049 Top stitch Pkt Bag 40 0.7 0.63 Female 
131420 AT BK PKT 2ND SEAM 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
110956 Att Bk Pkt-Symt Seam 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
111864 Att Bk Pkt-Symt Seam 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
90109 Att. Bk Pkt 2nd seam 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
92250 Att. Bk Pkt 2nd seam 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
12735 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
13675 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
60653 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
101334 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
110368 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
120288 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
120980 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
131340 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
131404 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
131446 Att. Waist band 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
10151 Att. Waist band Auto 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
70822 Att. Waist band Auto 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
82032 Att. Waist band Auto 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
131416 Att. Waist band Auto 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
123569 Close pkt bag 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
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62211 Close Pkt Bag  (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
120549 Close Pkt Bag  (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
131493 Close Pkt Bag  (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
131495 Close Pkt Bag  (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
10986 Close Pkt Bag (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
71495 Close Pkt Bag (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
100985 Close Pkt Bag (SN) 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
7452 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
60147 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
60820 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
62963 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
121468 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
121472 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
122603 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
130714 Close pkt bag SNLS 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
120392 Hem Bottom (mnl) 41 0.8 0.72 Female 
123535 Hem Bottom (mnl) 41 0.8 0.72 Male 
120292 Att CB Loop-(mnl) 42 0.96 0.87 Female 
120608 Att CB Loop-(mnl) 42 0.96 0.87 Male 
130073 Attach L/P 42 0.96 0.87 Female 
62738 Bartack Belt Loops-5 42 0.96 0.87 Male 
80301 Bartack Belt Loops-5 42 0.96 0.87 Male 
82044 Bartack Belt Loops-5 42 0.96 0.87 Male 
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90119 Bartack Belt Loops-5 42 0.96 0.87 Male 
102470 Bartack Belt Loops-5 42 0.96 0.87 Male 
10571 Att Bk Pkt-1st Seam 43 1 0.90 Male 
111801 Att Bk Pkt-1st Seam 43 1 0.90 Male 
122895 Att Bk Pkt-1st Seam 43 1 0.90 Male 
62064 Att. Back Pkt 43 1 0.90 Female 
102022 Close Bag with Label 43 1 0.90 Female 
101184 Close Pkt Bag-SNLS 43 1 0.90 Female 
111103 Close Pkt Bag-SNLS 43 1 0.90 Male 
131356 Close Pkt Bag-SNLS 43 1 0.90 Female 
11986 First Seam bk pkt 43 1 0.90 Male 
70979 First Seam bk pkt 43 1 0.90 Male 
81894 First Seam bk pkt 43 1 0.90 Female 
130117 First Seam bk pkt 43 1 0.90 Female 
90130 THRD TRMING 44 1.13 0.80 Male 
90474 Triming Jkt 44 1.13 1.02 Female 
122977 Triming Jkt 44 1.13 1.02 Female 
123558 Triming Jkt 44 1.13 1.02 Female 
6897 Triming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Male 
123028 Triming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
130016 Triming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Male 
130037 Triming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
131392 Triming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
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110606 Trimming thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
111567 Trimming thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
120394 Trimming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
121280 Trimming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
122976 Trimming thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
130044 Trimming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Male 
130047 Trimming Thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
131304 Trimming thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
131386 Trimming thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
131419 Trimming thread 44 1.13 0.80 Female 
90116 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Male 
110013 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Female 
110957 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Female 
111862 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Male 
111929 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Female 
122896 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Male 
122987 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 
45 1.25 1.13 Male 
130741 Topstitch band top edge with 
CBE 









Table 3: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Productivity 
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Tenure 0.175*** 0.133*** 
 (0.00642) (0.00931) 
   
Tenure-squared -0.00560*** -0.00557*** 
 (0.000192) (0.000190) 
   
Capacity utilization 0.00842*** 0.00842*** 
 (0.0000708) (0.0000708) 
   
Age  0.0864*** 
  (0.00962) 
   
Age-squared -0.00148*** -0.00145*** 
 (0.000125) (0.000123) 
   
Female  -0.133* 
  (0.0524) 







Time trend  -0.0466*** 
  (0.00725) 
   
Constant 6.415*** 4.297*** 
 (0.0693) (0.180) 







Table 2.12A: The Impact of the New Quality 
Management Practice on the Proportion of Defects 
 (1) 
 ratio 






















Standard Minute Value 0.00106*** 
 (0.000139) 
  






Standard errors in parentheses 












Chapter 3  
 
I. Introduction 
The causes of productivity differentials have become an important theme 
in various fields of economics including industrial organization and 
labour economics (Syverson, 2011). This chapter contributes to an 
important area of research in economics that has gained momentum in 
the past few years; the link between productivity differentials in firms due 
to differences in management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; 
Bloom et al., 2013). 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) identified that empirical research on the 
causal effects of management practices on firm performance is at an early 
stage. One of the obstacles in investigating the impact of management 
practices on firm performance is the lack of availability of high-quality 
firm level data. 
One measurement issue that was identified in the literature is the 
unavailability of direct measures of outputs and inputs. Deflated sales 
are usually used as a measure of output when a direct measure is not 
available. However, this research aims to fill in this gap as data on inputs 
and outputs has been directly measured and is available at the line level 
for a readymade garments manufacturer in Pakistan. 
This research complements the study by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
as they differentiate between good and bad management practices. Good 
management practices are likely to contribute positively to the 
productivity of the firm. We analyze a different management practice from 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) with the aim of investigating the impact 
of a new quality management practice on the line level productivity of a 
garments manufacturing firm. The new quality management practice 
brings in three new features on the factory floor: rewards and recognition 




Chapter 2 provides evidence that the new quality management practice 
increases the individual productivity of workers. However, we used data 
on only 648 workers who worked at the firm throughout the period of 
interest; it is still unclear how the new quality management practice 
affects the overall performance on the factory floor as there are 1400 to 
1500 operators at the firm each day. The productivity of each assembly 
line is determined by total output produced per line. 
The research is also motivated by the research strategy known as ‘insider 
econometrics’ which uses micro level data on worker, worker groups and 
firms to analyse the impact of management practices on productivity of 
firms. The basic question that insider econometrics addresses is whether 
a new management practice increases productivity? And why a practice 
may enhance performance among some entities while not among all 
(Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009). This issue can be addressed by identifying 
the causes of variation in the impact of new quality management 
practices between workers, teams of workers, or firms operating within 
the same industry. This unique data set makes the estimated results of 
this research convincing because it focuses on a narrow production 
process which eliminates sources of heterogeneity that are found in more 
aggregate or heterogeneous samples. 
This chapter also aims to analyse whether there is any variation in the 
impact of the new quality management practice across assembly lines 
i.e. does the new quality management practice enhance the productivity 
of some lines while having a negligible impact on others? The research 
also seeks to explore whether the impact of the quality management 
practice differs within and across lines due to the variation in the 
complexity of production. The research follows a similar theme as 
Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) who provide evidence that human 
resource management practices such as problem-solving teams had a 
higher impact on the productivity of lines associated with more complex 
production processes as compared to those with less complex production 
processes. However, we provide evidence that the implementation of the 
new quality management practice has a positive impact on basic lines 
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which produce products of a higher complexity as compared to the rest 
of the basic lines while the new practice has a negative impact on  basic 
lines with a lower complexity and complex lines. 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section II discusses the literature 
review, Section III explains the data and methodology, Section IV 























II. Literature Review 
The survival of businesses depends on their relative productivity as high 
productivity businesses are more likely to survive as compared to their 
less efficient competitors (Syverson, 2011). Research in labour economics 
has also explored the significance of the quality of human capital (Abowd 
et al., 2005; Fox and Smeets, 2011), the incentive effects of pay for 
performance (Lazear, 2000) and the role of social connections and the 
implementation of piece rates as a compensation mechanism (Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul, 2005) in explaining productivity differences. 
One of the most important results that micro data research has found is 
that there is a significant degree of heterogeneity in firm productivity 
within industries (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). One explanation for 
productivity differences among firms and countries is the variation in 
management practices, where better management has been found to be 
positively associated with firm productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).  
The following sections discuss the concept of productivity as a measure 
of firm performance, the methods to measure productivity and some 
common measurement issues, and the relationship between 
management practices and firm productivity. 
II.A. The concept of productivity 
Productivity at the firm level is defined as the efficiency with which firms 
convert inputs into output. A common measure of single-factor 
productivity is labour productivity which is output produced per unit of 
labour, although at times capital productivity or materials productivity is 
also used. Single factor productivity levels may be different between firms 
as they may face different factor prices and some firms may use other 
inputs such as capital more intensively. 
A better measure of productivity as compared to single factor productivity 
is considered to be total factor productivity (TFP) productivity as it is 
invariant to the intensity by which observable inputs are used. 
Differences in total factor productivity illustrate the differentials in output 
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given a fixed level of inputs. Higher total factor productivity indicates that 
a firm will produce more output given the same inputs as compared to a 
firm with lower total factor productivity. Factor price variations will have 
no effect on total factor productivity as it will bring about shifts along 
isoquants rather than shifts in isoquants. 
Productivity at the plant level or national level has usually been 
calculated as the differential between inputs and output. Total factor 
productivity at the country level was labelled as ‘a measure of our 
ignorance’ by Abramovitz (1956) as it captures the variation in output not 
explained by inputs. Productivity differences at the firm level is also a 
topic that has been under-researched. Differences in technology, 
research and innovation were associated with productivity differentials 
within firms, however, productivity differences were seen even after 
controlling for such variables (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).  
The models of productivity evolution vary in assumptions regarding the 
stability of productivity over time. Jovanovic (1982) suggests that firms 
have a time invariant efficiency parameter. A firm’s productivity will vary 
initially and then will become constant at a certain value. Ericson and 
Pakes (1995) suggest that contrary to Jovanovic (1982), negative shocks 
can cause efficiency losses. Lambson (1991) suggests that firms become 
locked into their technological choices. Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest 
that changes in regulatory structure also impacts productivity through 
the reallocation of capital towards more productive units. 
II.B. Measurement of Productivity 
In order to understand the sources of aggregate growth productivity, 
macroeconomists separate differences at the country level into micro 
components (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 
2010). Models of economic fluctuations due to productivity shocks are 
also estimated using micro level data such as firm level or plant level data 
rather than aggregate data (Campbell and Fisher, 2004). 
Syverson (2011) suggests that micro data has advantages as it provides 
us with an opportunity to analyse the research question closer to the level 
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where the economic decisions are made, but it also raises a number of 
measurement and data quality issues. Researchers need to make 
measurement choices while taking into consideration that any output 
driven by unmeasured variations in inputs will be included in 
productivity. 
One of the issues with micro data is that sometimes a direct measure of 
output is not available and instead only revenues are reported. The 
standard method in this case is to use deflated revenue to measure 
output. This method may be problematic if the price differentials indicate 
the differences in market power across firms and the value of deflated 
revenue may not reflect the producer’s output accurately. Manufacturers 
may also produce a variety of output so it might be challenging to create 
a single measure of output. 
Another measurement issue arises on how to include inputs such as 
capital, labour and intermediate materials. A researcher can either 
include the number of workers or the hours worked by employees or a 
quality adjusted measure such as the compensation of employees as 
wages reflect marginal product. A typical measure of capital is the firm’s 
book value of the capital stock. This may raise questions regarding 
whether capital stock is an appropriate measure for the flow of capital 
services. A similar problem to the one faced in the revenue-output 
situation occurs if only the total expenditure on inputs is available rather 
than the quantities of intermediate inputs. There is no clear strategy on 
how to include intermediate inputs when they are not directly 
measurable. In this case, a researcher can either use a gross output 
function and directly include intermediate inputs or alternatively treat 
the production function as a value-added function and subtract 
intermediaries from output.  
One other measurement concern is regarding the inclusion of multiple 
inputs into the production function. As total factor productivity measures 
the shifts in output given a fixed set of inputs, the weight of individual 
inputs needs to be included appropriately. 
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Total factor productivity can be represented by the time varying 
production function below: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 , 𝑀𝑡) 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is output at time t and is a function of inputs such as capital at 
time t (𝐾𝑡), labour at time t (𝐿𝑡), materials at time t (𝑀𝑡) and 𝐴𝑡  (factor 
neutral shifter) at time t. Total factor productivity is 𝐴𝑡 at time t, which 
captures the variations in output that are unexplained by changes in 
inputs. 
The weighting of inputs is easiest to see when the Cobb Douglas 












In the case above, the inputs are aggregated where the exponent of each 
input is its respective output elasticity. This specification is also 
considered to be the first order approximation to any production function.   
Several approaches are used in literature to measure the output 
elasticities. One approach uses the concept of cost minimization to 
measure the elasticities directly from the available data. A cost 
minimizing firm will equate the input elasticity of an input with the 
product of the scale elasticity and the input’s cost share. If the cost shares 
are measurable and the value of the scale elasticities is measured or 
assumed, then the output elasticities (𝛼𝑗) can be constructed easily. If 
additional assumptions are made for example, constant returns to scale, 
then the output elasticities equal the revenue paid to each input. 
Another approach is to calculate the elasticities by estimating the 
production function. In the Cobb-Douglas case, logged total factor 
productivity is the estimated sum of the constant and the residual. The 
double log form of the Cobb-Douglas case is given below: 
𝐿𝑛 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑘𝐿𝑛 𝐾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑙𝐿𝑛 𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼𝑚𝐿𝑛 𝑀𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖 
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In the case above, the total factor productivity estimate would be ?̂?0 + ?̂?𝑖, 
where ?̂?0 is common across the production units in the data and ?̂?𝑖 is the 
specific effect of each unit. Marschak and Andrews (1944) point out that 
this approach may raise some econometric issues as the input choices 
may be correlated with ?̂?𝑖 as producers may make input choices based 
on their beliefs about their efficiency. There is no consensus on which of 
the methods is the best, but the choice of method depends upon which 
assumption the researcher is comfortable with. However, studies have 
provided evidence that the calculations of productivity are not very 
sensitive to the method used. The inherent variation in firm level data is 
able to swamp any small differences in productivity due to measurement 
errors. High productivity producers will tend to look efficient regardless 
of the method used to estimate productivity (Syverson, 2011). 
II.C. Management and Firm Productivity 
The impact of management on the productivity of inputs was mentioned 
as early as Walker (1887). Nelson (1981) suggested that firms strive to 
find better ways to meet market demand. Decisions related to technology, 
inputs and production are taken by the management, hence different 
forms of management may lead to better choices regarding important 
decisions. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) also provide evidence that 
managerial differences are related to differences in the performance of an 
organization. The exclusion of a measure for management in the 
production function was mentioned by Mundlak (1961). However, as it 
was difficult to measure the quality of management, it was assumed that 
management is fixed over time. This assumption would not hold if there 
is a reason to believe that management will change over time.   
The quality of management became an important variable in the model 
of firm size by Lucas (1978) where firm performance is denoted by firm 
size. Firms with better management should be larger because in 
equilibrium, the market will allocate a greater share of sales to these firms 




One of the most puzzling questions regarding management practices is 
that if better management practices offer improved profitability to firms, 
then why are improved management practices not adopted by all firms? 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) gave various reasons for differences in 
management practices across countries and firms, such as product 
market competition, quality of human capital, labour regulation and 
ownership status of firms. Highly competitive product markets will tend 
to have better average management practices, and this may drive poorly 
managed firms out of the market which will encourage other firms to 
improve management practices. Managers with college education are 
more likely to be aware of the advantages of modern management 
practices. Labour regulations that limit the ability of managers to hire, 
fire, pay and promote employees has been negatively associated with the 
quality of incentives at firms, but labour regulation is not significantly 
correlated with other dimensions such as monitoring and targets. Family 
owned firms that were managed by an external chief executive officer 
were better managed as compared to firms that were family owned and 
family managed. The reason being that some family owned firms were 
run by their eldest sons without taking into consideration the ability to 
manage and run a firm. Firms owned by private equity are better 
managed as compared to government owned and family owned firms. 
Bloom et al. (2013) found evidence that in the Indian textile sector, 
informational constraints were the most important factor behind firms 
not adopting new management practices. Some simple widespread 
practices like measuring quality defects or machine downtime were also 
not adopted as firms believed that this would not increase profits. The 
owners believed that their quality was comparable to the rest of the local 
firms and because they were profitable, they had no incentive to 
implement new practices.  
Management of firms has received less attention in economics as 
compared to business and policy making. Economists have been 
sceptical of the importance of management due to the emphasis on profit 
maximisation and cost minimisation (Stigler, 1976). Firms in developing 
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countries may not adopt high quality systems as repairing defects is 
cheap due to lower labour costs. Therefore, management practices in 
developing countries may reflect an optimal response to low labour costs. 
The second reason why management practices have not been emphasized 
to a great degree in the literature is that it is empirically challenging to 
measure management (Bloom et al., 2013). 
However, in the past few years management practices have been 
incorporated in literature to study the impact on productivity and 
profitability. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) elaborate that there are some 
management practices that are on average good for the productivity of 
the firm. Although good management practices contribute positively to 
the productivity of the firm, managers may not be motivated enough to 
move away from bad practices to good practices due to the effort involved 
in changing the style of management. Some examples of good 
management practices are the lean manufacturing techniques such as 
just-in-time that were started in Japan and then were adopted by the 
west as these techniques were recognized to be superior. A second 
example is the use of a performance tracking system where data on key 
performers is collected, analysed and communicated within an 
organization. The absence of any mechanism to collect information on 
performance will indicate a poor style of management. The third example 
is the method used to promote employees. Promotions solely based on 
the tenure of employees and not on individual performance are likely to 
lead to lower firm performance.  
An extensive survey was undertaken by Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) to 
construct a robust measure of management practices under four areas: 
operations, monitoring, targets and incentives. The survey uses a 
practice evaluation tool that describes and provides a score (0 to 5) to 
eighteen management practices used by industrial firms. A score of 0 
denotes worst practice and 5 denotes best practice. The operations 
section focuses on how process improvements are documented, the use 
and introduction of lean manufacturing techniques and the reasons for 
improvements. The targets section focuses on the types of targets used 
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(financial or operational or both), whether targets are achievable, the 
consistency of targets in the organization and whether targets are simple 
or complex. The monitoring section looks at how the performance of 
employees is tracked and reviewed. One of the best practices for 
performance clarity is that performance measures are clearly defined and 
communicated to employees and performance is made public to 
encourage competition. The incentives section focuses on the criterion for 
promotion such as whether promotions at the organization are based on 
tenure or are linked to performance, the compensation mechanism, and 
the protocol to deal with poor performers. The best practice is the one 
that provides strong rewards to workers who can demonstrate high effort 
and ability. The scores were then converted into z-scores by normalizing 
by practice to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The overall score for the 
management practices is calculated by taking an average of all z-scores 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006). After calculating the management scores, 
there is scope for disagreement over whether these measures really 
constitute good practices. In order to analyze this, Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007) regress firm production on the management scores and found that 
these scores were positively associated with firm productivity. 
Management practices were found to differ among countries. The use of 
incentives was greater than the use of monitoring and targets in the 
United States, China and India as compared to the average country. In 
contrast, the use of monitoring and targets in Japan, Sweden and 
Germany was seen to be greater than the use of incentives. The wide use 
of incentives in the United States may be due to the ease of dismissing 
poor performers and rewarding high performers. The cross-country 
rankings of management practices show that management practices are 
an important factor for ranking productivity at the country level. An 
increase in the management score by one point is associated with a 
higher labour productivity of 57 percent. There are two ways through 
which countries can improve the quality of management practices and 
hence increase average productivity. Firstly, productivity within the 
average firm can be improved by disseminating better business 
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education. Secondly, reallocation across firms needs to be improved 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). 
Bloom et al. (2009) also find that higher management scores were 
associated with better performance in hospitals in the United Kingdom. 
Better management scores were associated with improved survival rates 
of patients as well as shorter waiting lists. Good management practices 
were associated with other indicators, such as better facilities for workers 
for example child care and job flexibility to maintain a better work-life 
balance (Bloom, Kretschmer and Van Reenen, 2009). Bloom et al. (2010) 
also provide evidence that firms that are well managed also tend to use 
energy more efficiently. 
There is an increasing use of ‘innovative’ human resource management 
practices such as problem-solving teams, pay for performance 
compensation schemes, cross training for multiple jobs and labour 
management communication procedures. However, establishing the 
optimal human resource practice is not straightforward as the results of 
an identical new management practice may vary across similar firms and 
between worker groups and establishments within firms (Ichniowski and 
Shaw, 2003). 
Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) explain that the identification of a 
specific type of production process in steel manufacturing lines provides 
convincing empirical evidence on the effect of innovative human resource 
practices i.e. group based incentives and problem-solving teams on the 
productivity of production lines in the steel industry. They used a fixed 
effects productivity model which allows for line specific autoregressive 
errors to provide evidence that group incentives raised productivity in all 
lines, but the adoption of teams increased productivity of lines which 
produced more complex products. The measure of productivity on these 
lines was defined as the ratio of number of tons that meet the quality 
standard divided by the number of tons that are loaded onto the 
production line. The production at these lines is divided into 4 production 
classes according to the complexity of production. Complexity was 
included in the productivity model in two alternative ways: a continuous 
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index of complexity which is calculated as a weighted total of the 
production classes and a dummy variable which is zero when the line 
produces low complexity products and is one when the line produces high 
complexity goods. Dummy variables were used to denote group incentives 
and problem-solving teams and several control variables were also 
included in the productivity model. The control variables included the 
measures of the lines’ technological features, a measure of capital which 
is denoted by age of the line and its square, worker characteristics such 
as tenure and age of operators, tenure of the line managers, turnover rate 
of the workforce and a time trend to control for learning curve effects. 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) explain that the advantage of 
focusing on one production process is that it eliminates heterogeneity 
that is found in aggregate data and heterogeneous samples. They also 
provide evidence in favour of using a set of complementary human 
resource practices as this has a higher impact on productivity as 
compared to making marginal changes in one management practice. 
Incentive pay plans combined with teams, flexible job assignments, job 
security and training tend to achieve higher levels of productivity as 
compared to more traditional management practices with narrow job 
definitions, strict work rules, incentive pay based on quantity but not 
quality and limited communication between managers and workers off-
line. 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1995) suggest that employee 
participation in the form of ideas to improve productivity should be 
complemented by a job security policy as employees may feel threatened 
by productivity enhancement perceiving that this may result in loss of 
jobs. Complementarities between human resource practices has been 
mentioned in the past, for example, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) 
who suggest that incentive pay plans based on objective performance 
complement policies such as work teams which required subjective 
evaluation. When workers perform multiple tasks, increasing an 
incentive for one task would lead to workers focusing just on that 
particular task while neglecting the rest. Increasing incentives for all 
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tasks is likely to minimize this problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). 
The element of trust between workers and managers needs to be present 
for a new management practice to be effective (Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1994). Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1995) elaborate that 
new practices such as information sharing, employment security and 
productivity improvement teams were ineffective in older steel 
manufacturing lines due to the lack of trust between workers and 
management. For example, one manager mentioned that workers were 
skeptical about productivity enhancement teams as they considered it to 
be another trick to cut jobs and workers perceived the contractual 
guarantee of job security to be temporary. 
The quantity-quality trade off associated with incentive pay plans such 
as piece rates has been mentioned at various points in the past 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). One other issue associated with piece 
rates is that workers may be reluctant to share productivity enhancement 
methods as an overall increase in productivity may decrease piece rates 
(Roy, 1952; Gibbons, 1987). Milgrom and Roberts (1995) mention the 
example of a firm that used a bonus for quality in addition to piece rates 
to avoid this trade-off.  Each unit of production was stenciled with the 
name of the worker and if the unit fails after delivery then the worker 
loses 10 percent of the bonus. However, apart from the bonus for quality, 
the firm had a no layoff policy and offered flexible work assignments and 
skill training for workers. They also had a channel of communication in 
place between managers and workers to develop the trust needed for the 
system to work which made productivity-improvement teams more 
effective.  
Ichniowski and Shaw (2009) refer to a research strategy known as insider 
econometrics which uses micro level data on workers and aims to address 
questions related to the impact of new management practices on the 
productivity of firms. Insider Econometrics uses detailed data on a 
specific production process and uses econometric methods to analyse the 
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impact of a management practice on performance. This performance can 
be measured for workers or for smaller units within an organisation.  
The simplest regression for obtaining estimates of the impact of a 
management practice on productivity, or any other dependent variable 
such as the quality of the product, or the downtime of an assembly line 
will be to include control variables implied by the production function i.e. 
factor inputs, a dummy variable which equals one when the management 
practice is present, work specific fixed effects and a common time trend.  
II.D. Future Directions for Research on the Economics of Management 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) pointed out that as there is limited work 
on the economics of management, and there are several topics that are 
yet to be explored in this area which can provide interesting results in 
the future. For example, conducting field experiments by introducing new 
management practices to find the causal relationship between firm 
performance and management practices. Bloom et al. (2013) tried to 
establish a causal relationship between firm performance and 
management practices through randomized control trials in the Indian 
textile sector. Free management consultancy was provided to randomly 
chosen textile manufacturers and the adoption of management practices 
such as improved quality control, performance-based incentives, and 
improved factory operation were found to increase productivity by 17 
percent. 
There is a further need to establish links between firm productivity and 
management practices. More theories regarding the link between 
management practices and firm performance maybe established as a 
result of new findings. If information on the same firm is used over time, 
it will give us further insight into the relationship between management 
and firm performance. New studies that use panel data to test the causal 
relationship between management practices and firm productivity would 
be especially useful. Management practices in areas other than 




Management of firms has been identified as an important component of 
firm productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2010; Bloom et al., 2013). However, there are a limited number of studies 
on the relationship between management and firm performance due to 
the lack of availability of high-quality data and the difficulty of measuring 
management practices. In some cases, direct figures on outputs and 
inputs are also not available, and researchers often have to make difficult 
choices (Syverson, 2011). Recently, there is there a trend to analyse 
innovative management practices on firm performance using a narrowly 
defined production process (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009; Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). Evidence has been provided that innovative 
management practices are not equally valued in all production 
environments and the impact of new management practices may vary 
with the complexity of the production process (Boning, Ichniowski and 
Shaw, 2007). 
This chapter derives its motivation from some of the identified gaps and 
methodologies mentioned in the literature. This study contributes to the 
literature in several ways. Firstly, high quality data is available with direct 
measures of output and inputs. Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) did 
not have detailed information on the product mix of lines that is needed 
to control for cross line differences, while we have information to control 
for this. Secondly, studies on management and firm performance using 
panel data are very limited so this study contributes to the literature on 
the causal effects of management on firm performance. Thirdly, the study 
contributes to the literature on insider econometrics and analyses 
whether the complexity of production can explain the heterogeneity in the 
impact of management practices within groups of the same firm.    
Building on the identified gaps, the aim of this chapter is to test whether 
the new quality management practice constitutes a good management 
practice or not. It also tests whether there are any differences in the 
impact of the new practice across and within assembly lines as the 
complexity of production can vary both across and within lines.  
122 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.A. Summary Statistics and Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
Daily line level data from the firm was collected before and after the 
introduction of the new quality management practice. The measure of 
productivity used in the analysis is the total production at the firm i.e. 
the number of garments stitched per day per line. Data on other variables 
includes the number of workers employed per line per day, target per line 
per day, the standard minute value of the product being produced per 
line per day which denotes the complexity of the product, and the 
materials (intermediate inputs) loaded on each line per day. The total 
sample covers 867 days and 9 assembly lines. However, the study uses 
an unbalanced panel as some line-day level observations were missing24 
so the total sample contains 7031 line-day level observations.  
Figure 4: Histogram of Total Production 
 
 
The variable for total production (the number of garments produced) is 
an integer, however given the large number of garments it can be treated 
as a continuous variable. There are some spikes in the histogram 
 
24 Some line-day level observations were missing as the line did not operate due to issues at the firm such 
as delayed input and other technical issues. 
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generated for total production which may be due to rounding off effects 
as when production numbers are high the firm rounds off the production 
figure to the nearest 500.  





Total Production  2245.69 701.98 29 4000 
Workers  121.23 36.38 19  218 
Standard Minute Value 18.46 4.45 4.28 34.99 
Target per line 2540.57 495.61 1500 3500 
Materials 2433.34 659.41 31 5736 
Observations 7031       
 
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics of the sample. Total production 
denotes the total number of garments stitched. The average number of 
garments stitched per assembly line is 2245.69, while the minimum is 
29 and maximum is 4000. The average number of workers present per 
line is 121.23, while the minimum is 19 and maximum is 218. The huge 
variation in the number of workers is due to the different styles produced 
per line and line balancing aspects. Workers are allocated to each task 
keeping in mind the time it takes to perform a task, hence tasks that take 
longer may require two or more workers so that the garment is produced 
within the allocated time, bottlenecks are avoided and targets are 
achieved. The target represents the desired output per line. The minimum 
target per line at the firm is 1500 garments and the maximum is 3500 
garments. The average target per line is 2540.57 garments per line. 
Materials denote the intermediate inputs of the firm.  The average 
number of intermediate inputs per line is 2433.34, minimum is 31 and 
maximum is 5736. 
The standard minute value is the time it takes to stitch a garment at the 
firm. On average, it takes 18.46 minutes to stitch a garment. The 
minimum standard minute value per line is 4.28 minutes and the 
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maximum is 34.99. The standard minute value is also an indication of 
the style and complexity of the garment. More tasks are involved while 
producing a complex garment as compared to a basic garment. For 
example, more complex denim jeans would have different kinds of rivets 
or fancier pockets or embroidery.  












Type of Production 
1A 11.69 21.95 14.95 Basic 
1B 4.63 21.95 14.93 Basic 
2A 11.54 25.90 16.45 Basic 
2B 4.28 25.90 16.38 Basic 
3A 11.55 26.68 17.67 Basic 
3B 11.54 26.68 17.62 Basic  
         4 12.88 30.70 21.09                   Complex  
       5 11.26 34.99 25.66 Complex  
         6 11.68 33.52 21.56                   Complex 
 
Personal visits to the firm and interviews with line managers and line 
supervisors allowed us to identify that there are 6 assembly lines that 
were operational before and after the new quality management practice 
was introduced at the firm. The complexity of production varies across 
lines and the complexity also changes within lines. Three lines operate 
double shifts, therefore, data for 9 assembly lines is available.  
The firm has dedicated different assembly lines for producing basic and 
complex products, details of which are presented in table 3.2. Some lines 
were coded with A and B as they operate double shifts. The day shift was 
coded as A and the night shift as B.  
Some lines that produce simple products most of the time are referred to 
as basic lines and lines that produce more complicated products are 
termed as complex lines. The complicated products will require a 
combination of different tasks and will use more sophisticated machinery 
as compared to basic products although some tasks will be common 
across all products. Lines 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B are all basic lines, 
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while lines 4, 5 and 6 are complex lines. Lines 3A and 3B produce slightly 
more complicated goods as compared to other basic lines. As expected, 
the average standard minute value of production lines that mostly 
produce basic products is lower than the average standard minute value 
of the lines that produce more complicated products.  
The complexity of production also varies within each line. For example, 
lines that produce basic products most of the time, may occasionally 
produce products that are more complicated than the ones that are 
usually produced on the line. On some occasions, basic products are also 
produced on lines that are designated as complex lines. Interviews with 
line managers and supervisors revealed that the assembly lines run 
smoothly when the usual product is produced, but bottlenecks and other 
problems arise when a more complicated product is run as it takes time 
for workers to adjust to the requirements of the new product. The 
organization of production and the procedure for task allocation for 
workers is the same across all lines.  
Table 3.3 shows the average production by assembly line before and after 
the implementation of the new quality management practice. No 
significant difference was found before and after the introduction of the 
practice for line 1A and line 1B. Interestingly, no significant difference 
was found before and after the implementation of the new quality 
management practice for line 2A but a significance difference was found 
for line 2B. The average production for line 2B is significantly higher after 
the implementation of the practice as compared to before. The average 
production for both lines 3A and 3B was found to be significantly higher 
after the implementation of the quality management practice. Line 4, 5 
and 6 produce more complicated products and average production was 
found to be significantly lower after the implementation of the new quality 
management practice. The magnitude of the decrease in average 







Table 3.3: Differences in the Mean of Total Production by Line Before and After the 
Introduction of the Practice 
 After Before Difference 
    
Line 1A 2062.16 2141.032 -78.87 
(40.24) 
 
Line 1B 2220.804 2241.76          20.95 
        (43.58) 
 
Line 2A 2390.96 2430.30 -39.34 
(43.59) 
 
Line 2B 2671.40 2455.86   215.54*** 
(44.69) 
   
Line 3A 1809.42 1665.10  144.32*** 
(36.58)  
  
Line 3B 1870.69 1678.67      192.02*** 
       (33.43) 
 
Line 4 2553.19 2925.62     -372.43*** 
        (50.37) 
 
Line 5 1787.65 1937.90     -150.25*** 
        (44.58) 
 
Line 6 2886.72 2701.62     -185.10*** 
        (49.06) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3.4 presents the mean of key variables by assembly line. The 
average production and target for line 6 is the highest as compared to the 
rest of the lines. The average production for line 1B is higher as compared 
to line 1A although the number of workers is lower, while the standard 
minute value and target is similar. The standard minute value of line 2A 
and 2B is similar but the average production for the night shift (2B) is 
higher than the average production for the day shift (2A), although the 
average target is similar and the average number of workers present is 
lower. The average production of 3B is also higher than the average 
production of 3B, although the average number of workers is lower and 
other variables such as the standard minute value, target and inputs are 
similar. The average number of workers present per line is highest for 
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lines 4, 5 and 6 as compared to the rest of the lines that produced simpler 
products. Complex products require more workers as some complex 
tasks may require two or more workers in order to balance the line. The 
lines that produce complex garments have higher average targets as 
compared to the rest of the lines which is an indication that the order 
sizes for these styles may be greater than the rest. The firm produces 5 
to 10 percent more than the number of garments required by the supplier 
so that there is a cushion for rejection. A higher percentage is kept as a 
cushion for complex garments as chances of quality defects are more as 






           Table 3.4: Mean of Variables by Assembly Line 
 
 
 Line 1A Line 1B Line 2A Line 2B Line 3A Line 3B Line 4 Line 5 Line 6 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
Total  
Production 























































































There is a need to understand the reasons why the impact of a certain 
practice differs among entities within the same firm. Data on a narrowly 
defined production process makes the identification of specific measures 
of performance easier. It also helps in isolating the effects of a new 
management practice on firm performance, minimises concerns about 
omitted variables, and helps build a true production function (Boning, 
Ichniowski and Shaw, 2007; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009; Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). Management practices are an important 
component in measuring firm performance has been demonstrated in 
various research papers (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al. ,2013).  
Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) used a fixed effects specification 
with line specific autoregressive errors to analyse the impact of an 
innovative management practice. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) explain 
that for short panel data sets, it is possible to control for serial correlation 
in the error term without explicitly stating a model for serial correlation. 
However, with a long panel data set i.e. when the time dimension is large 
relative to the cross-sectional dimension, it is necessary to specify a 
model for serial correlation in the error term to account for any potential 
autocorrelation. As the cross-sectional dimension is small in a long panel 
data set, the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated between 
groups or individuals can be relaxed.  
Ignoring the potential correlation of regression disturbances over time 
will lead to biased standard errors and statistical tests (such as t-test) 
would lose their validity. Unobserved factors may lead to complex forms 
of spatial and temporal dependence. Hence the standard errors should 
be adjusted for the potential dependence in the residuals. Also, it would 
be more natural to assume that residuals are correlated both within lines 
and between assembly lines (Hoechle, 2007).  
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One of the specifications to adjust the standard errors is to allow the error 
term to follow a line specific autoregressive process of order 1 as was used 
by Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007). One way to incorporate this into 
the methodology is to use ordinary least squares with panel corrected 
standard errors. This allows the error term to be heteroskedastic, 
autocorrelated of order 1 and correlated over the cross-sectional units 
(contemporaneous spatial dependence). Another method is to use OLS or 
fixed effects with standard errors proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
that are assumed to be heteroskedastic and robust to very general forms 
of spatial and temporal dependence. Hence, these standard errors allow 
autocorrelation in the error term of a more general form rather than 
restricting the errors to follow an autoregressive process of order 1. The 
cross-sectional dependence in the disturbance term arises due to the 
presence of an unobserved factor, which is common to all cross-sectional 
units. It follows an autoregressive process so both contemporaneous and 
lagged spatial dependence is present. 
When the lag length for autocorrelation is not specified, Stata uses a rule 
of thumb to select the lag length for autocorrelation. Stata uses the 
following formula to calculate the lag length by default: 







Where 𝑚(𝑇)  denotes the lag length up to which the residuals may be auto 
correlated, T represents time, which is the number of days in our case 
and floor is a function that rounds the value down to the largest integer. 
The following panel data equations will be estimated using fixed effects 
with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors to investigate the impact of the 
new quality management practice. 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡
2 + 𝑢1𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡
2 + 𝛽5(𝑃𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖) + 𝑢2𝑖 + 2𝑖𝑡  (2) 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷2014 + 𝛽7𝐷2015 + 𝛽8𝐷2016 + +𝑢3𝑖 + 3𝑖𝑡  (3) 
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𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑃𝑡 × 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖) + 𝛽6𝐷2014 + 𝛽7𝐷2015 + 𝛽8𝐷2016 +
+𝑢4𝑖 + 4𝑖𝑡  (4) 
The variables included in the equations are explained below. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the production of the firm i.e. the number of garments 
stitched at line i on day t. Production was also used a measure of firm 
productivity by Bloom and Van Reenen25 (2010).  
𝑃𝑡 is a dummy variable which equals one when the new management 
practice (details of the new management practice are given on pages 20-
21 in chapter 2) is in place and is zero otherwise. Ichniowski and Shaw 
(2009) also suggest that the estimates of the impact of a management 
practice can be obtained by using a dummy variable which equals one 
when the practice is present and zero otherwise. Bandiera, Barankay and 
Rasul (2005) also used a dummy variable to analyse the impact of piece 
rates on worker productivity.  
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector that includes variables such as log of the materials 
(intermediate inputs) loaded on each line per day, log of the number of 
workers and log of the target of each line per day. Boning, Ichniowski and 
Shaw (2007) found that management practices are not equally valued in 
all production environments and there were differences in the impact of 
a management practice due to the complexity of production. Therefore, 
variables that measure the complexity of production across and within 
lines were included in the equations. The log of the standard minute value 
is included which is the total time it takes to produce the product at line 
i on day t. The standard minute value represents the style and complexity 
of production. A higher standard minute value denotes higher 
complexity. A measure of the change in style was also included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡. It 
is measured as the log of the absolute deviation of the standard minute 
value from the average standard minute value. Production line 
supervisors mentioned that productivity decreases initially as the style of 
production changes, as workers take time to switch from one style to the 
 
25 As a direct measure of production was not available so deflated sales was used as a proxy for production 
by Bloom and Van Reenen (2010). 
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other. An interaction term between the deviation from the average 
standard minute value and 𝑃𝑡 was included to see whether the impact of 
the implementation of the new quality management practice changes 
with the deviation from the average standard minute value.  
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖 is a dummy variable that is one for a basic lines and zero for lines 
that produce complex garments. This variable is also a proxy for the type 
of capital employed on the line as some machines will be common among 
all lines but the lines that produce complex garments will use more 
sophisticated machines in order to perform complex tasks that will not 
be performed on basic lines. An interaction term between  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖 and 𝑃𝑡 is 
also later included to see whether the impact of the new quality 
management practice varies by the complexity of production. 
Time is included to account for learning curve effects and is specified in 
two different ways for flexibility. A linear time trend with a quadratic time 
trend is included and then time dummies are included which allow us to 
see year specific changes. 𝐷2014 is a dummy variable which equals one 
when the year is 2014 and equals zero otherwise. 𝐷2015 is a dummy 
variable which equals one when the year is 2015 and equals zero 
otherwise. 𝐷2016 represents a dummy for the year 2016 which equals one 
when the year is 2016 and is zero otherwise. 𝑢1𝑖, 𝑢2𝑖, 𝑢3𝑖 and 𝑢4𝑖 are the 
line fixed effects. 
The disturbance terms ( 1𝑖𝑡, 2𝑖𝑡, 3𝑖𝑡 and 4𝑖𝑡)  are explained as follows: 
1𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖𝑓𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡  and  𝑓𝑡 = ∑  𝛿1𝑓𝑡−𝜌 + 𝜔𝑡
10
𝜌=1  (5) 
2𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖ℎ𝑡 + 𝜅𝑖𝑡 and ℎ𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛿2ℎ𝑡−𝜌 + 𝜑𝑡
10
𝜌=1  (6) 
3𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡  and  𝑗𝑡 = ∑  𝛿3𝑗𝑡−𝜌 + 𝜒𝑡
10
𝜌=1    (7) 
4𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 and 𝑚𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛿4𝑚𝑡−𝜌 + 𝜄𝑡 
10
𝜌=1  (8)  
 𝑓𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 , 𝑗𝑡 and 𝑚𝑡  are constructed as common autoregressive processes so 
𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝛿3 and 𝛿4  are the autocorrelation parameters and 𝜌 = 1,2 … .10. 
 𝜗𝑖𝑡,  𝜅𝑖𝑡,  𝜏𝑖𝑡 and 𝜉𝑖𝑡 are the idiosyncratic forcing terms which are 
uncorrelated over time and across lines. 
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The following equations are also fixed effects specifications but are 
estimated using the least squares dummy approach for convenience. The 
main difference between the specifications in equations (9) to (10) and the 
specifications in equations (1) to (4) is that the fixed effects i.e. the line 
effects are included as dummy variables as we are interested in seeing 
the effect of the individual lines on productivity directly. The following 
equations will aim to provide us with the specific impact of the 
implementation of the new quality management practice on each line and 
help us analyse a more detailed picture of the impact of the new practice. 
Hence, the following equations are estimated using Pooled OLS with 
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors to investigate the impact of the new 
quality management practice. 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖
9
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖(𝑃𝑡 × 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖)
9
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡
2 + 5𝑖𝑡 
(9) 
𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖
9
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖(𝑃𝑡 × 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖)
9
𝑖=1 + 𝛽6𝐷2014 +
𝛽7𝐷2015 + 𝛽8𝐷2016 + 6𝑖𝑡 (10) 
The disturbance terms ( 5𝑖𝑡 and 6𝑖𝑡) are specified as follows: 
5𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑔𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿5𝑔𝑡−𝜌 + 𝑣𝑡
10
𝜌=1   (11) 
6𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑧𝑡 + 𝜚𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿6𝑡−𝜌 + 𝜓𝑡
10
𝜌=1   (12) 
𝑔𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡  are constructed as common autoregressive processes so 𝛿5 and 
𝛿6  are the autocorrelation parameters and 𝜌 = 1,2 … .10.  𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝜚𝑖𝑡 are the 
idiosyncratic forcing terms which are uncorrelated over time and across 
lines. 
𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖 is a dummy variable for each line where i=1…9. The line dummies 
also control for the type of capital used on the line. An interaction term 
between the new management practice and the line dummy variables is 
included to analyse the impact of the new quality management practice 
for each line and whether the productivity of lines changes after the 
introduction of the practice.  
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Equations (13) and (14) also control for line fixed effects like equations 
(9) and (10). However, the main difference between the following 
equations and equations (9) to (10) is the specification of the 
autoregressive process for the error term. The  specification of equations 
(13) and (14) is similar to the specification employed  by Boning, 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2007). Equations (9) and (10) allow  𝜌 to vary 
between 1 to 10 and allow both contemporaneous and lagged spatial 
dependence. However, equations (13) and (14) restrict the errors to follow 
an autoregressive process of order 1 i.e. 𝜌 = 1  and only allow 
contemporaneous spatial dependence. The following equation will be 
estimated using pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors. 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖
9
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖(𝑃𝑡 × 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖)
9
𝑖=1 + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡
2 +
𝜇𝑖𝑡  (13) 




𝑖=1 + 𝛽6𝐷2014 +
𝛽7𝐷2015 + 𝛽8𝐷2016 + 𝑞𝑖𝑡  (14) 
Where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜎𝑖𝜇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐1𝑖𝑡  and 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝜊𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐2𝑖𝑡. 𝑐1𝑖𝑡 and 𝑐2𝑖𝑡 are serially 













IV. Results and Analysis 
The following section discusses the results of tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. 
Table 3.5 illustrates the impact of the implementation of the new quality 
management practice on total production using the estimates from 
equations (1) to (4) with slight variations in the specifications as the 
interaction terms between some variables are also included. For tables 
3.5 and 3.6, the auto correlation lag is 1 i.e. 𝜌 in equations (5) to (8) and 
equations (11) to (12) in section III is specified as 1. The results of tables 
3.5 and 3.6 were also estimated by using different lags to see whether the 
results remain robust to changes in lags. Hoechle (2007) suggests that 
the default lag chosen by Stata may not be optimal as the chosen lag 
length does not take into consideration the data set at hand. However, 
there is no procedure in Stata that would select a lag length by taking 
into consideration the data set. Also, Stata may select a lag length which 
might be small.  Stata chooses the autocorrelation lag as 6 by default26 
but results were estimated for lags beyond 6 i.e. 𝜌 varies between 1 to 10. 
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 (see appendix B) present the robustness 
results for columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of table 3.5 respectively. 
Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 (see appendix B) present the robustness results 
for columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of table 3.6 while tables 16 and 17 (see appendix 
B) report the results for columns 3 and 6 of table 3.6.  
The analysis has been divided into sections by key results. The following 
sections will discuss the results for control variables, the impact of the 
introduction of the new practice on productivity for complex and basic 
production, impact of the implementation of the practice by individual 
lines, comparison of the productivity of assembly lines before and after 
the implementation of the new practice, the impact of change in 
complexity on productivity and how the impact of the new management 
practice varies by the change in complexity.  
 






] where T=867, the lag length will be 6.46 as the floor function 




Table 3.5: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















Log of Workers 0.226*** 0.202** 0.216** 0.194** 0.227*** 0.203** 0.223** 0.200** 
 (0.0868) (0.0863) (0.0873) (0.0865) (0.0866) (0.0861) (0.0876) (0.0868) 
         
Log of Materials 0.207*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.196*** 0.207*** 0.199*** 0.207*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0208) 
         



















Log of Target 0.171** 0.236*** 0.221** 0.284*** 0.170** 0.236*** 0.183** 0.243*** 
 (0.0838) (0.0871) (0.0869) (0.0901) (0.0838) (0.0872) (0.0845) (0.0876) 




















Linear Time Trend 0.000766***  0.000814***  0.000746***  0.000792***  
 (0.000163)  (0.000159)  (0.000166)  (0.000171)  
















     










     










     


















    




Table 3.5: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















Deviation from the 
Average Standard 
Minute Value 








     
         










       
         
Constant 3.711*** 3.383*** 3.418*** 3.098*** 3.717*** 3.389*** 3.622*** 3.334*** 
 (0.820) (0.831) (0.828) (0.841) (0.820) (0.831) (0.824) (0.834) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
All models are estimated using fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.6: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Line Specific Effects with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
Log of Workers 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 
 (0.0869) (0.0867) (0.0871) (0.0860) (0.0859) (0.0861) 
       
Log of Materials 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0207) 
       















Log of Target 0.158* 0.156* 0.164* 0.224** 0.223** 0.226** 
 (0.0920) (0.0919) (0.0921) (0.0947) (0.0946) (0.0945) 
















Line 1B 0.0872*** 0.0873*** 0.0871*** 0.0849*** 0.0850*** 0.0848*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) 
       
Line 2A 0.0637 0.0650 0.0588 0.0622 0.0634 0.0589 
 (0.0397) (0.0396) (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0399) 
       
Line 2B 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.0967*** 0.0976*** 0.0987*** 0.0943*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0363) (0.0362) (0.0362) 
       
Line 3A -0.257*** -0.253*** -0.269*** -0.251*** -0.248*** -0.261*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0534) (0.0537) (0.0534) (0.0537) (0.0542) 
 
Line 3B -0.192*** -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.189*** -0.185*** -0.199*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0460) (0.0461) (0.0465) 
       
Line 4 0.141** 
(0.0660) 
0.144** 0.129* 0.110* 0.113* 0.101 
 (0.0661) (0.0665) (0.0657) (0.0659) (0.0665) 





Table 3.6: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Line Specific Effects with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
 
Line 5 -0.248*** -0.242*** -0.268*** -0.249*** -0.244*** -0.265*** 
 (0.0818) (0.0822) (0.0836) (0.0809) (0.0815) (0.0830) 
       
Line 6 0.0103 0.0121 0.00190 -0.00354 -0.00181 -0.00913 
 (0.0680) (0.0680) (0.0683) (0.0669) (0.0669) (0.0672) 

























































































































Linear Time Trend 0.000800*** 0.000780*** 0.000843***    
 (0.000156) (0.000158) (0.000162)    
       
Quadratic Time Trend -0.000000769*** -0.000000749*** -0.000000798***    





Table 3.6: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Line Specific Effects with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
 
Deviation from the Average 









   




  -0.0317*** 
(0.00953) 
  -0.0249*** 
(0.00959) 
     
Time Dummy for 2014    0.0875*** 0.0858*** 0.0918*** 
    (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0256) 
       
Time Dummy for 2015    0.208*** 0.205*** 0.211*** 
    (0.0325) (0.0327) (0.0331) 
       
Time Dummy for 2016    0.111*** 0.110*** 0.117*** 
    (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0351) 
       
Constant 3.960*** 
(0.844) 
3.974*** 3.887*** 3.593*** 3.605*** 3.561*** 
 (0.843) (0.845) (0.854) (0.854) (0.855) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
All models are estimated using pooled OLS with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. 
Standard errors in parentheses 












 Table 3.7: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
Log of Workers 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0467) (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0461) 
       
Log of Materials 0.0935*** 0.0937*** 0.0946*** 0.0904*** 0.0905*** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
       















Log of Target 0.156** 0.153* 0.158** 0.227*** 0.223*** 0.226*** 
 (0.0789) (0.0789) (0.0787) (0.0791) (0.0791) (0.0791) 
















Line 1B 0.0930*** 0.0930*** 0.0929*** 0.0911*** 0.0911*** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0332) 
       
Line 2A 0.0724* 0.0743* 0.0721* 0.0689* 0.0707* 0.0696* 
 (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0395) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0386) 
       
Line 2B 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0364) 
       
Line 3A -0.286*** -0.282*** -0.286*** -0.280*** -0.275*** -0.277*** 
 
Line 3B -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.204*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0420) (0.0413) (0.0414) (0.0415) 
       
Line 4 0.144** 0.148*** 0.142** 0.112** 0.117** 0.114** 
 (0.0564) (0.0565) (0.0563) (0.0559) (0.0560) (0.0560) 
       
Line 5 -0.279*** -0.270*** -0.279*** -0.281*** -0.273*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0638) (0.0641) (0.0641) (0.0635) (0.0638) (0.0639) 
142 
 
Table 3.7: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
 
Line 6 0.0170 0.0206 0.0159 -0.000313 0.00319 0.000742 
 (0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0565) (0.0567) (0.0567) (0.0567) 






























































































       















       















       
Linear Time Trend 0.000761*** 0.000735*** 0.000760***    
 (0.000170) (0.000170) (0.000170)    
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Table 3.7: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
 
Quadratic Time Trend -0.000000731*** -0.000000705*** -0.000000727***    
 (0.000000170) (0.000000171) (0.000000170)    
       
Deviation from the Average 









   
       




  -0.00963 
(0.00841) 
  -0.00440 
(0.00835) 
     
Time Dummy for 2014    0.0579** 0.0554** 0.0577** 
    (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) 
       
Time Dummy for 2015    0.217*** 0.214*** 0.215*** 
    (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0344) 
       
Time Dummy for 2016    0.0948*** 0.0929** 0.0949*** 
    (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0365) 
Constant 4.623*** 4.656*** 4.598*** 4.196*** 4.227*** 4.198*** 
 (0.684) (0.684) (0.682) (0.678) (0.678) (0.678) 










































































 .324  
.387 
 .414  
.391 
 .535  
.515 
All models are estimated using OLS with panel corrected standard errors 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010 
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IV.A Control Variables 
The estimated coefficients for workers, materials and target in table 3.5 
suggest a positive and significant relationship with production in all 
specifications. The coefficients for workers and materials are also robust 
across all lags, while the coefficients for target are not robust across all 
lags27. Most estimates show that the standard minute value has no 
significant impact on production apart from columns (3) and (4) which 
show that a one percent increase in the standard minute value is likely 
to reduce productivity by 0.0798 and 0.0705 percent respectively. 
However, these results are not very robust to changes in lags as table 6 
shows that the coefficient of the standard minute value is only significant 
up to lag 2 and table 7 shows that the standard minute value is not 
significant after lag 1. The coefficients for the linear and quadratic time 
trend indicate that productivity is increasing over time but at a 
decreasing rate. The time dummies show that firm productivity in years 
2014, 2015 and 2016 is higher than the base year which is 2013. 
The pattern of the results for workers, materials and target in tables 3.6 
and 3.7 is the same as table 3.5, but magnitudes slightly differ from table 
3.5. The linear time trend and the quadratic time trend in all 
specifications in tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the same pattern of results 
as table 3.5 such that productivity is increasing but at a decreasing rate. 
The time dummies in tables 3.6 and 3.7 also show that productivity in 
years 2014, 2015 and 2016 is higher than the productivity in year 2013. 
The coefficient for the standard minute value was insignificant for most 
specifications in table 3.5, but the coefficient for the standard minute 
value in all specifications in tables 3.6 and 3.7 reveals that an increase 
in the standard minute value is likely to reduce the productivity of the 
firm. This result is not surprising, given a fixed 480-minute shift; an 
increase in the time it takes to produce a garment on the line will reduce 
the number of garments that can be produced during that shift. These 
 
27 Table 4 shows that the coefficient for target is only significant up to lag 2. In table 6 and 8, the coefficient 
for target is insignificant after lag 8 and in table 10, it is insignificant after lag 3. 
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estimates for workers, materials and standard minute value are quite 
robust to changes in lags while the estimates for target are sensitive to 
the lag structure. 
IV.B. Complex vs. Basic Production 
Columns (1) and (2) in table 3.5 suggest that the implementation of the 
new quality management practice significantly decreases firm 
productivity. In column (1), the implementation of the new quality 
management practice significantly reduces firm productivity by 4.8 
percent and column (2) indicates that the implementation of the new 
quality management practice reduces firm productivity by 5.5 percent. 
However, table 4 shows that the coefficient for the new quality 
management practice in column (1) is only robust up to lag 2 and table 5 
shows that the coefficient for the new management practice in column (2) 
is significant28 across all lags. 
An interaction term between the dummy variable for basic and the new 
quality management practice was added in columns (3) and (4). The 
results in column (3) indicate that the implementation of the new quality 
management practice differs between basic and complex lines such that 
the implementation of the new quality management practice reduces the 
productivity of complex lines by 10.1 percent but reduces the productivity 
of basic lines by 2.66 percent. The only difference between the 
specification of column (3) and column (4) is the way in which time was 
defined as the time trend in column (3) is replaced by time dummies in 
column (4). The estimates in column (4) suggest that the implementation 
of the new quality management practice decreases the productivity of 
complex lines by 10.4 percent while reduces the productivity of basic 
lines by only 3.3 percent. Tables 6 and 7 show that the coefficient of the 
new quality management practice29 is significant across all lags i.e. the 
implementation of the new quality management practice significantly 
reduces productivity. However, the significant difference between the 
 
28 The level of significance changes from 1 percent to 10 percent in table 5. 
29 The level of significance of the coefficient of the new quality management practice changes from 1 percent 
to 5 percent in tables 6 and 7. 
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impact of the new management practice for basic and complex lines is 
only robust30 up to lag 4 in table 6 and robust up to lag 3 in table 7.  
Columns (5) and (6) also show that the implementation of the new quality 
management practice significantly reduces productivity. However, table 
8 shows that the result in column (5) is only significant up to lag 2 but 
table 9 shows that the result in column (6) is significant across all lags31. 
The estimates of table 3.5 provide us with evidence that the impact of the 
new quality management practice is contingent upon the complexity of 
production which is in line with the findings of Boning, Ichniowski and 
Shaw (2007). Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) provide evidence that 
group incentives raised productivity in all lines but the adoption of 
problem solving teams increased productivity on lines with more 
complicated processes while we provide evidence that the implementation 
of the new quality management practice reduces the productivity of both 
basic and complex lines but the magnitude of the reduction is greater for 
complex lines. 
IV.C. Impact of the New Quality Management Practice by Basic Lines 
Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that within the 
category of basic lines, the implementation of the new quality 
management practice significantly reduces the productivity for lines 1A, 
1B and 2A but increases the productivity of lines 3A and 3B32. Lines 1A 
and 1B are the most basic lines at the firm with the lowest average 
standard minute value and produce similar goods. The direction of the 
impact of the new management practice is the same for both, although 
 
30 The linear combination of the new management practice and the interaction term between basic and the 
new management practice is insignificant, but they remain jointly significant at the 10 percent level up to lag 
10. 
31 The level of significance changes to 10 percent at lag 10. 
32 The linear combination of the quality management practice and the interaction term of line 1B and the 
quality management practice is significant at the 1 percent level  in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of tables 3.6 and 
3.7. The linear combination of the quality management practice and the interaction term of line 2A and the 
quality management practice is significant at the 10 percent level in columns 1 and  2 of tables 3.6 and 3.7 





the magnitude is higher for line 1B. For example, in column (1) of table 
3.6, the introduction of the new quality management practice reduces the 
productivity of line 1A by 12.2 percent and reduces the productivity of 
line 1B by 13.1 percent. Lines 2A and 2B are also basic lines but with a 
higher average standard minute value as compared to lines 1A and 1B. 
Both lines 2A and 2B produce similar goods but the direction of the 
impact of the management practice differs across specifications. Columns 
1, 2, 4 and 5 of tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that the new quality management 
reduces the productivity of line 2A, but the magnitude of this reduction 
is smaller as compared to line 1A. However, columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 in 
table 3.6 and columns 1 and 2 in table 3.7 show that the introduction of 
the new quality management practice increases the productivity of line 
2B. Columns 4 and 5 in table 3.7 do not support this result for line 2B 
and illustrate that the implementation of the practice reduces the 
productivity of line 2B although the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
miniscule.  
Lines 3A and 3B are basic lines with a higher average standard minute 
value as compared to the rest of the basic lines. Both these lines produce 
similar products and the direction and magnitude of the impact of the 
new quality management practice is quite similar in most specifications. 
Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that the implementation 
of the new practice increases the productivity of lines 3A and 3B. For 
example, in column (1) of table 3.6, the introduction of the practice 
increases the productivity of line 3A by 8.4 percent and of line 3B by 8.6 
percent.  
The result that the implementation of the new quality management 
practice significantly reduces the productivity of line 1A is robust to 
changes in lag length. However, we observe that the level of significance 
for line 1A changes from 1 percent to 5 percent after lag 5 in table 12 and 
after lag 6 in table 13. The result that the implementation of the new 
quality management practice reduces the productivity of line 1B and the 
magnitude of the impact of the new practice is greater for line 1B as 
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compared to line 1A is also robust to changes in lags33. The results for 
lines 2B, 3A and 3B are also robust to changes in lag length34. The results 
for line 2A in columns 1 and 4 such that there is a significant difference 
in the impact of the new quality management practice between line 1A 
and 2A are only robust up to lag 2 and the results for columns 2 and 5 
are only significant up to lag 5. Although, the variable for the new 
management practice and the interaction term between line 2A remain 
jointly significant up to lag 10. 
IV.D. Impact of the New Quality Management Practice by Complex Lines 
Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that within the category 
of complex lines, the implementation of the new quality management 
practice significantly reduces the productivity35 of line 4. For example, in 
column (1) of table 3.6, the implementation of the new quality 
management practice reduces the productivity of line 4 by 20.5 percent. 
These results are also robust to changes in lag length36. 
We find mixed results for lines 5 and 6. Columns 1 and 2 of table 3.7 
show that there is no significant difference in the impact of the new 
quality management practice between line 5 and line 1A. The linear 
combination of the new quality management practice and the interaction 
term of line 5 and the quality management practice is insignificant in 
columns 1 and 2 of table 3.7, while the two variables are jointly 
significant at the 5 percent level. However, the linear combination of the 
new quality management practice and the interaction term of line 5 and 
the new quality management is significant at the 5 percent level in 
columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of table 3.6 and in columns 4 and 5 in table 3.7. 
These estimates suggest there is a significant difference between the 
 
33  The linear combination of the dummy for the new management practice and the interaction term between 
the quality management practice and line 1B was found to be significant at the 1 percent level up to lag 7 
after which it is significant at the 5 percent level in table 12. In table 14, these variables are significant at the 
1 percent level up to lag 5 and then at the 5 percent level till lag 10. The linear combination of the new quality 
management practice and the interaction term between line 1B and the new quality management practice is 
significant at the 1 percent level up to lag 10 in tables 13 and 15. 
34 The interaction term for line 2B and the new quality management practice is significant at the 5 percent 
level at lag 9 and 10 in table 12 and at lag 10 in table 13. 
35 The linear combination of the quality management practice and interaction term of line 4 and the new 
quality management practice is significant at the 1 percent in columns 4 and 5 of tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
36 The linear combination of the dummy for the new management practice and the interaction term between 
the quality management practice and line 4 was found to be significant at the 1 percent level up to lag 10 in 
tables 12,13,14 and 15. 
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impact of the new management practice between line 5 and line 1A. The 
implementation of the new practice reduces the productivity of line 5 
although the magnitude is less than that of line 1A.  
The robustness results for columns 1 and 2 of table 3.6 shown in tables 
12 and 13 indicate that the result for line 5 remains robust37 up to lag 4, 
although the coefficients are jointly significant at the 5 percent level up 
to lag 10. Tables 14 and 15 show that the result that the implementation 
of the new quality management practice reduces the productivity of line 
5 is robust38 up to lag 5. Overall, we find that the significant difference 
between the impact of the new management practice between line 5 and 
line 1A is not robust across all lags. 
Columns 1 and 2 in tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that the new management 
practice increases the productivity of line 6 but the magnitude is small.  
However, columns 4 and 5 in tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that the 
implementation of the practice significantly reduces the productivity of 
line 6. The results are also robust to changes in lag length39. 
Overall these findings contribute to the literature on insider econometrics 
(see Ichniowski and Shaw, 2009) which aims to find how management 
practices impact productivity and identify areas where new practices 
have smaller or larger effects. These results can also be linked to the 
study by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) in which they distinguish 
between good and bad management practices. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide 
evidence that whether the implementation of the new quality 
management practice constitutes a good practice or not varies by 
assembly line. Most of the previous work on management and firm 
performance has used cross sectional data where management is time 
invariant. The analysis also highlights the dynamics of managerial 
change and emphasizes that production complexity is an important 
 
37 The linear combination of the dummy for the new management practice and the interaction term between 
the new management practice and line 5 was found to be significant at 10 percent between lags 2 and 4 in 
tables 12 and 13.  
38 The linear combination of the new quality management practice and the interaction term between the new 
quality management practice and line 5 is significant at the 10 percent level between lags 2 and 5 in tables 
14 and 15. Although the two variables remain jointly significant at the 1 percent up to lag 10. 




element in determining the impact of management practices. We find 
strong evidence that the implementation of the new management practice 
increases productivity of lines 3A and 3B as this is supported by all 
specifications. Hence, it has a positive effect on basic lines with the 
highest complexity (denoted by the highest standard minute value) as 
compared to the rest of the basic lines. Most specifications show that the 
implementation of the new quality management practice has a negative 
impact on lines at the extreme ends of the complexity spectrum as it has 
a negative effect on very basic lines and on complex lines. Therefore, in 
these lines, the standard management practices seem to suffice. These 
findings can also be linked to the evidence provided by Boning, 
Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) such that the complexity of production is an 
important determinant of the success of new management practices. 
There is also some evidence that the impact of the new management 
practice is different for lines of similar complexity. For example, we 
observe that some specifications indicate the opposite impact for lines 2A 
and 2B which produce similar goods but line 2A is operated during the 
day and line 2B is operated at night. This points out that the production 
setting also plays a role in determining the impact of the new 
management practice. 
We provide evidence in chapter 2 that the implementation of the new 
practice increases worker productivity, but the sample only contained 
648 workers who were present at the firm for the whole period of data 
collection. During the production of denim jeans, there are five stages of 
production: small parts, back, front, assembly 1 and assembly 2. At the 
first stage small parts are produced to be ready for the back and front 
section. The front and back of the jeans are stitched individually but then 
the front and back is assembled during assembly 1 and assembly 2 to 
complete the garment. As production operations are interdependent, a 
bottleneck at any stage can reduce the productivity of the line. Hence, 
even if the productivity of certain workers increases as we have provided 
evidence in chapter 2, it does not assure that line productivity will also 
increase as the productivity of the line is dependent on all the stages of 
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the production process. Most specifications provide evidence that the 
implementation of the new management practice reduces productivity of 
line 1A, line 2A, line 4, line 5 and few specifications also indicate a 
negative impact on line 2B and line 6. Hence, for practices to be 
successful all workers have to trust the management such that all 
workers be evaluated with fairness. This result can be potentially linked 
to the suggestion by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) that the element 
of trust is important for new practices to be effective. The mistrust 
between workers and management has also been highlighted by 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1995) who mention that the lack of 
trust between workers and management in older steel lines rendered 
practices such as information sharing, employment security and 
productivity improvement teams ineffective. They gave various examples 
of mistrust between management and workers such as productivity 
enhancement teams were considered by workers as another trick by 
management to cut jobs and the contractual guarantee of job security 
was considered to be temporary which will be renegotiated during the 
negotiations of the next contract. good approximation is important. 
IV.E. Comparison of Lines Before and After the Implementation of the 
New Quality Management Practice  
The estimates in tables 3.6 and 3.7 both show that within the category of 
basic lines, line 1B was significantly more productive than line 1A before 
the implementation of the new practice. The implementation of the new 
management practice has a dampening effect on line 1B due to which the 
productivity gap between line 1A and 1B is reduced40. For example, the 
estimates in column (1) of table 3.6 shows that before the introduction of 
the practice, line 1B was 8.72 percent more productive than line 1A and 
after the implementation of the new practice, line 1B is only 7.79 percent 
more productive than line 1A. The estimates for line 1B provided in tables 
12 to 17 show that this result is also robust to changes in lag length41. 
 
40 The linear combination of the dummy for line 1B and the interaction term between the quality management 
practice and line 1B was found to be significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications in tables 3.6 and 
3.7. 
41 The linear combination of the dummy for line 1B and the interaction term between the quality management 
practice and line 1B remains significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications in tables 12 to 17. 
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We find mixed results for line 2A, such that table 3.7 illustrates that line 
2A is more productive than line 1A before and after the implementation 
of the new practice42. However, table 3.6 shows that the coefficients for 
line 2A and the interaction term between the new quality management 
practice and line 2A are both insignificant. Both these variables were 
tested for joint significance and were found to be significant at the 1 
percent level in all specifications in table 3.6 indicating that line 2A does 
matter overall but the data does not allow us to cleanly separate the 
effects for line 2A before and after the implementation of the new quality 
management practice. We dropped the interaction term between line 2A 
and the new quality management practice in table 3.6 and observed that 
the coefficient for line 2A was positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level in all specifications which indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the effect of line 2A before and after the implementation of 
the new quality management practice43. All specifications in tables 3.6 
and 3.7 show that line 2B was significantly more productive than line 1A 
before and after the implementation of the practice. These estimates are 
also robust to changes in lags44. 
The estimates in tables 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate that lines 3A and 3B were 
significantly less productive than line 1A before the introduction of the 
practice. All specifications in tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that line 3A still 
remains less productive than line 1A but the productivity differential 
between line 1A and line 3A is reduced drastically after the 
implementation of the new practice. However, all specifications in table 
3.6 show that line 3B is significantly more productive than 1A after the 
new management practice is introduced. This result is also supported by 
columns (5) and (6) of table 3.7, although the magnitude of the 
coefficients is small. The rest of the specifications in table 3.7 suggest 
that line 3B remains less productive than line 1A but the differential 
reduces by a large magnitude for example, column (1) in table 3.7 shows 
 
42 The linear combination of the dummy for line 2A and the interaction term between the quality management 
practice and line 2A was found to be significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications in table 3.7. 
43 These results are shown in table 3.6A in the appendix B. 
44 The level of significance for the dummy for line 2B and the interaction term between line 2B and the new 
quality management practice switches from the 1 percent level to the 5 percent level in some specifications. 
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that line 3B was 21.3 percent less productive than 1A but it is only 1.4 
percent less productive than line 1A after the practice was introduced. 
These results are also robust to changes in lags. 
The estimates for all specifications in tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that line 
5 was less productive as compared to line 1A before the implementation 
of the practice. However, line 5 is still less productive than 1A after the 
implementation of the new practice but the differential between the 
productivity of line 5 and 1A has slightly reduced after the introduction 
of the practice45. This result is also robust46 to changes in lags as shown 
in tables 12 to 17.  
Columns 1 to 6 of tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that there was no significant 
difference between the productivity of line 6 and line 1A before the 
implementation of the practice. However, all specifications in tables 3.6 
and 3.7 provide evidence that line 6 was more productive than line 1A 
after the new quality management practice was implemented47. The 
estimates for line 6 in table 3.6 are not very robust to changes in lags. 
The result in column 1 is only robust48 up to lag 3 as the linear 
combination of the dummy variable for line 6 and the interaction term 
between line 6 and the new practice is significant at the 10 percent level 
only up to lag 3 in table 12. The result for column 3 is only significant up 
to lag 4 as shown in table 16. In table 16, the variable for line 6 and the 
interaction term between line 6 and the new quality management practice 
remains jointly significant at the 10 percent level between lags 5 and 8 
after which the two variables are no longer jointly significant. The results 
for columns 2 and 5 are significant49 up to lag 10. The result for column 
4 is not significant at lags beyond 1, as the linear combination of the 
variable for line 6 and the interaction term between line 6 and the new 
 
45 The linear combination of the dummy for line 5 and the interaction term between the quality management 
practice and line 5 was found to be significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications in tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
46 The linear combination of the dummy for line 5 and the interaction term between the quality management 
practice and line 5 remains significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications in tables 12 to 17. 
47 The linear combination of the dummy for line 6 and the interaction term between the quality management 
practice and line 6 was found to be significant at the 5 percent level in all specifications in table 3.7 except 
column 4 where it is significant at the 10 percent level. The linear combination of the dummy for line 6 and 
the interaction term between the quality management practice and line 6 was found to be significant at the 
10 percent level in columns 1,4, 5 and 6 and significant at the 5 percent level in columns 1 and 3 of table 3.6. 
48 The two variables are jointly significant at the 10 percent level up to lag 5. 
49 The linear combination of line 6 and the interaction term between line 6 and the new quality management 
practice remains significant up to lag 10. 
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quality management practice is insignificant at lag 2 and at further lags. 
Although the two variables are jointly significant at the 5 percent level at 
lag 2 and then at the 10 percent level up to lag 4 and then are jointly 
insignificant at lags beyond 4. The result for column 6 is robust up to lag 
2 as the linear combination is only significant up to lag 2 but then the 
variables are jointly significant at the 5 percent level between lags 3 and 
4 and at the 10 percent level between lags 5 and 10. We observe that the 
dummy for line 6 is insignificant in tables 3.6 and 3.7 but the interaction 
term between line 6 and the new management practice is significant for 
all lags. As the linear combination between these two variables is not 
significant across all lags, so the total effect is insignificant. Hence, the 
data does not provide very strong evidence for cleanly estimating the 
productivity differential for line 6 before and after the implementation of 
the new management practice for all lags. 
Columns (1) to (5) in table 3.6 and all columns in table 3.7 show that line 
4 was significantly more productive than line 1A before the new quality 
management practice was implemented. Columns (1) and (2) in table 3.6 
and columns (1) to (3) in table 3.7 show that the implementation of the 
practice has a dampening effect on the productivity of line 4, although it 
is still more productive than line 1A after the implementation of the 
practice. Columns (3) to (5) in table 3.6 and columns (3) to (6) in table 3.7 
show that line 4 is more productive than line 1A irrespective of the 
introduction of the new management practice50. Column (6) in table 3.6 
shows that the coefficients of line 4 and the coefficient for the interaction 
term between line 4 and the new quality management was insignificant51. 
The coefficient for line 4 was insignificant even after dropping the 
interaction term between the new quality management practice and line 
4, indicating that line 4 has no effect on productivity in this specification. 
The result of columns (1) and (2) in table 3.6 which indicate that there is 
a significant difference in the productivity of line 4 before and after the 
 
50 The linear combination of line 4 and the interaction term between line 4 and the new quality management 
practice was insignificant in columns 3 to 5 in table 3.6 and columns 3 to 6 in table 3.7. The coefficient for 
line 4 and the interaction term between the new quality management practice and line 4 were found to be 
jointly insignificant in columns 3 to 6 in tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
51 These variables are also jointly insignificant. 
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implementation of the new practice is not robust to changes in lag length, 
as the interaction term between line 4 and the new quality management 
practice is insignificant after lag 1 in tables 12 and 13. The linear 
combination of the dummy for line 4 and the new quality management 
practice is also insignificant and the two variables are also not jointly 
significant. However, tables 12 and 13 show that the result that there is 
a productivity effect of line 4 irrespective of the new quality management 
practice is significant up to lag 6 and table 16 shows that this result is 
robust up to lag 3. The results of column 4 and 5 of table 3.6 such that 
line 4 is more productive than line 1A irrespective of the new quality 
management practice is not robust to changes in lags. Overall, the results 
for line 4 are not very robust. 
We find strong evidence that lines 3A, 3B and 5 were the worst performing 
lines at the firm as compared to line 1A before the practice. However, 
after the implementation of the new practice, there has been a drastic 
improvement in the productivity for line 3A as compared to line 1A and a 
few specifications show that line 3B is more productive than line 1A after 
the introduction of the practice.  Line 5 still remains less productive than 
line 1A but the productivity differential is slightly reduced after the 
implementation of the new practice.  
The motivation behind introducing the new quality management practice 
was to incentivize workers to reduce quality defects and enhance 
productivity (workers were paid piece rate throughout). Lower quality 
defects mean that workers spend less time on re-doing defective pieces, 
hence this should translate into higher productivity. The result that the 
implementation of the new quality management practice significantly 
impacts the productivity of assembly lines whether positively or 
negatively highlights two alternative theories. The principal-agent theory 
suggests that an external intervention is expected to improve effort levels 
of a self-interested agent, as he/she would minimise the possibility of a 
sanction if caught shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Prendergast, 
1999; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). However, the crowding out 
hypothesis derived from social psychology (Frey, 1993) illustrates an 
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alternative view; an external intervention may reduce an agent’s self-
esteem as the worker may feel that his/her intrinsic motivation is not 
being appreciated hence would reduce effort. Agents who have high 
intrinsic motivation may also see external interventions as a sign of 
distrust. Generally, both the disciplining and crowding effect are active; 
external interventions may have two opposing effects on the performance 
of workers. The benefit of the intervention to the principal depends upon 
the relative magnitudes of both the effects (Frey and Jegen, 2001). The 
evidence for the performance of lines before and after the implementation 
of the new quality management practice highlights a point that has not 
been well emphasized in the previous studies on providing external 
incentives to workers i.e. the complexity of production also plays a role 
in determining the benefit of the intervention to the agent.  
The decrease in productivity after the implementation of the new quality 
management practice also complements the theory by Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1994) such that when workers perform multiple tasks, 
increasing an incentive for one task would lead to workers focusing just 
on that particular task while neglecting the rest. This theory is 
particularly relevant as the quantity-quality trade off exists while workers 
are paid piece rates (Paarsch and Shearer, 1999). Higher stitching speed 
means that workers will skimp on quality. In our case, the incentive for 
quality changes while the incentives for productivity remains the same. 
Although we do not have data on line level quality defects52 so we cannot 
comment on how quality defects changed but one potential reason for the 
slowdown in productivity could be that overall lines were trying to 
produce slowly in order to produce better quality products and minimize 
quality defects after the incentive for quality was introduced. Increasing 
incentives for all tasks is likely to minimize this problem and incentives 
should be complementary in nature. Milgrom and Roberts (1995) 
suggested that bonuses for quality and piece rates are complementary 
practices but they also emphasize that these practices should be paired 
 
52 We used worker level data on quality defects for 648 workers before and after the implementation of the 
new quality management practice in chapter 1 but data on quality defects per assembly line is not available.  
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with policies that provide job security as employees may be threatened 
that productivity enhancement may result in loss of jobs. A proper 
channel of communication needs to be present between workers and 
management that enhances the trust needed to make the system work. 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) use results from 17 steel 
manufacturing lines to illustrate that firms should use a set of human 
resource management practices as it has a higher impact on productivity 
as compared to changes in individual practices. Lines with incentive pay 
plans, teams, flexible job assignments, job security, and training 
combined tend to achieve higher levels of productivity than lines with 
more traditional practices such as narrow job definitions, strict work 
rules and hourly pay with close supervision. Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi (1995) also suggest that employee participation in the form of 
ideas to improve productivity should be complemented by a job security 
policy as employees may be threatened that productivity enhancement 
may result in loss of jobs.   
IV.F. Change in Complexity  
The variable for the deviation from the average standard minute value in 
columns (5) and (6) in table 3.5 shows that there is no significant impact 
on productivity due to any deviation from the average standard minute 
value. However, the linear combination of the deviation from the average 
standard minute value and the interaction term between the deviation 
from the average standard minute value and the new quality 
management practice is significant at the 1 percent level in column (7) of 
table 3.5. This result indicates that a one percent deviation from the 
average standard minute value after the implementation of the new 
quality management practice is likely to reduce productivity by 0.0117. 
Table 10 also shows that this result remains robust53 up to lag 10. 
Column (8) of table 3.5 shows that the deviation from the average 
 
53 The linear combination of the deviation from the average standard minute value and the interaction term 




standard minute value has no significant impact on productivity before 
and after the implementation of the new practice.  
Column (3) of table 3.6 shows that the deviation from the average 
standard minute increases productivity before the implementation of the 
new practice but a one percent deviation from the average standard 
minute value after the implementation of the new quality management 
practice decreases productivity by 0.0155 percent. However, column (6) 
shows that a change in the average standard minute value has no 
significant impact on productivity before the implementation of the new 
quality management practice, but a one percent deviation from the 
average standard minute value after the implementation of the practice 
significantly decreases productivity. Column 6 shows that a one percent 
deviation from the average standard minute value after the 
implementation of the new quality management practice decreases 
productivity by 0.0128 percent54. The estimates in table 3.7 show that 
the deviation from the average standard minute value has no significant 
impact on productivity before and after the implementation of the new 
practice. 
IV.G. Impact of the New Quality Management Practice Due to the 
Change in Complexity of Production  
Column (7) in table 3.5 provides evidence that the impact of the new 
management practice varies by the deviation from the average standard 
minute value. Given that there is no deviation from the average standard 
minute value, the implementation of the new quality management 
practice significantly reduces productivity by 4.71 percent.  However, a 
one percent deviation from the average standard minute value is likely to 
further reduce productivity by 0.0195 percent. Therefore, given a one 
percent deviation from the average standard minute value, the 
implementation of the new practice is likely to reduce productivity by 4.73 
percent. Column (8) also shows that the impact of the new management 
 
54 The linear combination of the deviation from the average standard minute value and its interaction with 
the new management practice is significant at 1 percent in column 6 in table 3.6. 
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practice55 varies by the deviation from the average standard minute 
value. The results in tables 10 and 11 show that the impact of the new 
management practice which varies by the deviation from the average 
standard minute value remains significant56 up to lag 10.  
According to the results in column (3) of table 3.6, a one percent deviation 
from the average standard minute value is likely to reduce productivity. 
For example, after the implementation of the new quality management 
practice, a one percent deviation from the average standard minute value 
is likely to reduce productivity by 13.73 percent for line 1A. There is a 
significant difference between the impact of the implementation of the 
new quality management practice given a one percent deviation from the 
average standard minute value between line 1A and the rest of the lines. 
The magnitude of this effect is significantly higher for lines 1B and 4 as 
compared to line 1A57, such that the productivity for line 1B decreases 
by 14.6 percent and line 4 decreases by 19.4 percent. The new 
management practice also has a negative impact on the productivity of 
lines 2A and 5 but the magnitude is lower58. However, the impact of the 
new quality management practice, given a one percent deviation from the 
average standard minute value is positive for lines 2B, 3A, 3B and 6. It 
increases the productivity of line 2B by 1.9 percent, line 3A by 9.3 
percent, line 3B by 9.6 percent and line 6 by 1.2 percent. Column (6) also 
shows a similar pattern of results but magnitudes of the coefficients 
differ59 slightly.  
 
55 The linear combination of the new management practice and the interaction term of the deviation from 
the average standard minute value and the new management practice is significant at the 1 percent level. 
56 The linear combination of the new management practice and the interaction term between the deviation 
from the average standard minute value and the new management practice remains significant at the 1 
percent level between lags 3 and 10 in table 10 and across all lags in table 11. 
57 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 1B and 
the new management practice and the  interaction term between  the deviation from the average standard 
minute value and the new quality management practice is significant at the 1 percent level. The linear 
combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 4 and the new 
management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute value 
and the new quality management practice is significant at the 1 percent level.  
58 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 5 and 
the management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute 
value and the new quality management practice is significant at the 5 percent level. The linear combination 
of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 2A and the management practice 
and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute value and the new quality 
management practice is significant at the 5 percent level. 
59 The results for column (6) indicate the implementation of the new practice increases the production of line 
6 by only 0.1 percent. 
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These results for lines 1A, 1B, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4 and 6 are quite robust60 to 
changes in lags. However, the results for line 2A61 in column (3) is only 
significant up to lag 8. The result for line 5 in column (3) is only 
significant62 up to lag 4 and the result in column (6) is significant up to 
lag 5. 
Columns (3) and (6) in table 3.7 show a similar pattern of results for lines 
1A63, 1B64, 2A65 and 4. The results for line 2B are different from table 3.6 
as the linear combination of the new management practice, the 
interaction term between line 2B and the new management practice and 
the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard 
minute value and the new quality management practice is insignificant 
indicating that the deviation from the average standard minute value has 
no effect on the impact of the new management practice for line 2B. For 
line 2B, the implementation of the practice increases productivity by 2.1 
percent in column (3) and decreases it by 0.1 percent in column (6). 
The linear combination of the new management practice, the interaction 
term between line 3A and the new management practice and the 
interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute 
value and the new quality management practice is insignificant. Hence, 
 
60 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 4 and 
the new management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard 
minute value and the new quality management practice remains significant at the 1 percent level. The linear 
combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 1B and the new 
management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute value 
and the new quality management practice remains significant at the 1 percent level. 
61 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 2A and 
the new management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard 
minute value and the new quality management practice is significant at the 5 percent level at lag 2 and 3 and 
then significant at the 10 percent level up to lag 8 in tables 16 and 17. These variables are still jointly 
significant at lag 9 and 10. 
62 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 5 and 
new management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute 
value and the new quality management practice is significant at the 5 percent level at lag 2 and then significant 
at the 10 percent level up to lag 4 in column 3 and significant at the 10 percent level up to lag 5 in column 6. 
These variables remain jointly significant at the 1 percent level up to lag 10 in columns 3 and 6. 
63 The linear combination of the new quality management practice and the interaction term between the 
deviation from the average standard minute value and the new quality management practice is significant at 
the 1 percent level in columns 3 and 6 in table 3.7. 
64 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 1B and 
the management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute 
value and the new quality management practice remains significant at the 1 percent level in columns 3 and 
6 in table 3.7. The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between 
line 4 and the management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard 
minute value and the new quality management practice remains significant at the 1 percent level in columns 
3 and 6 in table 3.7. 
65 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 2A and 
the management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute 




the deviation from the average standard minute value has no effect on 
the impact of the implementation of the new management practice for 
line 3A. Columns (3) and (6) show that the implementation of the new 
practice increases the productivity of line 3A by 9.2 percent and 6.5 
percent respectively. The results for line 3B show that the deviation from 
the average standard minute value after the implementation of the new 
practice significantly impacts the productivity of line 3B66. Hence, even 
after a one percent deviation from the average standard minute value, the 
implementation of the new quality management practice increases 
productivity for line 3B. Lines 5 and 6 show that the deviation from the 
average standard minute value after the implementation of the new 
practice has no impact on their productivity67.  
Overall the result that is supported by all specifications is that the 
implementation of the new quality management practice does vary by the 
change in complexity for mostly basic lines i.e. lines 1A, 1B, 2A, 3B and 
one complex line i.e. line 4. Therefore, it is not only the differences in the 
complexity of production across lines that explains the variation in the 
impact of the new quality management practice but changes in the 
complexity of production within a line is also a determinant of the impact 
of new management practices. These results are in line with the 
discussions with supervisors who suggested that a change in style 
usually has a dampening effect on productivity as workers take a while 
to get used to the new style of production. These results further elaborate 
the literature on good and bad management practices (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2007; Bloom  and Van Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al., 2013) such 
that the change in the complexity of production within the same working 
 
66 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 3B and 
the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard minute value and the new quality 
management practice is significant at the 10 percent level. 
67 The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the interaction term between line 5 and 
the new management practice and the interaction term between the deviation from the average standard 
minute value and the new quality management practice is insignificant but these variables are jointly 
significant at the 5 percent level. The linear combination of the new quality management practice, the 
interaction term between line 6 and the quality management practice and the interaction term between the 
deviation from the average standard minute value and the new quality management practice is insignificant 




group is also a determinant of how successful management practices are 





























This research adds to the literature on management and firm productivity 
and complements the study by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). The 
answer to the question of whether this new management practice turns 
out to be a good management practice or not is not straight forward as 
the impact of the new practice varies by assembly line. The results 
provide evidence in line with Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007)  such 
that the impact of new management practices is contingent upon the 
complexity of production as there are sizeable differences in the impact 
of the new quality management practice between complex and basic lines. 
The implementation of the new practice decreases the productivity of 
basic lines (1A, 1B and 2A) and complex lines (lines 4 and 5). However, 
we find mixed results for line 2B (basic line) and line 6 (complex line). All 
specifications show that the new practice increases the productivity of 
lines 3A and 3B, which produce relatively more complex products as 
compared to the rest of the basic lines. Therefore, we suggest that the 
standard management practices seem to suffice for very basic lines and 
complex lines, while the new practice is beneficial for lines 3A and 3B. 
Significant differences were also found in the impact of the new quality 
management practice for lines that produce similar products. For 
example, differences were found between day and night shifts of lines 
that have a similar average standard minute value. The implementation 
of the new quality management practice works in the opposite manner 
for lines 2A and 2B according to some specifications where an increase 
in productivity is observed for line 2B but a decrease in productivity is 
observed for line 2A. Line 4 and line 6 have a similar average standard 
minute value but the greatest reduction in productivity due to the 
implementation of the new quality management practice is observed for 
line 4 while some specifications show a positive impact and some show a 
negative impact for line 6. Line 5 has the highest average standard 
minute value and the implementation of the new quality management 
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practice reduces the productivity for line 5, although the magnitude is 
less than that of line 1A.  
We also observe that the impact of the new quality management practice 
also varies by the change in complexity of production denoted by the 
deviation from the average standard minute value and this effect also 
differs by assembly line as some specifications show that it further 
amplifies the negative effect of the new quality management practice 
while some specifications show that this effect is insignificant. 
The limitation of this study is that the data on quality defects per line is 
not available so we cannot provide empirical evidence on how quality 







Table 4: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 1 Table 3.5) 
 ( lag 1) ( lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 









































           
Log of Materials 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0229) 
           























Log of Target 0.171** 0.171* 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 
 (0.0838) (0.0960) (0.105) (0.111) (0.116) (0.120) (0.123) (0.125) (0.127) (0.128) 






































































 (0.000000198) (0.000000208) (0.000000218) (0.000000226) (0.000000233) (0.000000239) (0.000000244) 
           
Constant 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 3.711*** 
 (0.820) (0.914) (0.978) (1.026) (1.060) (1.086) (1.106) (1.119) (1.128) (1.135) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 5: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 2 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 0.202** 
 (0.0863) (0.0904) (0.0928) (0.0941) (0.0948) (0.0955) (0.0962) (0.0970) (0.0976) (0.0981) 
           
Log of Materials 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) 
           























Log of Target 0.236*** 0.236** 0.236** 0.236** 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 
 (0.0871) (0.100) (0.109) (0.116) (0.121) (0.125) (0.128) (0.131) (0.132) (0.134) 






























































































Constant 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 3.383*** 
 (0.831) (0.928) (0.995) (1.044) (1.078) (1.103) (1.123) (1.136) (1.144) (1.151) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 6: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 3 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 0.216** 
 (0.0873) (0.0917) (0.0944) (0.0960) (0.0970) (0.0979) (0.0989) (0.0998) (0.101) (0.101) 
           
Log of Materials 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
           






















Log of Target 0.221** 0.221** 0.221** 0.221* 0.221* 0.221* 0.221* 0.221* 0.221 0.221 
 (0.0869) (0.0999) (0.109) (0.116) (0.122) (0.126) (0.130) (0.133) (0.135) (0.136) 


























































































 (0.000000154) (0.000000170) (0.000000183) (0.000000194) (0.000000204) (0.000000214) (0.000000223) (0.000000230) (0.000000236) (0.000000242) 
           
Constant 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 3.418*** 
 (0.828) (0.924) (0.989) (1.038) (1.072) (1.098) (1.119) (1.132) (1.141) (1.149) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010 
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Table 7: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 4 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194** 0.194* 
 (0.0865) (0.0907) (0.0932) (0.0946) (0.0955) (0.0962) (0.0971) (0.0979) (0.0986) (0.0992) 
           
Log of Materials 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0232) 
           























Log of Target 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 
 (0.0901) (0.104) (0.114) (0.121) (0.127) (0.131) (0.135) (0.138) (0.141) (0.143) 






















































































































Constant 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 3.098*** 
 (0.841) (0.941) (1.010) (1.060) (1.095) (1.122) (1.143) (1.157) (1.167) (1.176) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 8: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 5 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.227*** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 0.227** 
 (0.0866) (0.0909) (0.0933) (0.0947) (0.0955) (0.0962) (0.0969) (0.0977) (0.0982) (0.0988) 
           
Log of Materials 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) 
           























Log of Target 0.170** 0.170* 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.170 
 (0.0838) (0.0960) (0.105) (0.111) (0.116) (0.120) (0.123) (0.125) (0.127) (0.129) 

















































Linear Time Trend 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 0.000746*** 
 (0.000166) (0.000183) (0.000196) (0.000207) (0.000218) (0.000227) (0.000236) (0.000243) (0.000249) (0.000254) 

































 (0.000000160) (0.000000177) (0.000000190) (0.000000201) (0.000000211) (0.000000221) (0.000000229) (0.000000236) (0.000000242) (0.000000247) 
           
Constant 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 3.717*** 
 (0.820) (0.913) (0.978) (1.025) (1.060) (1.086) (1.106) (1.118) (1.128) (1.135) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 9: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 6 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 0.203** 
 (0.0861) (0.0902) (0.0925) (0.0938) (0.0945) (0.0951) (0.0959) (0.0966) (0.0971) (0.0976) 
           
Log of Materials 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0219) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0229) 
           























Log of Target 0.236*** 0.236** 0.236** 0.236** 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 0.236* 
 (0.0872) (0.100) (0.109) (0.116) (0.121) (0.125) (0.128) (0.131) (0.133) (0.134) 





















































































































Constant 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 3.389*** 
 (0.831) (0.928) (0.995) (1.044) (1.078) (1.104) (1.124) (1.136) (1.145) (1.152) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010 
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Table 10: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 7 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 0.223** 
 (0.0876) (0.0919) (0.0944) (0.0959) (0.0967) (0.0974) (0.0982) (0.0989) (0.0996) (0.100) 
           
Log of Materials 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0222) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0230) 
           























Log of Target 0.183** 0.183* 0.183* 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.183 
 (0.0845) (0.0968) (0.106) (0.112) (0.117) (0.121) (0.124) (0.127) (0.129) (0.130) 









































































           
Linear Time Trend 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 0.000792*** 
 (0.000171) (0.000188) (0.000201) (0.000213) (0.000224) (0.000234) (0.000242) (0.000249) (0.000255) (0.000260) 























 (0.000000163) (0.000000181) (0.000000194) (0.000000206) (0.000000216) (0.000000226) (0.000000235) (0.000000242) (0.000000247) (0.000000252) 
           
Constant 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 3.622*** 
 (0.824) (0.918) (0.984) (1.033) (1.068) (1.094) (1.116) (1.130) (1.140) (1.148) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 8 Table 3.5) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 0.200** 
 (0.0868) (0.0910) (0.0933) (0.0945) (0.0953) (0.0959) (0.0967) (0.0974) (0.0980) (0.0985) 
           
Log of Materials 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0229) 
           























Log of Target 0.243*** 0.243** 0.243** 0.243** 0.243** 0.243* 0.243* 0.243* 0.243* 0.243* 
 (0.0876) (0.101) (0.110) (0.117) (0.122) (0.126) (0.129) (0.132) (0.134) (0.135) 







































































































































Constant 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 3.334*** 
 (0.834) (0.932) (1.000) (1.050) (1.084) (1.110) (1.131) (1.144) (1.154) (1.162) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010 
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Table 12: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 1 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 
 (0.0869) (0.0915) (0.0945) (0.0964) (0.0976) (0.0986) (0.0997) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
           
Log of Materials 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0230) 
           























Log of Target 0.158* 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 
 (0.0920) (0.106) (0.116) (0.124) (0.129) (0.134) (0.138) (0.141) (0.143) (0.145) 

























Line 1B 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 0.0872*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0304) (0.0309) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0323) 
           
Line 2A 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 0.0637 
 (0.0397) (0.0432) (0.0457) (0.0474) (0.0486) (0.0495) (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0510) 
           
Line 2B 0.101*** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 0.101** 
 (0.0363) (0.0393) (0.0416) (0.0432) (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0456) (0.0463) (0.0469) (0.0475) 
           
Line 3A -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.257*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0589) (0.0631) (0.0659) (0.0679) (0.0692) (0.0704) (0.0710) (0.0715) (0.0719) 
           
Line 3B -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0508) (0.0542) (0.0571) (0.0595) (0.0616) (0.0635) (0.0651) (0.0663) (0.0674) 
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Table 12: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 1 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 

























     0.141* 
(0.0763) 
    0.141* 
(0.0797) 
     0.141* 
(0.0826) 
     0.141* 
(0.0850) 
     0.141 
(0.0869) 
     0.141 
(0.0883) 
     0.141 
(0.0896) 
      0.141 
 (0.0908) 
           
Line 5 -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248** -0.248** -0.248** -0.248** -0.248** -0.248** -0.248** 
 (0.0818) (0.0889) (0.0939) (0.0977) (0.101) (0.103) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) 
           
Line 6 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 
 (0.0680) (0.0741) (0.0788) (0.0827) (0.0857) (0.0883) (0.0904) (0.0919) (0.0932) (0.0943) 




















































































































































Table 12: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 1 Table 3.6) 
 ( lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 






































































Linear Time Trend 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 0.000800*** 
 (0.000156) (0.000171) (0.000182) (0.000193) (0.000202) (0.000211) (0.000218) (0.000225) (0.000230) (0.000235) 

































 (0.000000151) (0.000000167) (0.000000179) (0.000000189) (0.000000199) (0.000000209) (0.000000217) (0.000000224) (0.000000230) (0.000000235) 
           
Constant 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 3.960*** 
 (0.844) (0.947) (1.018) (1.071) (1.110) (1.138) (1.160) (1.174) (1.184) (1.192) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 13: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 2 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 0.237** 
 (0.0867) (0.0913) (0.0943) (0.0962) (0.0974) (0.0984) (0.0994) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) 
           
Log of Materials 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0229) 
           























Log of Target 0.156* 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 
 (0.0919) (0.106) (0.116) (0.123) (0.129) (0.134) (0.138) (0.141) (0.143) (0.145) 

























Line 1B 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 0.0873*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0303) (0.0309) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0322) 
           
Line 2A 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 0.0650 
 (0.0396) (0.0431) (0.0456) (0.0473) (0.0485) (0.0494) (0.0500) (0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0511) 
 
 
Line 2B 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** 
 (0.0362) (0.0392) (0.0416) (0.0432) (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0456) (0.0463) (0.0470) (0.0476) 
           
Line 3A -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0591) (0.0634) (0.0662) (0.0681) (0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0714) (0.0719) (0.0723) 
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Table 13: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 2 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





















Line 3B -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0508) (0.0543) (0.0572) (0.0596) (0.0617) (0.0637) (0.0652) (0.0664) (0.0676) 
           
Line 4 0.144** 0.144** 0.144* 0.144* 0.144* 0.144* 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 
 (0.0661) (0.0723) (0.0766) (0.0801) (0.0832) (0.0856) (0.0876) (0.0891) (0.0905) (0.0917) 
           
Line 5 -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** -0.242** 
 (0.0822) (0.0895) (0.0948) (0.0987) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) 
           
Line 6 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 
 (0.0680) (0.0741) (0.0788) (0.0827) (0.0857) (0.0883) (0.0904) (0.0920) (0.0934) (0.0945) 



























































































































Table 13: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 2 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





































































































































































           












































Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 14: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 4 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 
 (0.0860) (0.0905) (0.0933) (0.0950) (0.0962) (0.0971) (0.0980) (0.0989) (0.0995) (0.100) 
           
Log of Materials 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0212) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0230) 
           























Log of Target 0.224** 0.224** 0.224* 0.224* 0.224* 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.224 
 (0.0947) (0.109) (0.120) (0.127) (0.133) (0.138) (0.142) (0.145) (0.147) (0.149) 

























Line 1B 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 0.0849*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0281) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0308) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0322) 
           
Line 2A 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 0.0622 
 (0.0398) (0.0433) (0.0458) (0.0475) (0.0488) (0.0496) (0.0503) (0.0506) (0.0510) (0.0514) 
           
Line 2B 0.0976*** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 0.0976** 
 (0.0363) (0.0393) (0.0416) (0.0432) (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0456) (0.0464) (0.0470) (0.0477) 
           
Line 3A -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** -0.251*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0592) (0.0634) (0.0662) (0.0681) (0.0695) (0.0706) (0.0712) (0.0716) (0.0719) 
           
Line 3B -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0502) (0.0535) (0.0562) (0.0584) (0.0604) (0.0622) (0.0635) (0.0645) (0.0654) 
           
Line 4 0.110* 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.110 
 (0.0657) (0.0714) (0.0752) (0.0783) (0.0809) (0.0829) (0.0845) (0.0856) (0.0866) (0.0875) 
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Table 14: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 4 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





















Line 5 -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.249** -0.249** -0.249** -0.249** -0.249** -0.249** 
 (0.0809) (0.0878) (0.0925) (0.0961) (0.0987) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) 
           
Line 6 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 -0.00354 
 (0.0669) (0.0727) (0.0770) (0.0806) (0.0832) (0.0855) (0.0872) (0.0885) (0.0895) (0.0903) 











































































































































































Table 14: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 4 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 


















































































































Constant 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 3.593*** 
 (0.854) (0.962) (1.035) (1.088) (1.127) (1.155) (1.178) (1.192) (1.203) (1.211) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 

















Table 15: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 5 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 
 (0.0859) (0.0904) (0.0931) (0.0948) (0.0960) (0.0969) (0.0978) (0.0987) (0.0993) (0.0999) 
           
Log of Materials 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0230) 
           























Log of Target 0.223** 0.223** 0.223* 0.223* 0.223* 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223 
 (0.0946) (0.109) (0.119) (0.127) (0.133) (0.138) (0.142) (0.145) (0.147) (0.149) 

























Line 1B 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 0.0850*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0281) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0312) (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0322) 
           
Line 2A 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 0.0634 
 (0.0397) (0.0432) (0.0458) (0.0475) (0.0487) (0.0496) (0.0502) (0.0506) (0.0510) (0.0514) 
           
Line 2B 0.0987*** 
(0.0362) 
0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0987** 
 (0.0392) (0.0415) (0.0432) (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0457) (0.0464) (0.0471) (0.0478) 
           
Line 3A -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.248*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0594) (0.0637) (0.0665) (0.0685) (0.0699) (0.0710) (0.0716) (0.0721) (0.0723) 
           
Line 3B -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0504) (0.0537) (0.0564) (0.0586) (0.0606) (0.0624) (0.0637) (0.0648) (0.0657) 
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Table 15: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 5 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





















Line 4 0.113* 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 
 (0.0659) (0.0718) (0.0757) (0.0789) (0.0816) (0.0837) (0.0854) (0.0866) (0.0877) (0.0886) 
           
Line 5 -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.244** -0.244** -0.244** -0.244** -0.244** -0.244** -0.244** 
 (0.0815) (0.0885) (0.0935) (0.0972) (0.100) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) 
           
Line 6 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 -0.00181 
 (0.0669) (0.0727) (0.0771) (0.0807) (0.0833) (0.0856) (0.0874) (0.0887) (0.0897) (0.0906) 



















































































































































Table 15: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 5 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 


































































































































































Constant 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 3.605*** 
 (0.854) (0.961) (1.035) (1.089) (1.127) (1.155) (1.178) (1.193) (1.204) (1.212) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 16: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 3 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 
 (0.0871) (0.0918) (0.0948) (0.0967) (0.0979) (0.0989) (0.0999) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) 
           
Log of Materials 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0232) 
           























Log of Target 0.164* 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 
 (0.0921) (0.106) (0.116) (0.124) (0.129) (0.134) (0.138) (0.141) (0.143) (0.145) 

























Line 1B 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 0.0871*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0303) (0.0309) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0322) 
           
Line 2A 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 0.0588 
 (0.0399) (0.0434) (0.0460) (0.0476) (0.0488) (0.0496) (0.0502) (0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0512) 
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Table 16: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 3 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





















Line 2B 0.0967*** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 0.0967** 
 (0.0361) (0.0391) (0.0415) (0.0431) (0.0441) (0.0447) (0.0454) (0.0461) (0.0468) (0.0474) 
           
Line 3A -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.269*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0593) (0.0634) (0.0661) (0.0680) (0.0694) (0.0704) (0.0711) (0.0715) (0.0718) 
           
Line 3B -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0510) (0.0543) (0.0572) (0.0595) (0.0617) (0.0636) (0.0652) (0.0664) (0.0675) 
           
Line 4 0.129* 0.129* 0.129* 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 
 (0.0665) (0.0728) (0.0772) (0.0806) (0.0836) (0.0860) (0.0879) (0.0894) (0.0907) (0.0919) 
           
Line 5 -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.268** -0.268** -0.268** -0.268** -0.268** -0.268** 
 (0.0836) (0.0912) (0.0967) (0.101) (0.104) (0.106) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) 
           
Line 6 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 0.00190 
 (0.0683) (0.0745) (0.0793) (0.0834) (0.0864) (0.0890) (0.0911) (0.0927) (0.0940) (0.0951) 



























Table 16: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 3 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 







































































































































































Table 16: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 3 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 













































Linear Time Trend 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 0.000843*** 





















































           



















































Constant 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 3.887*** 
 (0.845) (0.949) (1.021) (1.073) (1.112) (1.140) (1.163) (1.178) (1.188) (1.196) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010 
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Table 17: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 6 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 




















Log of Workers 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 0.219** 
 (0.0861) (0.0907) (0.0935) (0.0952) (0.0963) (0.0973) (0.0982) (0.0991) (0.0997) (0.100) 
           
Log of Materials 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0232) 
           























Log of Target 0.226** 0.226** 0.226* 0.226* 0.226* 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.226 
 (0.0945) (0.109) (0.119) (0.127) (0.133) (0.138) (0.142) (0.145) (0.147) (0.149) 




-0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0386) (0.0408) (0.0425) (0.0435) (0.0443) (0.0450) (0.0454) (0.0457) (0.0460) 
           
Line 1B 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 0.0848*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0281) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0322) 
           
Line 2A 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 0.0589 
 (0.0399) (0.0435) (0.0461) (0.0478) (0.0490) (0.0499) (0.0505) (0.0509) (0.0512) (0.0516) 
           
190 
 
Table 17: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 6 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





















Line 2B 0.0943*** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 0.0943** 
 (0.0362) (0.0392) (0.0415) (0.0432) (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0457) (0.0464) (0.0471) (0.0478) 
           
Line 3A -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -0.261*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0599) (0.0640) (0.0667) (0.0687) (0.0700) (0.0711) (0.0716) (0.0720) (0.0722) 
           
Line 3B -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0507) (0.0539) (0.0567) (0.0589) (0.0609) (0.0626) (0.0640) (0.0650) (0.0659) 
           
Line 4 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 
 (0.0665) (0.0726) (0.0767) (0.0799) (0.0826) (0.0847) (0.0864) (0.0876) (0.0887) (0.0896) 
           
Line 5 -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.265** -0.265** -0.265** -0.265** -0.265** -0.265** 
 (0.0830) (0.0904) (0.0958) (0.0997) (0.103) (0.105) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) 
           
Line 6 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 -0.00913 
 (0.0672) (0.0731) (0.0777) (0.0814) (0.0841) (0.0864) (0.0882) (0.0895) (0.0906) (0.0914) 
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Table 17: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 6 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 































































































































































































Table 17: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity with Autocorrelation Lag up to 10 (Column 6 Table 3.6) 
 (lag 1) (lag 2) (lag 3) (lag 4) (lag 5) (lag 6) (lag 7) (lag 8) (lag 9) (lag 10) 





















Time Dummy for 
2014 
0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0918*** 0.0918** 0.0918** 0.0918** 0.0918** 
 (0.0256) (0.0284) (0.0305) (0.0323) (0.0336) (0.0348) (0.0358) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0371) 
           
Time Dummy for 
2015 
0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0369) (0.0398) (0.0421) (0.0438) (0.0451) (0.0462) (0.0469) (0.0474) (0.0477) 
           
Time Dummy for 
2016 
0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117** 0.117** 0.117** 0.117** 0.117** 
 (0.0351) (0.0389) (0.0416) (0.0439) (0.0454) (0.0467) (0.0477) (0.0484) (0.0487) (0.0491) 
           



















































Constant 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 3.561*** 
 (0.855) (0.962) (1.036) (1.089) (1.128) (1.156) (1.179) (1.194) (1.204) (1.213) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3.6 A: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (excluding Line 2A*Quality Management Practice) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
Log of Workers 0.236*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.218** 0.218** 0.218** 
 (0.0868) (0.0867) (0.0870) (0.0860) (0.0859) (0.0861) 
       
Log of Materials 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0207) 
       














Log of Target 0.153* 0.151* 0.157* 0.219** 0.217** 0.219** 
 (0.0916) (0.0915) (0.0915) (0.0941) (0.0941) (0.0940) 
       
Quality Management Practice -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0307) 
       
Line 1B 0.0998*** 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.0983*** 0.0991*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0264) 
       
Line 2A 0.0895*** 0.0921*** 0.0943*** 0.0897*** 0.0921*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0241) 
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Table 3.6 A: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Excluding Line 2A*Quality Management Practice) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
 
Line 2B 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0300) 
 
Line 3A -0.245*** -0.240*** -0.252*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.244*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0516) (0.0519) 
       
Line 3B -0.180*** -0.175*** -0.187*** -0.176*** -0.172*** -0.182*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0442) (0.0444) (0.0436) (0.0439) (0.0442) 
       
Line 4 0.155** 0.159** 0.149** 0.126** 0.129** 0.121* 
 (0.0637) (0.0640) (0.0641) (0.0634) (0.0638) (0.0641) 
       
Line 5 -0.235*** -0.229*** -0.250*** -0.236*** -0.230*** -0.247*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0812) (0.0824) (0.0798) (0.0805) (0.0818) 
       
Line 6 0.0245 0.0270 0.0215 0.0118 0.0142 0.0106 
 (0.0669) (0.0670) (0.0672) (0.0657) (0.0658) (0.0660) 
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Table 3.6 A: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity(Excluding Line 2A*Quality Management Practice) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 






















































































Linear Time Trend 0.000795*** 0.000776*** 0.000836***    
 (0.000156) (0.000158) (0.000163)    
       
Quadratic Time Trend -0.000000764*** -0.000000744*** -0.000000790***    
 (0.000000151) (0.000000153) (0.000000156)    
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Table 3.6 A: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Firm Productivity (Excluding Line 2A*Quality Management Practice) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production Log of Production 
 
Deviation from Standard 
Minute Value*Quality 
Management Practice 
  -0.0304*** 
(0.00956) 
  -0.0237** 
(0.00961) 
Time Dummy for 2014    0.0871*** 0.0855*** 0.0911*** 
    (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0256) 
       
Time Dummy for 2015    0.207*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 
    (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0332) 
 
Time Dummy for 2016    0.110*** 0.109*** 0.116*** 
    (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0351) 
       
Constant 3.987*** 4.002*** 3.926*** 3.626*** 3.638*** 3.604*** 
 (0.842) (0.842) (0.844) (0.852) (0.852) (0.853) 
Observations 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 7031 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Chapter 4  
 
 I. Introduction 
Labour turnover is a prominent subject of labour economics, which has 
prompted empirical research on the effects of employee tenure on job 
mobility. This research complements the diverse literature on employee 
turnover (Jovanovic, 1979; Anderson et al., 1994; Parsons, 1972; 
Donohue, 1988; Bishop, 1990; Sicherman, 1996). 
After analysing the data for chapter 2 to study the impact of the new 
quality management practice on worker productivity and quality defects, 
a high attrition rate of workers was noticed over the period of observation 
i.e. August 2013 to June 2016. The factory has an average of 1400 to 
1500 workers on the assembly line each day. However, there were only 
648 workers who remained with the firm over the period of observation 
and new workers joined the firm at various points in time. This motivated 
us to explore the reasons for such turnover. The aim of chapter 4 is to 
investigate whether the new quality management practice impacts total 
turnover (voluntary and involuntary turnover). 
The new quality management practice brings in three new features on the 
factory floor: rewards and recognition according to the performance of the 
worker, increased monitoring and peer pressure. Shocks at the workplace 
have been suggested to play a role in the turnover problem (Lee and 
Mitchell, 1994). A shock has been described as any positive, negative and 
neutral expected or unexpected event that shakes the employee out of 
steady state and initiates feelings about leaving the job. Shocks due to 
negative feedback during informal or formal performance appraisals have 
been recognised (Allen and Griffeth, 1999) and practices that aim to 
enhance performance increase the number of quits and dismissals as the 
enhanced standard may expose individuals who do not match up to the 
criteria of the new practice (Batt and Colvin, 2011). The research takes 
motivation from the theory of Lee and Mitchell (1994) to empirically test 
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the impact of a unique quality management practice on employee 
turnover.  
The research also draws its motivation from the job matching theory 
(Jovanovic, 1979) and aims to test whether the impact of the new 
management practice is likely to vary with job tenure. Hence, another 
interesting feature of this research is that it seeks to find whether the 
impact of the new quality management practice for workers with shorter 
tenures is different from the impact on workers with relatively longer 
tenures. There is limited empirical work on the effects of new 
management practices on turnover; hence, this research will fill in this 
gap.  
A strong relationship between the shirking behaviour of workers and 
turnover was established in the past (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). This 
research uses data on productivity, quality defects rate and absenteeism 
to analyse the impact of shirking. The research also aims to analyse 
whether the implementation of the new quality management accentuates 
the relationship between these three variables and turnover. Therefore, 
the main question that this chapter aims to address is whether greater 
monitoring and recognition of poor-quality standards people leave? Or do 
forms of recognition for those with higher quality standards reduce 
turnover? 
Younger workers are known to change jobs frequently (Topel and Ward, 
1992), so we also test how the implementation of the new quality 
management practice may alter this relationship. 
The findings of chapter 2 present a strong case for significant gender 
differentials (potentially due to psychological gender differences and 
gender differences in attitudes toward competition) in the impact of the 
new quality management practice on productivity and the number of 
quality defects made, so it is worthwhile exploring whether there is any 
significant difference between the turnover of males and females due to 
the implementation of the new practice. Viscusi (1980) mentions that 
conclusions drawn from data sets that use a diverse set of job 
characteristics may not be useful. The data we use can give us useful 
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results about gender differences as all males and females are at the same 
level in the hierarchy of the firm and we also control for tasks that the 
workers perform. The Experimental economics literature has suggested 
that females are more averse to competition but most of these findings 
have been based on laboratory experiments (Bertrand, 2011). The 
implementation of the new quality management increases competition at 
the workplace, therefore this research will further add to the literature on 
whether gender preferences play any role in labour market outcomes. 
Previous studies on gender differentials in job turnover focus on market 
and non-market reasons for turnover, but there is little empirical work 
on gender differences in turnover due to shocks caused by the 
introduction of new management practices. 
The study uses survival analysis, which has the advantage of considering 
both the occurrence and timing of turnover. A piece-wise discrete time 
survival model has been chosen for the analysis as tenure increments in 
number of discrete days.  
Chapter 4 is organised as follows; Section II presents the literature 
review, Section III describes the data and methodology, Section IV 

















II. Literature Review 
Employee turnover is divided into two broad categories: one that is 
initiated by the employee and the second, which is the decision of the 
organisation. In many cases, this distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary separation may not be relevant as turnover often occurs due 
to the mutual decision of the employee and employer (Bludedorn, 1978). 
The literature review has been divided into two sections: one section 
reviews the economics literature on turnover and the other reviews the 
management and industrial psychology literature. The following sections 
go into further detail about the various theories of employee turnover, the 
relationship between performance and turnover, the link between 
absenteeism and turnover, the role of shocks in the turnover process, 
gender and age as determinants of job turnover, relationship of wages, 
monitoring and turnover and the methodologies used to understand the 
turnover process. 
II.A. Economic Theories of Turnover 
Turnover refers to the creation and termination of employee-employer job 
matches, and can be categorised into three parts: dissolution due to 
voluntary quits, layoffs or turnover due to a mutual decision (Anderson 
et al., 1994).  
From a worker’s perspective, he/she will move to a new job if the gain in 
utility outweighs the cost of change. The quit function for an individual 
worker is dependent upon alternative work opportunities, job 
satisfaction, and monetary and non-monetary costs of quitting. Workers 
with higher job satisfaction are less likely to quit and workers who are 
assigned more complex tasks are more likely to quit as compared to 
workers who are given simpler tasks (Weiss, 1984). 
Higher current wages and expectations of higher wages and benefits can 
reduce voluntary turnover. The use of compensation schemes that pay 
less than the marginal product early in the career and above the marginal 
product later in the career are also tools to reduce voluntary turnover 
(Anderson et al., 1994; Parsons, 1972). 
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When a contract between an employee and employer is initiated, neither 
party knows how the match is going to turn out. As the match is 
experienced and the true productivity of the employee is revealed over 
time, this may cause either party to become dissatisfied with the terms 
of the contract. The simple job matching model infers that workers will 
switch jobs if one job does not seem to be a good match. All job 
separations are initiated by the worker, however, there is a blurred line 
between quits and dismissals. In this model, firms do not directly fire 
workers but may lower wages to an extent that is enough to induce the 
worker to quit. Workers who end up in good job matches will respond by 
not changing jobs frequently, hence longer tenures are associated with 
good job matches. Workers will continue jobs in which their productivity 
is revealed to be relatively high and will quit jobs in which their 
productivity is revealed to be low.  Also, the probability of separation is 
likely to be a decreasing function of tenure as a mismatch between a 
worker and an employer is likely to be detected before much tenure is 
accrued (Jovanovic, 1979). 
According to the sorting model, employers gain knowledge about the 
agent’s type over time and each new observation regarding performance 
has a diminishing effect on the employer’s belief about the employee’s 
ability. The probability of dismissal is less sensitive to the employee’s 
performance as tenure is accumulated. The incentive model suggests that 
employers can provide incentives in two ways; by increasing the 
probability of dismissal for a given level of performance or by making the 
probability of dismissal more sensitive to performance. Learning by doing 
makes an existing worker more productive as he/she gains skills at the 
job and becomes more expensive to dismiss over time, hence the employer 
will decrease the probability of dismissal. Therefore, both models suggest 
that average probability of dismissal will decline with tenure (Kwon, 
2005). 
A distinction between models of permanent separation has emerged in 
literature; jobs are either treated as ‘experience goods’ or ‘pure search 
goods’. According to the ‘experience goods’ model the only way to know 
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the quality of a job match is to experience it; new information about the 
current job match or an alternative job will lead to turnover (Johnson, 
1978). According to the ‘pure search goods’ model of turnover, dissolution 
of current job matches takes place due to the availability of new 
information of an alternative match (Lucas and Prescott, 1974;  Burdett, 
1977). 
Another component of turnover consists of the firm’s decision to hire and 
fire workers. The value of a worker varies from one firm to the other  as 
job changes are costlier for workers who have accumulated a substantial 
amount of firm specific capital (Becker, 1962; Oi, 1962). 
A model of static labour demand suggests that firms will hire up to the 
point where wage equals the marginal revenue product. However, firms 
do incur adjustment costs such as training costs due to labour turnover 
which creates a wedge between the marginal product and the current 
wage. Higher adjustment costs imply lower variability of employment. 
However, training costs to acquire firm specific human capital may be 
shared between the employee and employer. Higher investments in firm 
specific training will provide an incentive to both the worker and firm to 
form long term attachments. Promoting workers with high productivity 
and firing workers with low productivity is another way to deal with 
productivity differentials. Renegotiations of  lower wage rates with low 
productive workers may not be optimal after a certain training has been 
acquired by a worker (Hashimoto and Yu, 1980). 
Voluntary and involuntary turnover are negatively related to an 
employee’s productivity at small and medium non-unionised firms while 
productivity seems to be negatively related to dismissals at large non-
unionised establishments. Productivity appears to be positively related to 
dismissals and quits at large unionised establishments as Fama (1980) 
suggested that the most productive workers are among the first to leave 
at firms that do not have reward structures contingent on performance  
(Bishop, 1990). 
When wage compression is used as a tool to promote cooperation, 
workers of similar quality sort themselves into the same firm. After 
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learning that their co-workers are relatively less productive, workers will 
tend to leave and look for employers that have a workforce of a relatively 
higher quality. To maintain the morale of the workforce, employers will 
feel the need to fire the least productive workers  has been recognised by 
Lazear (1989) and Akerlof (1982). 
According to the efficient turnover literature, formation and dissolution 
of employment contracts is efficient or jointly optimal, hence the quit-
dismissal distinction is irrelevant (see Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979; 
Mortensen, 1988; McLaughlin, 1991). 
According to the shirking model, the productivity of a worker is positively 
related to the wage rate, which provides incentives to firms to pay above 
the market clearing wage. The fear of termination of an employment 
contract can discourage workers from shirking, hence a higher wage and 
a higher unemployment rate raises the cost of losing a job. Firms find it 
optimal to fire shirkers as a wage reduction would induce the worker to 
shirk again. Monitoring and pay are tools to motivate workers, however, 
they are considered to be substitutes. When monitoring is difficult, 
workers have to be well paid to minimise shirking and when monitoring 
is easy, workers do not have to be highly paid in order to discourage them 
from shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 1985).  Campbell 
(1994) showed that when local and industry unemployment rates are 
lower, worker dismissals are higher because presumably shirking is more 
frequent.  
Agell and Lundborg (2003) provide little support for the shirking model 
and explain that workers who were found shirking were punished with a 
verbal reprimand. Bewley (1995) also explains that punishment should 
not be used to obtain cooperation between employees and employers as 
it impacts the morale of workers. Good morale means that workers are 
willing to make compromises for the organisation. Therefore, happiness 
of the workforce is a highly desirable attribute. After discussions with 
managers and labour leaders, Gintis et al. (2005) also suggest that the 
shirking model does not hold. Employers do not obtain cooperation with 
204 
 
workers through the threat of dismissal. The threat of dismissal creates 
a negative environment and it impairs morale. Employers usually deal 
with shirking through discussions and warnings and employees are 
usually fired if the behaviour persists for a long period of time. Employers 
encourage workers to improve effort by explaining what the employer 
expects from workers, discussing their strengths and weakness, giving 
them constructive criticism and making them feel valued within the 
organisation.  
According to the turnover cost model, at the start of a job there is a 
probability that the worker will be dismissed or will not be satisfied with 
the job and look for alternative employment opportunities. Hence, quits 
will be negatively related to the ease of finding another job, which will be 
difficult if the unemployment rate is high. Also, a higher wage reduces 
quits and lowers the firm’s cost of hiring new workers and training them 
(Stiglitz, 1974; Salop, 1979). 
Monitoring and pay can be substitutes or complements which depends 
on the source of variation among firms (Allgulin and Ellingsen, 2002; 
Prendergast, 1999). If the source of variation is the cost of monitoring, 
then wages and monitoring will act as substitutes as firms will substitute 
high cost supervision into wages. The two instruments will act as 
complements if some firms value higher effort levels than others, hence 
firms that value higher effort levels will use both monitoring and pay to 
motivate workers. 
Campbell (1992) developed a model in which workers select the utility 
maximising effort and firms choose a profit maximising wage and 
monitoring intensity. Dismissals are dependent upon a firm’s monitoring 
intensity and worker’s effort. Dismissals should have a negative 
relationship with the cost of supervision as firms are likely to reduce the 
intensity of monitoring when costs of monitoring increases.  
205 
 
II.B. Gender and Age as Determinants of Job Turnover 
Gender differences in labour force attachment that arise as females 
assume household responsibilities under the traditional division of 
labour (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; Angelov, Johansson and Lindahl, 2016; 
Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan, 2015) were first explained by Mincer and 
Polachek (1974). It has been argued that women spend more time on 
household responsibilities and childcare than men do, and are 
considered as secondary household earners, therefore, women tend to 
have high turnover rates and are likely to have a more discontinuous 
pattern of labour force participation. 
The human capital acquired by females might depreciate as females take 
time off from work for childcare. Decisions related to child rearing, may 
also induce females to delay training until they re-join their workplace. 
Hence, on average females will receive less training than males. Women 
tend to accumulate less total work experience, job specific experience and 
seniority as compared to men (Polacheck, 1981; Barron, Black and 
Loewenstein, 1993; Corcoran and Duncan, 1979). Firms may also sort 
women into jobs with lower training requirements due to their higher 
probability of turnover (Barron, Black and Loewenstein, 1993). Family 
migration decisions as analysed by Mincer (1978) may also be a 
determinant of sporadic female labour force attachments (Viscusi, 1980). 
Blau and Kahn (1981) used the National Longitudinal Surveys of women 
and men aged between 14 and 24 and found that the relationship of 
quitting and current job tenure was similar for men and women after 
including job and personal characteristics.  Viscusi (1980)  used the 1976 
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics to estimate the quit behaviour 
of females and males using a logit model. A significant difference between 
the quit rates of men and women were found during the first year of a 
job, however, no significant difference was noted after the first year of job 
tenure.  
Building on Viscusi’s finding on gender differences in the first year of a 
job, Meitzen (1986) used the Employment Opportunities Pilot Program 
Employers’ survey of workers with a maximum tenure of 2.5 years.  
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Gender differences in the job matching process were found as the 
probability of quitting decreased with tenure for males but increased with 
tenure for females. This highlights the differences in the way females do 
on the job learning regarding their work preferences and job 
discrimination. The relationship between age and the probability of 
quitting was stronger for females as compared to males. Older females 
are more likely to be attached to the job market as they may have less 
family responsibilities as compared to younger females. Although the 
probability of quitting of older men was lower as compared to younger 
men, the selection of older male workers into this sample of workers with 
short job tenures may point out to the idea that they may change jobs 
frequently (Meitzen, 1986). 
Donohue (1988) suggests that the high female hazard rate of quitting the 
first job after school maybe due to fertility decisions. Sicherman (1996) 
uses personnel records from a firm to examine gender differences of 
quitting. A higher percentage of females compared to males quit their jobs 
due to non-market reasons such as household responsibilities. More 
women left their jobs due to higher wages elsewhere rather than better 
opportunities as compared to men. This points to gender differences in 
terms of career considerations as on the job training and long-term career 
considerations seem to be more important for men. Interestingly, 
although the likelihood of turnover increased for both genders in the first 
two months and then decreased at a decreasing rate, the likelihood of 
turnover for females was less than that of males after five years of job 
tenure. Royalty (1998) suggests that the explanation of gender differences 
of job turnover is incomplete without distinguishing between job-to-job 
and job-to-no employment transitions as the quit probabilities of 
educated men and women were found to be similar. Differences in 
turnover behaviour of men and women can be attributed to the 
behavioural patterns of low educated women.  
Using the role of employee turnover in the efficiency wage theory, 
Campbell (1997) examined the determinants of turnover (quits, 
dismissals and layoffs) using data on individual workers. One of the 
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important findings was that workers shirk less when there are fewer job 
alternatives available, hence unemployment in the local labour market 
has a negative relationship with dismissals. Males were more likely to be 
dismissed, and women were found to shirk less, which may be due to the 
availability of fewer job alternatives for females. This finding is in line with 
the evidence found by Johansson, Karimi and Nilsson (2014) such that 
males are more likely to shirk when there is a reduction in monitoring. 
Job shopping as termed by Reynolds (1951) is a critical component of the 
process that leads to stable employment. One of the most consistent 
relationship between age and labour mobility is that the rate of job 
changing decreases with age  (Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). 
A typical young male worker changes seven jobs during the first ten years 
of his career. Wage gains due to job changes can be attributed to these 
weak labour force attachments at the start of the career for young 
workers (Topel and Ward, 1992). Younger workers tend to change jobs 
more frequently as transferability of skills is easier for them as they have 
more general training because firm specific training is accumulated over 
time (Parsons, 1972). Parnes (1954) suggests that wage comparisons 
between jobs may not be the deciding factor for manual workers when 
switching jobs voluntarily. Seniority rules and maturation explain 
declining turnover with age.   
II.C. Absenteeism as a Predictor of Turnover 
Labour market conditions, employee values and job perceptions all 
combine to form intentions of quitting and before quitting employees may 
engage in other withdrawal patterns such as increased absenteeism 
(Mobley et al., 1979). 
Absenteeism has been divided into two types: avoidable and unavoidable. 
Examples of unavoidable absences include absences due to sickness and 
avoidable absences refer to events when workers may not have the 
motivation to attend work. Hence, observed absence is understood as an 
interaction between the ability and motivation to attend work (Chadwick-
Jones, Brown and Nicholson, 1973). Voluntary absences may also be 
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used for fulfilling aims such as testing the market for other job 
opportunities (Miller, 1981). 
According to one view, absenteeism is perceived as a  precursor  of 
employee turnover (Lyons, 1972; Muchinsky, 1977) and a positive 
relationship between absenteeism and turnover has been suggested 
(Gupta and Jenkins, 1982). Another view suggests that absenteeism and 
turnover are substitutes and de-motivated workers are more likely to 
indulge in this behaviour, but they do not quit (Talacchi, 1960). The third 
view suggests that absenteeism and turnover are unrelated (March and 
Simon, 1958). 
Withdrawal behaviors such as absenteeism reflect invisible attitudes 
such as dissatisfaction with the job, low levels of commitment with the 
organization or the intention to leave. Absenteeism is an expression of 
negative attachment to the organization (Hanisch and Hulin, 1991). 
Absence may have a positive impact on dissatisfied employees as it is an 
opportunity to avoid the negative emotions he/she associates with the 
job. On the contrary, highly satisfied workers are likely to avoid being 
absent from work and maintain continued attachment to their job (Blau 
and Boal, 1987). 
Absenteeism has received less attention in economics as compared to 
other fields such as psychology. One of the first studies in economics that 
connected job satisfaction with absenteeism as implied by the psychology 
literature was Flanagan, Strauss and Ulman (1974). As the economy 
grows, the employee’s demands for both monetary and non-monetary 
rewards will increase. Employees are assumed to be concerned with a 
combination of these rewards and dissatisfaction with the combination 
of these rewards will lead to lower productivity and a higher level of 
turnover and absenteeism. 
Economists see absence within the static neo-classical labour supply 
model. Employees must supply a certain number of hours that are 
specified in the contract. Employees may gain utility by being absent if 
the number of specified hours exceed the employee’s preferred number of 
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hours. Absences arise due to the difference in the worker’s marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption and leisure and the economic rate 
of substitution between income and leisure at the level of hours 
contracted between the employee and employer. Any changes in the 
marginal rate of substitution will affect the incentives for being absent. 
The employee’s marginal rate of substitution will be relatively high when 
leisure is highly valued in cases of important events such as weddings 
and funerals and in cases of illness. According to the labour-leisure 
choice model, employees choose the level of voluntary absence where the 
marginal costs of leisure equal the marginal benefits of absence (Allen, 
1981b; Allen, 1981a). 
Absenteeism may not be inefficient because if there is a wedge between 
the marginal and economic rates of substitution the worker will have an 
incentive to shirk. The worker is being rational given his/her constraints. 
The firm faces a choice to enforce fines or threat of dismissal due to such 
behavior or permit this behavior. The choice will be dependent upon 
factors such as the nature of the production process, the relationship of 
the worker with other workers, and the psychology of the available 
workforce. If the marginal cost of enforcing the contract through penalties 
or threat of dismissals is greater than the marginal benefit of 
enforcement, then the firm will choose not to enforce the contract and 
permit the non-compliant behavior (Brown and Sessions, 1996). 
The work discipline models of efficiency wages suggest that workers 
prefer leisure to work and may take days off from work given that it is 
difficult for the employer to distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary absence. However, absenteeism is associated with a cost 
generated due to the increased likelihood of dismissal and loss of future 
income. The employee decides the level of absenteeism by weighing the 
probability and cost of dismissal against the benefits. The expected utility 
loss from dismissal rises with an increase in wage, decreases with an 
increase in income from other sources and adverse working environment, 
increases as a worker accumulates firm specific capital and with a higher  
expected unemployment duration (Kenyon and Dawkins, 1989). Drago 
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and Wooden (1992) provides evidence that male, low tenured workers and 
workers on a higher wage are less likely to be absent while workers with 
better potential alternative opportunities, workers who receive sick leave 
pay and those who do shift work are more likely to be absent. They also 
suggest that the inverse relationship between job satisfaction and 
absenteeism can be derived from the labour-leisure theory and work 
discipline models as the relative utility from leisure will be low when job 
satisfaction is high. 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) suggested that the incentive to shirk 
decreases when unemployment is high as it would be difficult to find an 
alternative job if the worker is dismissed. A few studies suggested that 
unemployment at the regional or industry level has an inverse 
relationship with absenteeism (Leigh, 1985; Askildsen, Bratberg and 
Nilsen, 2005). Scoppa and Vuri (2014) suggest that worker’s absenteeism 
rate can be a proxy for shirking as workers are usually provided medical 
insurance by the employer or the government, while the health of the 
worker cannot be truly observed by the employer, so there will be an 
incentive to  take time off and still get the full salary. They provide 
evidence that absenteeism rate is negatively related to the unemployment 
rate at the provincial level and the relationship between unemployment 
and absenteeism was stronger in smaller firms as compared to larger 
firms due to the lower protection from dismissal in smaller firms. 
II.D. Management and Psychological Theories of Voluntary Turnover  
The traditional theories of voluntary turnover in the management 
literature also emphasize a similar idea as Weiss (1984) such that job 
satisfaction and the availability of job alternatives are key factors in 
determining an employee’s motivation to withdraw from the organisation. 
These factors independently determine the decision to quit (March and 
Simon, 1958). Job dissatisfaction may lead to the evaluation of 
alternatives before the final decision to quit is made or an individual may 
evaluate the level of satisfaction with the current job when a job 




The intention to quit was also included in turnover models, as the 
turnover process comprises of various phases that employees go through 
before withdrawing. Cognitive processes such as the intention to leave, 
utility of turnover and job search behaviour such as the evaluation of job 
alternatives both combined lead to turnover (Mobley, 1977).  
Price and Mueller (1981) considered organizational commitment as a 
factor to link job satisfaction and the intention to withdraw. Hom, Griffeth 
and Sellaro (1984) derived a model from Mobley’s (1977) suggestion such 
that once employees think about leaving the job they make two decisions; 
employees either look at other job prospects and make a comparison with 
their current position or immediately resign from their current position. 
The investment model suggests that commitment with the current job is 
defined as a function of job satisfaction i.e. rewards and costs of the job, 
the kind of alternative employment opportunities available and the 
magnitude of a worker’s investment in the current job. Increase in 
rewards and reduction in costs increase job satisfaction and hence 
increase job commitment. Poor quality of alternative job opportunities 
tends to increase commitment with the current job. Tenure of the current 
job, retirement programs and acquisition of firm specific skills represent 
the investment of a worker in the current job and an increase in 
investment is associated with an increase in job commitment as it 
increases the cost of leaving the job. Such investments may be material, 
psychological, intrinsic or extrinsic (Farrell and Rusbult, 1981). 
The traditional turnover models focused on job satisfaction and employee 
commitment however as research on turnover evolved, variables related 
to organizations and employee’s interaction with the work environment 
were considered relevant to turnover theory (Abelson and Baysinger, 
1984; Katz, 1978). 
Organisational characteristics such as pay inequality was found to 
predict turnover of university administrators as institutions with more 
uniform pay structures were found to have lower turnover rates (Pfeffer 




Apart from variables related to organizational characteristics, emphasis 
on variables that accounted for employee’s relationship with the 
organisation such as relationships with supervisors, managers and co-
workers and the orientation of employee and organisational values were 
incorporated into turnover theory (O'Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell, 1991; 
Kristof, 1996; McPherson, Popielarz and Drobnic, 1992).  
Lee and Mitchell (1994) introduced a unique theory of voluntary turnover 
known as the unfolding model. The model suggests that voluntary 
turnover may not always be a result of job dissatisfaction but the decision 
to leave maybe initiated by a shock experienced by the employee. A shock 
has been described as any positive, negative and neutral expected or 
unexpected event that shakes the employee out of steady state and 
initiates feelings about leaving the job. Examples of shocks include 
takeover of a firm by another organisation, change in marital status, 
negative evaluations, and disagreement with a boss or not getting a 
promotion that an employee deserved.  
People may experience various circumstances when they quit their jobs, 
however they may follow one of the four behavioural paths while leaving 
their current job. Path 1 suggests that an employee may act upon a pre-
existing script because of a shock. Job satisfaction plays no role in this 
path and a quit response is done with minimal planning. Path 2 suggests 
that a shock, which is usually negative, may lead to image violations. 
Individuals compare the circumstances generated by the shock to their 
images such as values and goals, hence thoughts of withdrawal emerge 
if their values and strategies are not aligned with those of the organisation 
or those reflected in the shock. The employee would leave without 
searching for job alternatives in this path. In path 3, a worker may seek 
job alternatives due to the shock and may leave due to the availability of 
job alternatives. Path 4 suggests that the decision to quit is initiated not 
because of a shock but as employees reassess their job commitment from 
time to time and leave as the employee maybe dissatisfied with the job. 
The employee may leave with or without seeking job alternatives (Lee and 
Mitchell, 1994; Lee et al., 1996; Lee et al., 1999).  
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Negative feedback during informal or formal performance evaluations can 
also act like a shock that may lead to intentions of leaving or immediate 
quitting (Allen and Griffeth, 1999). Further, Kammeyer-Mueller et al. 
(2005) and Iverson and Pullman (2000) report that critical events also 
predicted turnover in a manner distinct from the operation of attitudes, 
which is consistent with the notion of shocks advanced by the unfolding 
model (Lee and Mitchell, 1994). 
When looking at the results from previous studies, it seems that 
employees who quit due to low job satisfaction are likely to be poor 
performers, while better performers who quit are more likely to have a 
higher level of job satisfaction. Hence, if only job satisfaction is 
considered as a factor in employee turnover, it will be difficult to 
understand why high performers leave. Therefore, shocks should be 
incorporated into turnover models as they may offer a better mechanism 
to predict the turnover of high performers. The psychological process 
suggested by path 3 according to the unfolding model happens due to a 
shock but also considers relative dissatisfaction. Therefore, the purpose 
of including shocks into turnover theory is not to replace existing theory 
but to enhance it (Holtom et al., 2005).  
II.E. Performance and Turnover 
Studies show that poor performers are more likely to exit. Examples 
include mail order house employees (Giese and Ruter, 1949), sewing 
machine operators (Lefkowitz, 1970), navy enlisted personnel (Rocco, 
Pugh and Gunderson, 1977), electric company employees in Japan 
(Marsh and Mannari, 1977), nurses (Seybolt, Pavett and Walker, 1978), 
bank tellers (Stumpf and Dawley, 1981) and managerial, professional and 
technical employees (Dreher, 1982).  
In contrast, studies on scientists (Allison, 1974), university employed 
social scientists (Lazarsfeld and Thielens, 1958) and employees of 
General Electric Missile and Space Division (Bassett, 1967) established a 
positive relationship between job performance and voluntary turnover. A 
third opinion on the relationship between job performance and turnover 
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suggests that there is no link between the two variables (Martin, Price 
and Mueller, 1981; Sheridan and Vredenburgh, 1979). 
Job performance has been identified as a significant predictor of both 
voluntary and involuntary separation (Wanous, Stumpf and Bedrosian, 
1979). Practices that aim to enhance performance increase the number 
of quits and dismissals as the enhanced standard may expose individuals 
who do not match up to the criteria of the new practice (Batt and Colvin, 
2011). 
A curvilinear relationship may exist between job performance and 
turnover. Employees with high job performance are more likely to quit 
due to the availability of more job alternatives. Relatively lower but 
adequate performers are more likely to stay due to fewer job alternatives 
while low performers are dismissed by employers (Jackofsky, 1984; 
Trevor, Gerhart and Boudreau, 1997). Poor performers have a lower level 
of job satisfaction as compared to high performers (Judge et al., 2001), 
have a higher rate of absenteeism (Viswesvaran, 2002) and are more 
likely to quit (Griffeth, Hom and Gaertner, 2000). 
Low performance combined with the threat of dismissal may cause 
employees to quit on their own (Jackofsky, 1984; Vroom, 1964). To avoid 
consequences of negative evaluations, employees are sometimes asked to 
quit which is then recorded as a voluntary decision on official records 
(Hom and Griffeth, 1995; Kraut, 1975). 
Evidence from studies and meta-analyses suggests that low performers 
are more likely to leave (Williams and Livingstone, 1994; McEvoy and 
Cascio, 1987; Bycio, Hackett and Alvares, 1990); however, there is a 
variation in the performance-turnover relationship in the presence of pay 
contingent on performance. Dreher (1982) proposed that the presence of 
reward contingencies lead to higher outcomes for high performers and 
therefore, induce a greater level of job satisfaction and reduce the 
attractiveness of alternative jobs. For low performers, reward 
contingencies could reduce satisfaction as the rewards generate fewer 
intrinsic and extrinsic benefits. The negative-performance turnover 
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relationship is stronger when rewards are linked to performance 
(Harrison, Virick and William, 1996; Williams and Livingstone, 1994).  
II.F. Methodologies for modelling employee turnover 
The use of an appropriate methodology is an important concern while 
modelling employee turnover. The decision of the choice of methodology 
depends upon the research question and the nature of data.  
Survival analysis can model the conditional probability of an event at a 
particular time, given that it has not happened prior to that time and can 
handle right censored data (Morita, Lee and Mowday, 1993). The duration 
of retention of employees is an important factor in understanding 
turnover. Employee turnover should be studied by analysing information 
on both the timing and occurrence of the event (Morita, Lee and Mowday, 
1989; Morita, Lee and Mowday, 1993; Somers, 1996; Singer and Willett, 
1993; Meitzen, 1986; Donohue, 1988). Incorporating the duration of 
retention of employees is a relevant factor in understanding the turnover 
problem as questions regarding ‘when’ and ‘why’ of employee withdrawal 
are addressed (Hoverstad, Moncrief and Lucas, 1990).  
While using survival analysis, researchers must choose whether time is 
to be treated as continuous or discrete. The choice of modelling is derived 
through the nature of available data. If time varying covariates are 
measured in a continuous manner and an exact measure of the timing of 
turnover is available, then a continuous model is appropriate. However, 
if time varying covariates are measured in intervals along a time scale 
then a discrete time model is preferable (Yamaguchi, 1991; Jenkins, 
1995). 
II.G. Conclusion 
Research in the field of economics and management has suggested that 
performance is a significant predictor of turnover (Bishop, 1990; Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984; Williams and Livingstone, 1994; Dreher, 1982;), but 
shocks or critical events such as negative feedback during appraisals 
may also play a vital role in the turnover process (Lee and Mitchell, 1994).  
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Turnover in this study is defined as a worker exiting the firm, it is not 
disaggregated into voluntary or involuntary turnover.  Job performance 
indicators such as quantity of garments produced and quality defects are 
used in this chapter to test whether there is a negative relationship 
between job performance and turnover. The research also draws its 
motivation from the job matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979) and aims to 
test whether the impact of the new management practice is likely to vary 
with job tenure. A strong relationship between the shirking behaviour of 
workers and turnover has been suggested in the past (Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, 1984). This research uses productivity, defects rate and 
absenteeism68 to analyse the impact of shirking on turnover. The 
research also aims to analyse whether the implementation of the new 
quality management changes the relationship between these three 
variables and turnover. Younger workers are known to change jobs 
frequently (Topel and Ward, 1992; Frederiksen, 2008; Weiss, 1984), 
hence we also test how the implementation of the new quality 
management practice may alter this relationship. These variables have 
been explained in more detail in the empirical methodology section. 
Significant differences in the male-female turnover patterns were 
observed in the past (Donohue, 1988; Sicherman, 1996; Viscusi, 1980; 
Meitzen, 1986). This research draws motivation from previous gender 
differences found in research and tests whether there are gender 
differences in employee turnover due to shocks at the workplace. A 
dummy variable was initially used to analyse gender differences but later 
the sample has been split by gender as explained in section IV.  
Job satisfaction and job commitment have also been identified as 
prominent predictors of turnover (Weiss, 1984; March and Simon, 1958; 
Farrell and Rusbult, 1981; Price and Mueller, 1981). However, as we do 
not have data on job satisfaction or job commitment, we are unable to 
test this relationship. 
 
 
68 Scoppa and Vuri (2014) suggest that absenteeism can be a proxy for shirking. 
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III.Data and Methodology 
III.A. Descriptive Statistics and Data Structure 
Turnover in this study is defined as a worker exiting the firm, it is not 
disaggregated into voluntary or involuntary turnover.  All workers in the 
study are paid piece rates and do not have a requirement to serve a notice 
period before leaving. The sample for this study was generated by a 
combination of two sampling methods; stock sampling and inflow 
sampling. Stock sampling is when individuals occupying a state at a 
certain point in time are selected into the sample and inflow sampling is 
when some spells start during the observation window. The observation 
window consists of a total of 852 working days. Data collection started 
on 1st August 2013 and ended on 1st June 2016. The new quality 
management practice was introduced on 15th September 2014. The 
sample contains workers that were employed by the firm on 1st August 
2013 and workers who started working at the firm during the observation 
window. The date of joining of workers who were already employed by the 
firm at the start of the observation window is also known. There are 648 
workers who did not experience turnover by the time data collection 
ended, hence there are some right-hand censored observations. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
     
 Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Quantity 1056.97 1045.36 1.00 10000.00 
Defects 0.01 0.67 0.00 50.00 
Age 27.37 5.68 16.14 55.73 
Tenure 4.47 3.70 0.00 21.16 
Standard Minute Value 0.43 0.27 0.05 1.25 
Absence Rate 0.17 0.06 0.056 0.81 





Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the data analysed in this 
chapter. An unbalanced data set containing 769,491 worker-day level 
observations covering 1406 workers and 852 working days has been used 
for the analysis. The average number of working days in the sample is 
378. The mean quantity of pieces of garments produced by workers per 
day is 1056.97 garments, while the minimum is 1 and maximum is 
10000. The standard deviation of the variable quantity is quite large 
indicating that the number of garments produced by workers is spread 
out over a large range of values. The average of quality defects made by 
workers per day is 0.096, while the minimum is 0 and maximum is 50. 
This indicates that the average quality defects made by workers are low 
as the value is close to zero. The standard deviation of defects is 0.67, 
which is greater than the mean as the sample contains values which are 
zero. The mean tenure of workers is 4.471 years. Minimum tenure is 0 
and maximum is 21.162 years; the range of tenure is quite spread out. 
The mean tenure of workers is 4.471 which is low given that the 
maximum tenure in the sample is 21.162 years. The mean age is 27.376 
years, the minimum age is 16.142 years and maximum is 55.732 years. 
The range of age indicates a mix of young and older workers in the 
sample. The standard minute value that represents the time it takes to 
perform a task by an operative is 0.436 minutes. The minimum standard 
minute value is 0.053 minutes and maximum is 1.25 minutes. The 
absence rate is defined as the number of absences of a worker as a 
percentage of total days worked at the firm. The mean absence rate is 
0.171 i.e. 17.1 percent, while the minimum is 5.6 percent and maximum 










Table 4.2: Unconditional Differences in the Mean of Key Variables by Gender 
    
 Mean of 
Females 
Mean of Males Difference 
Quantity 993.808 1116.896     123.1*** 
    (51.22) 
 
Defects 0.075 0.116    0.0406*** 
     (26.51) 
 
Age 26.674 28.041     1.367*** 
    (106.48) 
 
Tenure 4.137 4.789     0.652*** 
     (77.27) 
 
Standard Minute Value 0.439 0.434  -0.00419*** 
     (-6.84) 
 
Absence Rate 0.167 0.175   0.00886*** 
     (69.10) 
 
Observations 374575 394916  
 t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 4.2 presents the unconditional differences in the mean of key 
variables by gender. Significant differences were found between sexes. 
The average daily number of piece of garments produced by males is 
1116.89 and the average number produced by females is 993.80. The 
average number of defects made per day by females is 0.075 and for 
males is 0.116. Given that the number of garments produced by males is 
higher as compared to the number of garments produced by females but 
the average number of quality defects made by females are lower as 
compared to males is not surprising. The orientation of females towards 
precise tasks such as sewing is derived from the ‘nimble fingers 
hypothesis’ (Elson and Pearson, 1981). In a survey of 150 garment 
manufacturing firms, Haque (2009) also reports that managers and 
supervisors often find females to be more disciplined, produce better 
quality garments but the stitching speed of females is lower than that of 
males, so productivity of females is lower. 
The average age of females is 26.674 years and for males is 28.041 years. 
The average job tenure of females is 4.137 years and the average tenure 
for males is 4.789 years. The average standard minute value of tasks 
performed by females is 0.439, while for males it is 0.434. The average 
percentage of absence of females over the period of employment is 16.7 
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percent and for males is 17.5 percent. 
III.B. Choice of Model 
 
We use survival analysis for testing our hypothesis. The methodology was 
motivated by the use of survival analysis to study employee turnover by 
Donohue (1988) and Meitzen (1986). One of the most important decisions 
when using survival analysis is to choose whether to consider time as 
discrete or continuous. Allison (1984) suggests that this choice should 
depend upon the data generation process and researcher convenience. 
An important consideration in this decision is to look at the unit used to 
measure the timing of the event. If the exact timing of the event is known, 
a continuous model should be used. Discrete time models will be more 
appropriate if time is broadly measured for example in intervals such as 
months or years. However, sometimes time is truly discrete i.e. events 
can only occur at certain distinct points in time (Yamaguchi, 1991). 
A discrete time model is appropriate for this research as we have daily 
discrete records of tenure and daily performance measures of workers 
such as quantity produced and quality defects. Also, the data contains 
gaps as the firm was closed on weekends and for other public holidays, 
hence turnover can only occur at certain points in time.  
III.C. The survivor and hazard function when time is intrinsically 
discrete 
The length of a spell for an individual is a discrete variable T with a 
cumulative distribution function, F(t), and probability density function, 
f(t).  
 
F(t) is the failure function and the survivor function is: 
𝑆(𝑇) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑇)       (1)  
 
When survival times are intrinsically discrete, survival time T is a 
discrete random variable with the probability of failure  
 




Where  𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3, … } the set of positive integers which indexes time 
periods. 
 
The discrete time survivor function for period j, showing the probability 
of survival for j periods, is given by: 
 
𝑆(𝑗) = Pr(𝑇 ≥ 𝑗) = ∑ 𝑓(𝑘)∞𝑘=𝑗     (3) 
 
 
The value of the survivor function at (j-1)th period is: 
 
Pr (𝑇 = (𝑗 − 1)) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑗 − 1) = 𝑆(𝑗 − 1)  (4) 
 
The probability of the event (turnover in our case) at the jth period is 
 
Pr(𝑗 − 1 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑗) = 𝐹(𝑗) − 𝐹(𝑗 − 1)   (5) 
 
The discrete time hazard at j, h(j) is the conditional probability of the 
event at j (with conditioning on survival until j-1 ) is: 
 










𝑆(𝑗 − 1) − 𝑆(𝑗)
𝑆(𝑗 − 1)
      (8) 
   
ℎ(𝑗) = 1 −
𝑆(𝑗)
𝑆(𝑗 − 1)
         (9) 
                     
The survivor function for the jth period can also be expressed as  
 
𝑆(𝑗) = (1 − ℎ1)(1 − ℎ2)(1 − ℎ3) … … . (1 − ℎ𝑗−1)(1 − ℎ𝑗)    (10) 
 
𝑆(𝑗) = ∏(1 − ℎ𝑘)
𝑗
𝑘=1
     (11) 
 
The discrete time failure function for the jth period can be expressed as 
 
𝐹(𝑗) = 1 − ∏(1 − ℎ𝑘)
𝑗
𝑘=1
    (12) 
     




𝑓(𝑗) = 𝑆(𝑗 − 1) − 𝑆(𝑗)  (13) 
 
𝑓(𝑗) = ℎ𝑗𝑆(𝑗−1) =
ℎ𝑗
ℎ(𝑗−1)
𝑆𝑗  (14) 
   
Hence, the discrete density is the probability of survival up to (j-1)th 














Table 4.3: Survival by Time Intervals 
  Full Sample Males  Females  


















0 to 300 1406 81 0 748 67 0 658 14 0 
301 to 600 1325 87 0 681 54 0 644 33 0 
601 to 900 1238 192 0 627 109 0 611 83 0 
901 to 1200 1046 87 195 518 40 94 528 47 101 
1201 to 1800 764 114 144 384 46 65 380 68 79 
1801 to 2700 506 93 139 273 43 77 233 50 62 
2701 to 3300 274 42 40 153 11 24 121 31 16 
3301 to 3900 192 35 52 118 15 29 74 20 23 
3901 to 7542 105 27 78 74 15 59 31 12 19 
Total 6856 758 648 3576 400 348 3280 358 300 
The table above illustrates the number of workers who experienced turnover in each interval and the number of workers for 
whom we have censored data. As shown above, there are 758 workers who experienced turnover during the observation 
window and there are 648 workers who did not experience turnover during the observation window, hence data is censored. 
Out of 748 males, 400 experienced turnover during the observation window while there is censored information for 348 males. 
























The hazard rate illustrates the risk of turnover during each time interval as shown in table 4.4 and plotted against tenure 
intervals (working days) in figure 6. The higher the hazard rate, the greater is the risk of exiting the firm. 























D1 0   to 300 1406 0.0576 0.000232 748 0.0896 0.00030 658 0.0213 0.00007 
D2 301 to 600 1325 0.1195 0.000461 681 0.1618 0.00026 644 0.0714 0.00017 
D3 601 to 900 1238 0.256 0.000358 627 0.3075 0.00057 611 0.1976 0.00045 
D4 901 to 1200 1046 0.3179 0.000268 518 0.361 0.00026 528 0.269 0.00030 
D5 1201 to 1800 764 0.4197 0.000233 384 0.4375 0.00020 380 0.3998 0.00030 
D6 1801 to 2700 506 0.5264 0.000207 273 0.5261 0.00018 233 0.5286 0.00024 
D7 2701 to 3300 274 0.599 0.000284 153 0.5602 0.00012 121 0.6494 0.00043 
D8 3301 to 3900 192 0.6721 0.000297 118 0.6161 0.00021 74 0.7441 0.00045 




III.D. Non-Parametric Survival Analysis 
Non-parametric analysis was initially performed as it informs us about 
the pattern of duration dependence (relationship between the hazard 
function and survival time) and may help us choose an appropriate 
parametric model. Non-parametric analysis can be done for discrete time 
data by using the lifetable method. The lifetable provides estimates of 
survival, failure and hazard functions. 
 
Figure 5: Survivor Function for the Full Sample 
 
 
The survivor function illustrates the survival probability (proportion of 
the population that survives at each period) where time is given in 
number of working days. Figure 5 shows that at the beginning of the 
study survival probability is 1.  However, as time progresses, the survival 
probability decreases.  
The discrete time hazard is the conditional probability that the worker 
will exit at a certain time interval given that the worker has not exited at 
the beginning of the time interval. The discrete time hazard rate cannot 
be estimated for periods when there are no events. For such values, the 
hazard rate equals to zero. The interpretation of the hazard rate when no 
event occurs is difficult. One strategy is to suppose that the hazard rate 
is zero when no event occurs, however, this seems to be implausible as 
there is no obvious justification for such an assumption. A more plausible 
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strategy is to derive the hazard rate while assuming that the hazard is 
constant over a broader time interval. The grouping of intervals was 
redefined (as shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4) so that there are sufficient 
events per interval to derive the hazard rate. Bergström and Edin (1992) 
show that whether daily data is aggregated according to weeks, months 
or quarters in a discrete time semi parametric model, the parameter 
estimates are stable. Initially, daily tenure data was aggregated into 
quarterly intervals, where 300 working days69 represent a quarter. 
However, while creating the intervals we found that even when daily data 
is transformed into quarterly data there were some intervals where there 
were no events or very few events so the hazard rate could not be 
generated. A more plausible way of dealing with this is to suppose that 
the hazard rate is constant over a longer interval in some cases (see 
Jenkins,   2008). The full sample was used for analysis and then the data 
was split by gender to analyse gender differences. To keep the tenure 
intervals consistent across the analysis of the full sample and then by 
gender, we needed to make sure that there are sufficient events to 
generate the hazard rate in both cases.  As shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4, 
daily data is aggregated into quarters up to 1200 days and then broader 
intervals are created so that the hazard rate can be interpreted.  
Figure 6: Hazard Graph for the Full Sample, Males and Females 
 




Figure 6 illustrates the hazard rates of the full sample and the relative 
positions of the hazard rates of males and females70. The graph shows 
two peaks: one at 601 days and the other at 3301 days. The hazard rate 
increases until 600 days, then decreases until 1800 days, and increases 
again until 3300 days after which it decreases again. 
The hazard rate of males and females increases between 0 and 600 days 
and then falls between 601 and 900 days. At 901 days, the hazard rate 
of males becomes lower than the hazard rate of females. The hazard rate 
of females remains constant between 901 and 1200 days, while the 
hazard rate of males decreases. The hazard rate of males continues to 
decrease until 2700 days, while the hazard rate of females decreases 
between 1201 and 1800 days, and then rises until 2700 days. The hazard 
rate of males and females increases between 2701 and 3300 days after 
which the hazard rate for both genders decreases.  
The hazard rate is increasing at the beginning, and then decreases after 
600 days until 1800 days, this seems to be consistent with the job 
matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979). Workers will have a higher probability 
of quitting in the initial years of employment as the arrival of bad 
information is more likely to take place at the beginning of the 
employment. Workers will remain in jobs in which they perform well and 
will leave jobs in which their productivity is found to be low. Workers who 
end up in good job matches will respond by not changing jobs frequently. 
Moreover, longer tenures are associated with good job matches. Workers 
are also less likely to leave after they accumulate firm specific training 
(Becker, 1962). The human capital theory and job matching theory both 
predict that the probability of turnover will decline with tenure. 
However, the hazard rate rises again after 1800 days until 3300 days, 
which may reflect the effects of boredom. The relationship between job 
tenure and job performance may even be slightly negative due to greater 
 
70 The graph connects hazard rates at the beginning of the interval. 
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boredom among workers with a long job tenure. The effects of learning 
by doing exist but boredom is likely to set in eventually. As time passes, 
there might be a negative effect on productivity, which is called on the job 
sensory deprivation (Medoff and Abraham, 1980). Workers are unlikely 
to remain in jobs which they dislike or where they perform poorly (Kanfer 
et al. 1988; Schneider 1987; Jovanovic 1979). Hutchens (1987) also 
suggests that piece rate jobs usually involve doing repetitive tasks and 
are conducive to monitoring and tend not to have job characteristics such 
as pensions and long job tenures. 
III.E. Choice of Functional Form for the Model 
After deciding the unit of time, which is discrete in our case, the next 
important step is to specify how the hazard rate depends upon time and 
independent variables.  
The most popular choice for the discrete time model is the logistic 
regression function (Cox, 1972; Myers, Hankey and Mantel, 1973; Byar 
and Mantel, 1975). A time discrete piecewise-constant exponential model 
will be used to estimate the hazard rate in this chapter. The hazard rate 
is assumed to be constant within pre-specified time intervals as shown 
in table 4.4, but the hazard rate may vary between intervals. An 
advantage of this specification is that it does not impose strong 
assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard function in advance 
(Singer and Willett, 1991; Singer and Willett, 1993). With this 
specification, one can explore how the hazard rate varies with survival 
time, and one can later choose one of the parametric specifications in the 
light of this check. 
III.F. Model 
The empirical methodology is motivated by the work of Jenkins (1995) on 
the use of discrete time survival analysis. The following equations were 
estimated using a random effects logit specification. The unit of analysis 
in the model is the person-period (Allison, 1982; Singer and Willett, 1991; 
Singer and Willett, 1993). Each observation or row of the data matrix was 
a person-day.  
229 
 
Model 1 (base model) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝛽6Χ𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 + 1𝑖 (15) 
Model 2 (model with interaction terms of tenure and the quality 
management practice) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝛽6Χ𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑗  + 2𝑖 (16) 
Model 3 (model with the interaction between quantity and the quality 
management practice) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝛽6Χ𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑗   + 𝛾𝑃𝑗𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 3𝑖 (17) 
Model 4 (model with the interaction between quality defects and the 
quality management practice) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝛽6Χ𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑗  + 𝜙𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 4𝑖 (18) 
Model 5 (model with the interaction between absence rate and the 
quality management practice) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝛽6Χ𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑗  + 𝜃𝑃𝑗Χ𝑖 + 5𝑖 (19) 
Model 6 (model with the interaction between age and the quality 
management practice) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑖𝑗+𝛽6Χ𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐷𝑘
9
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑃𝑗  + 𝛿𝑃𝑗𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 6𝑖 (20) 
The variables included in the equations are defined below. 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 defines the probability that individual i as distinguished by 
his/her predictor values exits the firm at the jth day where j=1……7542, 
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given that he or she survived through all prior periods. The variable j 
indexes tenure represented in terms of working days. The variable for 
turnover equals 1 if the worker exits that day otherwise it’s 0.  However, 
as the hazard rate cannot be calculated when no event takes places, 
tenure (working days) was grouped into intervals (as shown in table 4.4) 
so that there are sufficient events per interval to derive the hazard rate. 
The variable 𝐷𝑘 represents the dummy variables as shown is table 4.4, 
where k ranges from 1 to 9. No constant term was included, hence all 9 
period dummies can be included. 
𝑃𝑗 is a dummy variable for the new quality management practice. The 
dummy variable equals one when the practice is in place and zero 
otherwise. Utility gains due to incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 2008; 
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007) and reduction in turnover due to 
gains in utility at the current job (Weiss 1984) were suggested. On the 
contrary, shocks at the workplace have been linked to higher employee 
turnover (Lee and Mitchell, 1994) and practices that aim to enhance 
performance increase the number of quits and dismissals (Batt and 
Colvin, 2011).  
𝑄𝑖𝑗 is the quantity of garments produced by worker i on day j. 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the 
quality defects made by worker i on day j. Low performers are more likely 
to have a higher probability of turnover. A negative relationship between 
performance and voluntary and involuntary turnover has been found 
(Jackofsky, 1984; McEvoy and Cascio, 1987; Bycio et al., 1990; Williams 
and Livingstone, 1994; Bishop, 1990; Hashimoto and Yu, 1980). As the 
true productivity of the employee is revealed over time, firms may fire the 
least productive workers, while good job matches are likely to survive 
longer (Jovanovic, 1979). The shirking model also suggests that workers 
with low performance will be dismissed (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
𝐴𝑖𝑗 is the age of worker i at time j. Younger workers are more likely to quit 




𝐺𝑖 represents gender of the worker. Females are expected to have higher 
turnover rates. This can be linked to the theory of lower labour force 
attachments and discontinuous patterns of females due to household 
responsibilities and child care (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Anderson et 
al., 2002; Angelov et al.,  2016; Light and Ureta, 1990). 
Χ𝑖 represents the absence rate of a worker. It is calculated as the number 
of absent days divided by the number of working days of the worker. 
Absenteeism is included as another proxy for shirking (Scoppa and Vuri, 
2014). A positive association between absenteeism and turnover is 
expected as has been found in the past (Lyons, 1972; Muchinsky, 1977; 
Gupta and Jenkins, 1982).  
𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖 represents the standard minute value of the task performed by the 
worker. The standard minute value is the time it takes to perform a task 
on a single garment. The standard minute value has been added as Weiss 
(1984) suggested that the complexity of the job has a positive association 
with the propensity to quit. Workers who are assigned more complex 
tasks are more likely to quit as compared to workers who are given 
simpler tasks. 
Interaction terms between tenure (as shown by the 9 binary dummies for 
the days worked) and the new quality management practice were 
included in equations 16 to 20 as the logit hazard function corresponding 
to the implementation of the new quality management may not be a 
simple shift of the baseline hazard function. The implementation of the 
new quality management practice may vary with tenure and may alter 
the shape of the baseline hazard function. The job matching theory 
(Jovanovic, 1979) implies that the impact of the new quality management 
practice may vary by tenure. Workers dissatisfied with the new practice 
may feel that the current job match is not a good one, hence they may 
switch jobs. 
Four other interaction terms have been included. An interaction term 
between quantity and the quality management practice, an interaction 
term between defects and the quality management practice, an 
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interaction term between absenteeism and the quality management 
practice and an interaction term between age and the quality 
management practice. The motivation to include these interaction terms 
is to see whether the impact of these variables changes after the new 
quality management practice is implemented. 
The implementation of the quality management practice also brings in 
rigorous monitoring of workers with low productivity and high quality 
defects. Campbell (1997) suggested that an increase in monitoring 
intensity increases the number of dismissals. Therefore, shirkers are 
more likely to be dismissed after the new quality management practice is 
implemented. For low performers, reward contingencies could also 
reduce satisfaction as the rewards generate fewer intrinsic and extrinsic 
benefits (Dreher, 1982). The negative-performance turnover relationship 
should become stronger when rewards are linked to performance. [ 1𝑖… 6𝑖] 















IV. Results and Analysis 
IV.A. Baseline Hazard Rate 
Table 4.5 presents the estimates of equations 15 to 20 using a random 
effects logit model to estimate a discrete time model. The model estimated 
in column (1) assumes constant proportionality of turnover odds over 
time. The intercept terms D1 to D9 describe the baseline hazard function 
in columns (1) to (6). The shape of the baseline hazard in all columns 
suggest that the hazard rate initially increases until D3 i.e. tenure up to 
900 days, decreases between 901 and 1200 days, increases again until 
2700 days, and takes a dip again until 3300 days after which it increases 
again. The hazard rate is the lowest for workers with tenure up to 300 
days, after which the hazard rate takes a dip twice but remains higher 
than the hazard rate for tenure up to 300 days. The finding that the 
hazard rate for tenure greater than 300 days is always higher than the 
hazard rate in the initial tenure interval can be linked to various reasons. 
One of the identified potential reasons is job boredom.  Job boredom is 
the extent to which a worker finds a job uninteresting (Fisherl, 1993). Job 
boredom may emerge due to prolonged exposure to a monotonous task 
(Kass, Vodanovich and Callender, 2001) and boredom has been well 
recognised in industrial settings (Maier, 1973).  
The relationship between job tenure and job performance may even be 
slightly negative due to greater boredom among workers with long job 
tenure. The effects of learning by doing exist but boredom is likely to set 
in eventually. As time passes, there might be a negative effect on 
productivity which is called on the job sensory deprivation (Medoff and 
Abraham, 1980). Workers with longer tenure may experience a loss in 
motivation due to the lack of task variety which may also decrease job 
performance (Frone, 1998; Hackman, 1980). Repetition of well learned 
tasks may also decrease intrinsic motivation (Stewart, 1999). The loss in 
job motivation due to boredom may offset the positive human capital 
gains through learning by doing that are accompanied with a long job 




Table 4.5: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
       
Age -0.0501*** -0.0502*** -0.0503*** -0.0507*** -0.0521*** -0.0330*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0121) 
       
Quantity -0.00000687 -0.00000611 0.00000158 -0.00000549 -0.00000742 -0.00000739 
 (0.0000494) (0.0000494) (0.0000578) (0.0000493) (0.0000494) (0.0000494) 
       
Defects 0.0475 0.0478 0.0479 0.0559* 0.0478 0.0475 
 (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0323) 
       
Absence Percentage 9.080*** 8.864*** 8.869*** 8.869*** 8.174*** 8.860*** 
 (0.528) (0.537) (0.538) (0.537) (0.620) (0.539) 
       














Female 0.0882 0.0925 0.0921 0.0887 0.0905 0.0914 
 (0.0847) (0.0849) (0.0850) (0.0850) (0.0848) (0.0849) 





     
      
D1 -8.158*** -7.913*** -7.918*** -7.910*** -7.620*** -8.306*** 
 (0.334) (0.345) (0.346) (0.345) (0.362) (0.379) 
       
D2 -7.903*** -7.685*** -7.691*** -7.681*** -7.476*** -8.097*** 
 (0.316) (0.325) (0.326) (0.325) (0.335) (0.364) 
       





















Table 4.5: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
 
D4 -7.427*** -7.557*** -7.564*** -7.554*** -7.372*** -7.984*** 
 (0.322) (0.339) (0.340) (0.339) (0.346) (0.379) 
       
D5 -7.369*** -7.241*** -7.247*** -7.236*** -7.061*** -7.686*** 
 (0.325) (0.331) (0.332) (0.331) (0.337) (0.375) 
       
D6 -6.987*** -6.835*** -6.841*** -6.831*** -6.659*** -7.304*** 
 (0.336) (0.343) (0.344) (0.343) (0.349) (0.389) 
       
D7 -7.205*** -7.071*** -7.079*** -7.066*** -6.877*** -7.583*** 
 (0.381) (0.395) (0.396) (0.395) (0.401) (0.442) 
       
D8 -6.911*** -6.720*** -6.729*** -6.715*** -6.535*** -7.254*** 
 (0.394) (0.408) (0.409) (0.408) (0.414) (0.458) 
       
D9 -6.834*** -6.727*** -6.736*** -6.720*** -6.544*** -7.333*** 
 (0.432) (0.457) (0.458) (0.457) (0.461) (0.515) 
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Table 4.5: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























































  -0.0000218 
(0.0000876) 
   
      
Defects*Quality 
Management Practice 
   -0.491* 
(0.298) 
  
      
       
Absence*Quality 
Management Practice 
    2.838** 
(1.169) 
 
      
       
Age*Quality Management 
Practice 
     -0.0505** 
(0.0219) 
/       
lnsig2u -12.37 -12.38 -12.38 -12.38 -13.02 -12.15 
 (11.63) (11.61) (11.61) (11.61) (14.74) (8.412) 
N 769491 769491 769491 769491 769491 769491 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010 
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Workers are unlikely to remain in jobs which they dislike or where they 
perform poorly (Schneider, 1987; Kanfer, Crosby and Brandt, 1988). The 
job matching theory also predicts that workers are likely to stay in jobs 
where their productivity is revealed to be high and quit jobs where their 
productivity is revealed to be low.  
The value of a worker varies from one firm to the other as job changes are 
costlier for workers who have accumulated a substantial amount of firm 
specific capital (Oi, 1962; Becker, 1962). Jobs with repetitive tasks may 
require little specific training (Hutchens, 1987). Therefore, the 
relationship suggested by Hashimoto and Yu (1980) such that high 
investments in specific training are likely to provide incentives to form 
long term attachments may not be very strong given that the workers at 
this firm perform repetitive tasks. Workers at this firm receive training 
for around 6 weeks and skills are quite transferable between firms for 
example, a worker who performs a task that attaches front pockets on 
denim jeans will be able to perform the same task at another firm that 
produces denim jeans. We interviewed a human resource manager and 
asked him about the procedure for hiring and training of workers. He 
replied by saying that most of the workers belong to the villages around 
the firm. Also, there is no proper institute where the firm can hire trained 
workers; the firm spends resources on providing in house training but 
the attachment of workers with the firm is weak.  
Lazear (1979) and Lazear (1981) stated that age-earnings profiles should 
be created that pay the worker less than the value of the marginal product 
when the worker is young and more than the value of the marginal 
product when the worker is nearing retirement. The use of delayed 
payment schemes are also tools to reduce voluntary turnover (Parsons, 
1972; Anderson et al., 1994). This may also be a tool to prevent employees 
from shirking, because if the worker shirks, he/she will be dismissed 
immediately and will incur a huge cost by losing higher earnings in 
future. Wages tend to grow with experience, not because senior workers 
are more productive but because paying senior workers higher wages will 
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produce incentives for junior workers to work harder. Jobs with delayed 
payment contracts are likely to have characteristics such as long tenure, 
pension schemes, and mandatory retirement as it is necessary to have a 
date where the worker is not entitled to receive a wage rate which is more 
than the marginal product. Such contracts lead to long tenures due to 
the associated fixed costs (Hutchens, 1986). 
The workers at the firm are paid piece rates i.e. pay is dependent upon 
the quantity of output produced by workers. Hutchens (1987) noted that 
piece rate jobs usually involve doing repetitive tasks and are conducive 
to monitoring and tend not to have job characteristics such as pensions, 
long job tenures, and comparatively higher wages for senior workers. 
Bjorklund and Akerman (1989) also reveal that workers who are paid 
piece rates start with a higher wage but receive low tenure premiums.  
IV.B. The New Quality Management Practice 
The coefficient of the new quality management practice is significant at 
the 1 percent level and the implementation of the new quality 
management practice reduces the log odds of turnover by 0.520. This 
finding can be linked to various elements that define the new practice. 
The new quality management practice provides recognition to workers 
according to work standards and promises monetary rewards to workers 
with outstanding performance. Non-monetary rewards and monetary 
rewards are associated with utility gains of workers (Besley and Ghatak, 
2008; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007). From a worker’s perspective, 
he/she will move to a new job if the gain in utility from switching jobs 
outweighs the cost of change (Weiss, 1984). The finding that the 
implementation of the new quality management practices reduces 
turnover is in line with the relationship implied by Weiss (1984) such that 
an increase in utility at the current job is likely to reduce turnover. The 
potential increase in job attachment due to the monetary and non-
monetary incentives provided by the new quality management practice 
and the reduction in employee turnover can be linked to the investment 
model (Farrell and Rusbult, 1981). 
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The negative relationship between the quality management practice and 
turnover also provides some evidence in line with the turnover cost model 
(Stiglitz, 1974) which suggests that firms can reduce the quit rate of 
workers and save on training costs by offering a higher wage relative to 
other firms. In our case, the firm does not directly increase the wage rate 
of workers but provides an opportunity to workers to increase earnings 
given that they match up to the standards of the new quality management 
practice.  According to this model, quits will also be negatively related to 
the ease of finding another job, which will be difficult if the 
unemployment rate is high. The firm operates in a relatively rural area of 
Pakistan and the nearest garments manufacturer that can provide job 
opportunities for stitching operators is approximately 50 kilometres away 
and the next two are around 60 kilometres away. These firms pay a 
similar piece rate but did not provide the incentives that are provided by 
the new quality management practice during the data collection period. 
Hence, the lack of job alternatives combined with the increase in utility 
due to the recognition and rewards provided by the new quality 
management practice can be attributed to a reduction in turnover at the 
firm. The results are also in line with Campbell (1997) such that firms 
can reduce quits by providing good working conditions and increasing 
wages. Farrell and Rusbult (1981) also suggest that poor quality of 
alternative job opportunities also increases job attachment. Cognitive 
processes such as the intention to leave, utility of turnover and job search 
behaviour such as the evaluation of job alternatives both combined lead 
to turnover (Mobley 1977). 
Managers and firm owners are concerned about the morale of workers as 
it affects the turnover at the organisation (Bewley, 1995; Gintis et al., 
2005). Disgruntled workers will leave as soon as an alternative job 
opportunity is available. Incentives may also help improve morale and 
contribute to internal equity as employees may believe that they are being 





IV.C. Tenure and the New Quality Management Practice 
Column (2) shows the estimates of the model that includes the interaction 
terms of tenure and the new quality management practice. The 
implementation of the practice has a decreasing effect on the hazard rate 
of turnover for workers with a tenure up to 300 days, as it reduces the 
log odds of turnover by 1.474. The magnitude of the impact of the quality 
management practice is the highest for workers with a tenure up to 300 
days, after which the magnitude of the impact is lower or is insignificant. 
This finding can be linked to the process by which workers accumulate 
information about the quality of the job match. The job matching theory 
(Jovanovic, 1979) suggests that at the start of a job, the employee has 
incomplete information about aspects of the job such as working 
conditions, tasks and perceptions of a future with the employer. The 
arrival of information that leads to dissatisfaction may prompt workers 
to look for alternative work opportunities. Workers will have a higher 
probability of quitting in the initial years of employment as the arrival of 
bad information is more likely to take place at the beginning of the 
employment. Workers who end up in good job matches will respond by 
not changing jobs frequently; longer tenures are associated with good job 
matches. The job matching theory, human capital theory, sorting and 
incentive models all predict that the probability of turnover will decline 
with tenure (Becker, 1962; Jovanovic, 1979; Kwon, 2005). In our case, 
the probability of separation does not fall monotonically with tenure, and 
those who have accumulated less information about the job quality are 
less likely to quit as the hazard rate for the shortest tenure category 
(tenure up to 300 days) is the lowest. Workers who have accumulated 
more information about the job match are more likely to be bored and 
realise that the job provides low tenure premium and limited specific 
training.  
The magnitude of the impact of the practice is lower for workers with 
relatively longer tenures and highest for workers who are still in the 
process of accumulating information about the task requirements of the 
job. The implementation of the practice may send out positive information 
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and signals about the employer and job to short tenured employees. The 
gain in utility due to the features of the new quality management practice 
seems to be stronger for employees with less tenure.  
The specifications in columns (2) to (4) suggested that the impact of the 
new quality management practice for workers with a tenure between 601 
and 1200 days is insignificant, while column (5) shows that the impact is 
only significant at the 10 percent level. However, column (6) suggests that 
the impact of the practice is only significant for workers who have a 
tenure between 601 and 1200 days, hence the practice has no impact on 
workers who have spent shorter durations with the firm and workers with 
tenure greater than 1200 days. These results are in line with the 
unfolding model (Lee and Mitchell, 1994) which suggests that shocks and 
practices that aim to enhance performance (Batt and Colvin, 2011) are 
likely to increase turnover.  
IV.D. Job performance and the New Quality Management Practice 
Performance indicators such as quantity and defects were included in all 
models. Only column (4) shows that an increase in quality defects is 
significantly associated with higher turnover, while all the other 
specifications show that both quantity and defects are insignificant 
factors in determining turnover. The job matching theory suggests that 
workers will remain in jobs where their performance is high and will quit 
jobs where their performance is found to be low. Also, given that most of 
the coefficients for quantity and defects are insignificant, we do not find 
evidence in line with the shirking model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) such 
that the choice of effort levels made by workers are likely to predict 
dismissals. After discussions with managers and labour leaders, Gintis 
et al. (2005) also suggest that the shirking model does not hold. 
Employers do not obtain cooperation with workers through the threat of 
dismissal. The threat of dismissal creates a negative environment and it 
impairs morale. Employers usually deal with shirking through 
discussions and warnings and employees are usually fired if the 
behaviour persists for a long period of time. Employers encourage 
workers to improve effort by explaining what the employer expects from 
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workers, discussing their strengths and weakness, giving them 
constructive criticism and making them feel valued within the 
organisation. Agell and Lundborg (2003) also suggest that shirkers are 
punished with a verbal reprimand. 
An interaction term between quantity and the new quality management 
practice was added in column (3) and an interaction term between defects 
and the new quality management practice was included in column (4). 
The interaction term between quantity and the new quality management 
practice is insignificant, while the interaction term between defects and 
the new quality management practice is significant at the 10 percent 
level. As shown in column (4), before the implementation of the new 
management practice, workers with higher quality defects were more 
likely to turnover, but after the implementation of the new practice, 
workers with higher quality defects are less likely to turnover. A 
curvilinear relationship between job performance and turnover has been 
suggested in the past. Employees with high job performance are more 
likely to quit due to the availability of more job alternatives, relatively 
lower but adequate performers are more likely to stay due to fewer job 
alternatives while low performers are dismissed by employers (Jackofsky, 
1984; Trevor, Gerhart and Boudreau, 1997). The job matching theory 
also suggests that low performing workers are more likely to quit. The 
implementation of the new management practice is offering an 
opportunity to workers to earn more while it provides non-monetary 
incentives which are likely to be associated with a higher utility at the 
current job. Stiglitz (1974) suggested that firms can reduce the quit rate 
of workers by offering a higher wage relative to other firms, while quit 
rates will also be negatively related to the ease of finding an alternative 
job. There are limited job opportunities in the area and the other three 
nearest firms were not providing the monetary and non-monetary 
incentives to workers that are provided by the new management practice. 
It seems like the relationship suggested by Stiglitz (1974) is stronger for 
employees with a relatively lower performance as they are likely to have 
fewer job alternatives. Also, according to the job matching theory, 
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workers who are more likely to quit due to a lower job performance are 
more likely to stay after the implementation of the new practice. 
Therefore, we do not find evidence in line with Campbell (1997) who 
suggested that an increase in the intensity of monitoring is likely to 
increase the number of dismissals as more workers will be caught 
shirking.  
As indicated by Gintis et al. (2005), firms may not use dismissals as a 
tool to prevent shirking as it impairs the morale of workers and creates a 
hostile environment within the firm. Therefore, even after the 
implementation of the new practice, the relationship between quantity 
and turnover remains insignificant. 
The coefficients for the interaction terms between tenure and the quality 
management practice in columns (3) and (4) are similar to the ones 
estimated in column (2). The coefficients reiterate the notion that the 
quality management practice has the greatest impact on workers who are 
in the initial stages of accumulating information about the quality of the 
job match. 
IV.E. Relationship of Absenteeism and Turnover 
Column (1) shows that an increase in the absence rate by one percent 
increases the log odds of turnover by 9.08. The rest of the specifications 
also show a similar relationship, but the magnitude is slightly lower. A 
positive association between absenteeism and turnover has also been 
found in the past (Lyons, 1972; Muchinsky, 1977; Gupta and Jenkins, 
1982). Absenteeism is also a proxy for shirking and the threat of 
dismissal due to absenteeism may act as a worker disciplining device 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Brown and Sessions, 1996). The result that 
an increase in absenteeism has a positive relationship with turnover is 
also in line with Scoppa and Vuri (2014) who suggest that the negative 
relationship between unemployment and shirking denoted by the 
absenteeism rate is stronger in smaller firms as compared to larger firms 
due to lower employee protection from dismissals. Brown and Sessions 
(1996) suggest that firms face a choice between dismissing employees 
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with higher absences or permitting this behaviour. The decision depends 
upon the nature of the production process, the relationships between 
workers and the psychology of the labour force. 
Absenteeism is a cause of concern for the firm as production takes place 
on an assembly line. Absenteeism is a threat to assembly line production 
as it requires an immediate replacement. The worker who replaces the 
absent worker  has to have the same specialisation otherwise the quality 
of production is compromised (Mateo, 2008). During factory visits, it was 
observed that supervisors often change the allocation of workers around 
the assembly line when workers are absent. Some workers are multi 
skilled, hence they can perform multiple tasks, but this re-allocation of 
workers is an extra burden on supervisors and sometimes leads to 
bottlenecks on the line. Chaudhry and Faran (2015) surveyed 33 line 
supervisors from six readymade garments factories (including the firm we 
have collected our data from) and found that two thirds of the supervisors 
found absenteeism to be a cause of bottlenecks on the line.  
Absenteeism is an expression of negative attachment to the organization 
(Hanisch and Hulin, 1991). Absence may have a positive impact on 
dissatisfied employees as it is an opportunity to avoid the negative 
emotions he/she associates with the job. On the contrary, highly satisfied 
workers are likely to avoid being absent from work and maintain 
continued attachment to their job (Blau and Boal, 1987).  
IV.F. Absenteeism and the New Quality Management Practice 
Column (5) includes an interaction term between the absence rate of 
workers and the new quality management practice, which indicates that 
after the implementation of the new practice, the relationship between 
the absence rate and the quality management practice becomes stronger. 
Before the implementation of the practice, a one percent increase in the 
absence rate increases the log odds of turnover by 8.174, however after 
the implementation of the practice, a one percent increase in the absence 
rate increases the log odds of turnover by 11.012.  
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Drago and Wooden (1992) suggest that the inverse relationship between 
job satisfaction and absenteeism can be derived from the labour-leisure 
theory and work discipline models as the relative utility from leisure will 
be low when job satisfaction is high. Although we do not have data on the 
job satisfaction of employees, but as the relationship between the absence 
rate and turnover becomes stronger after the implementation of the new 
quality management practice, we can infer that workers who express 
negative attachment to the firm by being absent from work are more likely 
to leave due to shocks experienced at the workplace.  
The interaction term between the absence rate and the new practice also 
indicates that after the implementation of the new quality management 
practice, shirking behaviour such as missing a day at work has a higher 
impact on turnover. Therefore, we can link this with the idea by Campbell 
(1997) such that an increase in the monitoring intensity is likely to 
increase the number of dismissals as more workers will be caught 
shirking. In our case, shirking is defined by the absence rate of workers 
and not employee’s work effort. We can again link this to the production 
process at the firm. It seems that as the procedure of managing the line 
improves with the new quality management practice, shirking behaviour 
such as absenteeism is considered a greater threat to the management of 
the line as it is likely to cause disruptions on the line.  
Column (5) shows that the coefficients of the interaction terms between 
the new practice and tenure dummies indicate a similar trend to the 
previous specifications (columns 1 to 4) such that the impact of the new 
practice is strongest for workers who are in the shortest tenure category, 
while the magnitude is lower or insignificant for the rest of the tenure 
categories. However, the magnitudes are different from the previous 
specifications. In this specification, the implementation of the practice 
also significantly reduces the log odds of turnover by 1.180 for workers 
with a tenure greater than 3900 days. 
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IV.G. Age and the New Quality Management Practice 
An increase in age by one year reduces the log odds of turnover by 0.05 
in column (1); similar coefficients were estimated for the specifications in 
columns (2) to (5). This is consistent with the notion that job shopping is 
more relevant for younger workers and as a worker ages, the frequency 
of job switching declines (Parsons, 1978; Topel and Ward, 1992; Mincer 
and Jovanovic, 1981)71. 
Column (6) indicates that the coefficient for age is significant and 
indicates that an increase in age by one year reduces the log odds of 
turnover by 0.0330. However, the impact of age varies with the 
implementation of the new practice. Younger workers are more mobile 
between jobs and will be less attached to the current job and firm as 
compared to older workers. Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) emphasize that 
as a worker has a finite working life, the likelihood of changing jobs for a 
better salary decreases with age due to the shorter period to collect 
returns. An increase in age has a stronger impact on turnover after the 
implementation of the practice i.e. an increase in age reduces the log odds 
of turnover by 0.0835. Lee and Mitchell (1994) suggest that employees 
may seek job alternatives due to the circumstances generated by shocks 
and may also quit due to the availability of job alternatives. Younger 
workers have a relatively weaker labour force attachment and are more 
likely to try and test other options in the labour market. Job shopping is 
less relevant for older workers and older workers may also be less likely 
to search for alternatives due to critical events experienced at the 
workplace. Hence the impact of the new quality management practice is 
greater for older workers who are less likely to switch jobs as compared 




71 The model specifications were estimated with age-squared as well. Age-squared was found to be 
insignificant. The results are available in table 19 of Appendix C. 
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IV.H. Robustness of the Results in Table 4.5 Without Including Absence 
Percentage 
The specifications in table 4.5 were estimated without absence rate due 
to the possibility of the absence rate being endogenous. The results are 
available in table 18 of appendix C which show that the impact of the 
quality managemnet practice given in column (1) in table 4.5 is the same 
as in table 18, but the magnitude of the coefficient is higher. Also, the 
relationship between tenure and the new quality management practice 
suggested in table 4.5 is similar to what is suggsted in table 18, however 
the cofficients of the interaction term between the new quality 
management practice and tenure in table 4.5 are different to the ones 
estimated in table 18.  Overall, the results show that the direction of the 
impact of the new quality management practice suggested in table 4.5 is 
robust even when absence percentage is excluded. 
The coefficient of standard minute value is insignificant in table 4.5, but 
it is significant in all specifications in table 18, showing that workers who 
perform tasks with a higher standard minute value are more likely to 
turnover. This result is line with Weiss (1984) who suggests that workers 
who perform complex tasks are more likely to turnover. Table 4.5 
suggests that the impact of age changes with the implementation of the 
new quality management practice. However, table 18 shows that the 
cofficient of age is insignificant when the interaction term between age 
and the new quality management practice is added, although the 
interaction term between age and the new quality management practice 
is significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of quantity is 
significant in table 18 but at 5 percent in column (1) and then at the 10 
percent level for the rest of the specifications. Table 4.5 shows that 
workers with higher quality defects are more likely to turnover, although 
the coefficient for quality defects and the interaction term between defects 
and the quality management practice were only significant at the 10 
percent level. However, table 18 shows that the interaction term between 
defects and the new quality management practice is insignificant. 
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IV.I. Gender Differences in the Baseline Hazard Rate 
The gender dummy in table 4.5 shows that gender is an insignificant 
predictor of turnover. Blau and Kahn (1981) also suggest that males and 
females have similar quit probabilities after job and personal variables 
are held constant. However, estimations done after splitting the sample 
by gender provide some interesting insights into the male-female 
differences in turnover. The results are summarised in tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
The results were tested to see whether the coefficients for males and 
females are significantly different. These results are available in table 20 
of appendix C. 
The coefficients of the dummy variables D1, D2, D3, D4 and D5 in 
column (1) of tables 4.6 and 4.7 were found to be significantly different 
from each other. The hazard rate of females was found to be significantly 
lower than the hazard rate of males for tenure up to 1800 days. The 
hazard rate estimates in columns (2) to (4) of tables 4.6 and 4.7 indicate 
that the hazard rate of females is significantly lower for tenure up to 900 
days and tenure between 1201 and 1800 days as compared to males72. 
The estimates in column (5) suggest that the hazard rate of females is 
significantly lower than that of males for tenure up to 300 days and with 
tenure between 601 and 900 days and between 1201 and 1800 days. 
Overall, columns (1) to (5) all provide evidence that there is a significant 
difference in the hazard rate of males and females in the initial years of 
employment after which no significant difference was found. Our results 
complement the finding by Viscusi (1980) who provided evidence that quit 
behaviour during the first year of employment represents the most 
important gender difference in turnover. Although his estimates suggest 
that the quit rate of females was significantly higher than the quit rate of 
males in the first year of a job but after that no significant difference was 
found.   
 
72 The coefficient for the interaction term between tenure of 1201 and 1800 days and gender is only significant 
at the 10 percent for columns (1) to (5) in table 20 of appendix C. 
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The initial period on the job reflects a learning process as complete 
information of the job has not been acquired. The significant difference 
in the hazard rate of males and females during the initial years of 
employment highlights gender differences in accumulating information 
about the quality of the job match. Meitzen (1986) suggests that the 
probability of quitting declines with tenure for males but increases with 
tenure for females. This was linked to gender differences in the  job 
matching process as females may do on-the-job learning regarding their 
work preferences and discrimination differently from males.  
Makino (2012) reports that the main reason why women choose to work 
in the garments industry in Pakistan is financial need. Haque (2009) also 
reports a similar finding such that supervisors, workers and managers in 
the garments industry agree that a woman should stay home if the men 
in the household earn enough. This is also supported by other evidence 
(Sultana and Malik, 1994; Ahmad and Hafeez, 2007). Makino (2012) also 
quotes a female manager at a garment factory who explained that 
unmarried women also work to save money for their dowries.  The social 
fabric of  Pakistan restricts mobility of females. Papanek (1971) explains 
that male family members place restrictions on the mobility of female 
household members. Travelling is considered to be risky as it may lead 
to unwanted interactions with the opposite gender and loss of honour. 
The honour of men is linked with the sexual behaviour of women and 
female mobility is restricted through the norms of gender segregation and 
female seclusion (Asian Development Bank, 2000). The mobility of women 
is controlled through permission, escort and veiling (Sathar and Kazi, 
2000). Given that the mobility of females is more restricted as compared 
to the mobility of males, this may also hinder the way females can actively 




Table 4.6: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Females) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
       
Age -0.0373*** -0.0371*** -0.0371*** -0.0376*** -0.0383*** -0.0363** 
 (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0181) 
       
Quantity 0.0000169 0.0000179 0.00000113 0.0000183 0.0000164 0.0000179 
 (0.0000688) (0.0000688) (0.0000846) (0.0000687) (0.0000688) (0.0000688) 
       
Defects -0.0465 -0.0467 -0.0469 0.00769 -0.0469 -0.0467 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.0902) (0.127) (0.127) 
       






































     
      
D1 -9.172*** -8.714*** -8.706*** -8.709*** -8.347*** -8.733*** 
 (0.515) (0.535) (0.535) (0.535) (0.569) (0.596) 
       
D2 -8.505*** -8.241*** -8.229*** -8.237*** -7.957*** -8.261*** 
 (0.437) (0.455) (0.456) (0.455) (0.481) (0.530) 
       
D3 -7.498*** -7.923*** -7.911*** -7.920*** -7.653*** -7.943*** 
 (0.410) (0.437) (0.438) (0.437) (0.462) (0.515) 
       
D4 -7.906*** -7.965*** -7.951*** -7.962*** -7.700*** -7.985*** 
 (0.428) (0.448) (0.450) (0.448) (0.471) (0.525) 
       
D5 -7.841*** -7.787*** -7.773*** -7.784*** -7.536*** -7.808*** 
 (0.427) (0.438) (0.439) (0.437) (0.458) (0.521) 
       
D6 -7.432*** -7.263*** -7.250*** -7.263*** -7.022*** -7.285*** 





Table 4.6: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Females) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
D7 -7.506*** -7.411*** -7.395*** -7.408*** -7.120*** -7.436*** 
 (0.499) (0.514) (0.516) (0.514) (0.539) (0.612) 
       
D8 -7.060*** -7.015*** -6.996*** -7.009*** -6.779*** -7.040*** 
 (0.524) (0.550) (0.553) (0.551) (0.567) (0.649) 
       
D9 -6.847*** -6.627*** -6.609*** -6.619*** -6.391*** -6.657*** 
 (0.612) (0.632) (0.634) (0.632) (0.645) (0.756) 



























































































































Table 4.6: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Females) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
Quantity*Quality 
Management Practice 
  0.0000424 
(0.000119) 
   
      
Defects*Quality 
Management Practice 
   -1.016 
(0.722) 
  
      
Absence Rate*Quality 
Management Practice 
    3.305* 
(1.842) 
 
      
Age*Quality Management 
Practice 
     -0.00206 
(0.0282) 
/       
lnsig2u -12.44 -12.46 -12.46 -12.46 -12.46 -12.46 
 (11.61) (11.59) (11.59) (11.59) (11.63) (11.59) 
N 374575 374575 374575 374575 374575 374575 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 4.7: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Males) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
       
Age -0.0649*** -0.0655*** -0.0657*** -0.0657*** -0.0672*** -0.0341** 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0164) 
       
Quantity -0.0000293 -0.0000279 0.000000847 -0.0000274 -0.0000296 -0.0000322 
 (0.0000711) (0.0000711) (0.0000808) (0.0000710) (0.0000712) (0.0000712) 
       
Defects 0.0646** 0.0653** 0.0654** 0.0687** 0.0652** 0.0645** 
 (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0305) (0.0317) (0.0317) 
       































     
      
D1 -7.342*** -7.189*** -7.213*** -7.193*** -6.943*** -7.894*** 
 (0.450) (0.462) (0.463) (0.462) (0.478) (0.500) 
       
D2 -7.236*** -7.069*** -7.095*** -7.071*** -6.892*** -7.808*** 
 (0.436) (0.447) (0.448) (0.447) (0.454) (0.490) 
       
D3 -6.215*** -6.329*** -6.357*** -6.332*** -6.167*** -7.074*** 
 (0.420) (0.428) (0.430) (0.428) (0.434) (0.474) 
       
D4 -6.850*** -7.091*** -7.118*** -7.094*** -6.937*** -7.876*** 
 (0.457) (0.490) (0.491) (0.490) (0.494) (0.535) 
       
D5 -6.785*** -6.580*** -6.606*** -6.582*** -6.429*** -7.414*** 
 (0.468) (0.473) (0.475) (0.473) (0.477) (0.523) 





Table 4.7: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Males) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
D6 -6.421*** -6.305*** -6.331*** -6.307*** -6.157*** -7.173*** 
 (0.480) (0.490) (0.491) (0.490) (0.493) (0.541) 
       
D7 -7.014*** -6.873*** -6.902*** -6.875*** -6.723*** -7.802*** 
 (0.577) (0.609) (0.610) (0.609) (0.612) (0.654) 
       
D8 -6.599*** -6.272*** -6.302*** -6.273*** -6.114*** -7.246*** 
 (0.572) (0.581) (0.583) (0.581) (0.584) (0.633) 
       
D9 -6.479*** -6.550*** -6.587*** -6.551*** -6.398*** -7.627*** 
 (0.607) (0.656) (0.659) (0.656) (0.658) (0.714) 

































































































Table 4.7: The Effect of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Males) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





























  -0.0000881 
(0.000130) 
   
      
Defects*Quality 
Management Practice 
   -0.284 
(0.326) 
  
      
Absence Rate*Quality 
Management Practice 
    2.869* 
(1.607) 
 
      
       
Age*Quality Management 
Practice 
     -0.109*** 
(0.0348) 
      
/       
lnsig2u -12.14 -12.14 -12.14 -12.15 -12.79 -12.14 
 (11.54) (11.52) (11.52) (11.52) (15.83) (11.47) 
N 394916 394916 394916 394916 394916 394916 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Female workers are reluctant to work during evening shifts due to 
restricted mobility and household responsibilities. In the textile sector, 
female workers were found in stitching units but mostly males were 
found in the spinning, weaving and processing units. Females prefer 
working in stitching units as they attain stitching skills while doing other 
household work. Choices of economic activities for women are restricted 
due to the socio-cultural norms. Females face greater difficulties than 
males to find alternative jobs as females are concentrated in a few sectors. 
There is a high concentration of females in the agriculture sector and 
other unskilled occupations (Siegmann, 2005).   
Financial hardship combined with fewer job alternatives may suggest 
that the utility loss from quitting or being dismissed for females maybe 
greater as compared to males. As there are more barriers for females in 
terms of job opportunities, therefore once females are in employment they 
may not have the same opportunities as males to actively seek 
alternatives and therefore switch jobs.  
Females and males are known to have different psychological attributes 
which may also play a role in explaining the gender difference in turnover. 
Females are also found to be more conscientious than males (Mueller and 
Plug, 2006; Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006).  Haque (2009) reveals that 
a survey of managers in 150 garment manufacturing firms in Pakistan 
indicates that managers think that females provide better quality work, 
are more honest, disciplined and responsible than their male 
counterparts. Managers have indicated a preference for female workers 
as they produce better quality products and have better work ethics, 
however the stitching speed of females is lower as compared to males. 
Managers would prefer hiring more females if firms can fetch orders for 
medium to high quality products so that the profit margin is high enough 
to compensate for the lower stitching speed of females.  
The justification for hiring female workers is also derived from the ‘nimble 
fingers’ hypothesis, where the orientation of women towards precise tasks 
that are required in garment production emerges from their traditional 
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designation at home and performing tasks like sewing. Females are 
naturally more compliant, less likely to join trade unions and accept 
tougher work discipline as compared to males (Elson and Pearson, 1981). 
Managers and supervisors at the firm73 also agree that female stitching 
operators at the firm are more disciplined as compared to male operators. 
These differences also highlight the potential reasons for the lower 
turnover rate of females in the initial period of employment. 
IV.J. Gender Differences in the Impact of the New Quality Management 
Practice 
Overall, we find that few specifications show significant gender 
differences in the impact of the new quality management practice. 
Columns (2) and (4) show that the implementation of the new quality 
management practice increases the log odds of  turnover for females with 
a tenure between 601 and 900 days while the introduction of the practice 
has no significant impact on the turnover of males74.  Column (6) also 
illustrates that there are significant gender differences in the impact of 
the new quality managemenet practice. The implementation of the new 
quality management practice decreases the log odds of turnover for 
females with tenure up to 300 days but has no impact on the turnover of 
males. However, the implementation of the new quality management 
practice  increases the log odds of turnover for males with a tenure 
between 301 and 3300 days and tenure greater than 3900 days but there 
is no impact on the turnover of females. 
The relationship that the new quality management practice increases 
turnover is in line with the unfolding model (Lee and Mitchell, 1994) such 
that shocks at the workplace can increase turnover. Batt and Colvin 
(2011) also suggest that productivity enhancing practices may increase 
quits and dismissals as they expose individuals who can’t keep up with 
the expectations of the practice. The process of turnover described by the 
unfolding model suggests that a shock, which is usually negative, may 
 
73 During the interviews with managers and supervisors when the data was collected, managers and 
supervisors were asked whether they observed any gender differences within the stitching operators in terms 
of performance and work ethics at the firm. 
74 This result is only significant at the 10 percent level. 
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lead to image violations. Individuals compare the circumstances 
generated by the shock to their images such as values and goals, hence 
thoughts of withdrawal emerge if their values and strategies are not 
aligned with those of the organisation or those reflected in the shock. A 
worker may seek job alternatives due to the shock and may leave due to 
the availability of job alternatives.  
IV.K. Gender Differences in the Impact of Age 
Column (6) includes an interaction term between age and the new quality 
management practice. An increase in age reduces the log odds of turnover 
by 0.0341 before the implementation of the practice for males and by 
0.0363 for females. An interesting finding is that although there is no 
significant gender difference in the impact of age, but the impact of the 
new quality management practice is different for older males as compared 
to older females. After the implementation of the practice, an increase in 
age by one year reduces the log odds of turnover by 0.1431 for males. 
However, the relationship between age and turnover does not change for 
females after the implementation of the practice as the interaction term 
between age and the new quality management practice is insignificant in 
table 4.6. Various gender differences in labour market outcomes have 
been found in the past for example females are found to be more averse 
to competition as compared to males, tend to be more altruistic and are 
less concerned about financial outcomes as compared to males and are 
also likely to opt for fixed pay schemes as compared to variable pay 










The research uses discrete time survival analysis to provide evidence of 
the impact of a new quality management practice on employee turnover. 
The new quality management practice provides monetary and non-
monetary incentives to workers, increases monitoring of workers with low 
performance, and increases peer pressure at the work place. Gains in 
utility of workers due to rewards and recognition has been established in 
the past. This research provides results in line with the relationship 
suggested by Weiss (1984), such that a higher expected utility at the 
current job is likely to decrease turnover. The lack of job alternatives 
combined with the potential increase in job attachment due to the 
recognition and rewards provided by the new management practice can 
explain the reduction in turnover at the firm. 
In our case, workers with longer tenures who have accumulated 
substantial information about the job are more likely to turnover due to 
various reasons discussed in the analysis, such as boredom due to 
repetitive tasks, low amount of firm specific training, and low tenure 
premium. 
One of the most important findings is that the impact of the new quality 
management practice varies by job tenure. The magnitude of the impact 
of the new practice is higher for short tenured workers as compared to 
workers with longer tenures. The new quality management practice may 
send positive signals about the job to workers who have only been with 
the firm for a short period of time. Therefore, a larger reduction in 
turnover has been observed for workers who are in the initial stages of 
the job and are in the process of accumulating information about the 
quality of the job match as compared to those workers who have 
accumulated substantial information about the quality of the job match 
and other aspects of the job.  
Most model specifications suggest that worker effort denoted by 
productivity and quality defects is not a significant predictor of turnover 
before the implementation of the new practice. This may be explained by 
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the notion that firms may not extensively use the threat of dismissal as 
it may impair the morale of the workforce. Instead of using the threat of 
dismissal, shirking behaviour may be dealt through discussions and 
verbal warnings.  Interestingly, one specification suggests that before the 
implementation of the new management practice, workers with higher 
quality defects are more likely to turnover, however, after the 
implementation of the new quality management practice, workers with 
higher quality defects are less likely to turnover.  
An interesting finding is that absenteeism is a significant determinant of 
turnover, as an increase in absenteeism increases the likelihood of 
turnover. After the implementation of the new quality management 
practice, shirking behaviour such as absenteeism has a higher impact on 
turnover, hence shirkers are more likley to be dismissed or the 
withdrawal process of absenteeism that leads to turnover becomes 
stronger. Another finding is that older workers are less likely to turnover 
and this relationship becomes stronger after the implementation of the 
new quality management practice. 
In one of the model specifications we find that the implementation of the 
new practice increases the likelihood of turnover, which supports the 
unfolding model (Lee and Mitchell, 1994), but overall we do not find 
evidence in line with this.  
Initially, a gender dummy was included in the logit estimation for the full 
sample, but no significant difference between the turnover of males and 
females was found. However, the sample was split by gender and a logit 
model including all predictors that were used for the full sample was 
estimated. The hazard rate of females were found to be significantly lower 
than the hazard rate of males in the initial years of employment, after 
which no significant difference was found. This result also highlights 
significant gender differences in the job matching process. Financial 
hardship and fewer job alternatives due to restrictions on the mobility of 
females may also be potential reasons for the lower turnover rate of 
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females. The implementation of the new quality management practice 
reduces turnover for older males but has no impact on older females.   
The results provide empirical evidence that the use of motivational tools 
which provide a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives, 
monitoring and peer pressure may reduce the training and hiring costs 
incurred by firms due to high employee turnover.  
The limitation of this research is that we are not able to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary turnover. Although it has been 
suggested that there is a blurred line between voluntary and involuntary 
turnover as these decisions are mutual. However, this distinction could 
provide us with further insights into the importance of the predictors 














Table 18: The Effect of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (full sample without absence percentage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover  
     
Age -0.0336*** -0.0345*** -0.0345*** -0.0349*** -0.0160 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0121) 
      
Quantity -0.000103** -0.0000987* -0.000102* -0.0000982* -0.000101* 
 (0.0000518) (0.0000516) (0.0000610) (0.0000515) (0.0000517) 
      
Defects 0.0486 0.0493 0.0493 0.0564** 0.0489 
 (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0282) (0.0307) 
      
Female -0.0749 -0.0650 -0.0649 -0.0684 -0.0659 
 (0.0829) (0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0831) (0.0830) 
      
Standard Minute Value -0.387** -0.387** -0.387** -0.374** -0.390** 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) 
      
Quality Management Practice -0.690*** 
(0.0861) 
    
     
D1 -5.735*** -5.385*** -5.383*** -5.382*** -5.811*** 
 (0.295) (0.298) (0.299) (0.298) (0.336) 
      
D2 -6.055*** -5.883*** -5.881*** -5.880*** -6.325*** 
 (0.298) (0.307) (0.308) (0.307) (0.347) 
      
D3 -5.199*** -5.477*** -5.475*** -5.474*** -5.922*** 
 (0.288) (0.299) (0.300) (0.299) (0.340)  




Table 18: The Effect of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (full sample without absence percentage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
 
D4 -5.799*** -5.982*** -5.980*** -5.979*** -6.436*** 
 (0.308) (0.327) (0.328) (0.327) (0.366) 
      
D5 -5.826*** -5.751*** -5.748*** -5.747*** -6.223*** 
 (0.313) (0.320) (0.321) (0.320) (0.362)  
D6 -5.521*** -5.424*** -5.421*** -5.420*** -5.929*** 
 (0.331) (0.338) (0.339) (0.338) (0.383) 
      
D7 -5.706*** -5.602*** -5.600*** -5.598*** -6.155*** 
 (0.377) (0.391) (0.392) (0.390) (0.438) 
      
D8 -5.544*** -5.395*** -5.392*** -5.390*** -5.973*** 
 (0.393) (0.407) (0.408) (0.406) (0.456) 
      
D9 -5.614*** -5.575*** -5.572*** -5.569*** -6.236*** 
 (0.437) (0.461) (0.463) (0.461) (0.519) 
      












































      










Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 18: The Effect of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (full sample without absence percentage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
 



























      
Quantity*Quality Management 
Practice 
  0.00000868 
(0.0000920) 
  
     
      
Defects*Quality Management 
Practice 
   -0.473 
(0.298) 
 
     
      
Age*Quality Management Practice     -0.0563** 
(0.0224) 
     











             -3.120 
               (3.564) 
12.61 
(9.015) 




Table 19: The Impact of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover with Age-Squared (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover  
      
Age -0.102* -0.112* -0.112** -0.113** -0.105* -0.0581 
 (0.0576) (0.0573) (0.0573) (0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0715) 
       
Age-squared 0.000853 0.00103 0.00103 0.00103 0.000868 0.000417 
 (0.000932) (0.000926) (0.000926) (0.000926) (0.000929) (0.00117) 
       
Quantity -0.00000576 -0.00000479 0.00000337 -0.00000416 -0.00000631 -0.00000642 
 (0.0000494) (0.0000494) (0.0000579) (0.0000493) (0.0000495) (0.0000495) 
       
Defects 0.0475 0.0477 0.0478 0.0559* 0.0478 0.0473 
 (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0324) 
       
Absence Percentage 9.079*** 8.862*** 8.867*** 8.867*** 8.190*** 8.846*** 
 (0.528) (0.537) (0.537) (0.537) (0.620) (0.539) 
       
Female 0.0853 0.0888 0.0884 0.0851 0.0875 0.0880 
 (0.0847) (0.0850) (0.0850) (0.0850) (0.0849) (0.0849) 
       
Standard Minute Value -0.0464 -0.0572 -0.0587 -0.0432 -0.0542 -0.0586 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) 





     
      
D1 -7.440*** -7.049*** -7.051*** -7.046*** -6.895*** -7.955*** 
 (0.861) (0.863) (0.863) (0.863) (0.864) (1.053) 
       
D2 -7.176*** -6.810*** -6.813*** -6.806*** -6.740*** -7.743*** 
 (0.863) (0.865) (0.865) (0.865) (0.864) (1.061) 
 
  






Table 19: The Impact of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover with Age-Squared (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















D4 -6.693*** -6.675*** -6.679*** -6.670*** -6.628*** -7.628*** 
 (0.873) (0.877) (0.877) (0.877) (0.876) (1.072) 
       
D5 -6.624*** -6.344*** -6.349*** -6.340*** -6.305*** -7.325*** 
 (0.885) (0.885) (0.885) (0.885) (0.885) (1.084) 
       
D6 -6.232*** -5.925*** -5.929*** -5.920*** -5.891*** -6.938*** 
 (0.901) (0.902) (0.902) (0.902) (0.902) (1.104) 
       
D7 -6.444*** -6.151*** -6.156*** -6.144*** -6.101*** -7.212*** 
 (0.926) (0.933) (0.933) (0.933) (0.933) (1.134) 
       
D8 -6.150*** -5.800*** -5.806*** -5.794*** -5.759*** -6.885*** 
 (0.931) (0.939) (0.939) (0.939) (0.938) (1.139) 
       
D9 -6.108*** -5.845*** -5.852*** -5.837*** -5.800*** -6.982*** 
 (0.914) (0.931) (0.931) (0.931) (0.931) (1.121) 






































































Table 19: The Impact of the Quality Management Practice on Turnover with Age-Squared (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























































  -0.0000231 
(0.0000877) 
   
      
       
Defects*Quality 
Management Practice 
   -0.491* 
(0.298) 
  
      
Absence Percentage*Quality 
Management Practice 
    2.753** 
(1.169) 
 
      
Age*Quality Management 
Practice 
     -0.187 
(0.119) 
      
Age-squared*Quality 
Management Practice 
     0.00224 
(0.00189) 
      

















Observations 769491 769491 769491 769491 769491 769491 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 20: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Gender Interaction Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover  
      
Age -0.0649*** -0.0655*** -0.0657*** -0.0657*** -0.0672*** -0.0341** 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0164) 
       
Quantity -0.0000293 -0.0000279 0.000000845 -0.0000274 -0.0000296 -0.0000322 
 (0.0000711) (0.0000711) (0.0000808) (0.0000710) (0.0000712) (0.0000712) 
       
Defects 0.0646** 0.0653** 0.0654** 0.0687** 0.0652** 0.0645** 
 (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0305) (0.0317) (0.0317) 
       
Absence Percentage 8.241*** 8.081*** 8.107*** 8.089*** 7.523*** 8.061*** 
 (0.658) (0.672) (0.674) (0.672) (0.755) (0.675) 
       
Standard Minute Value -0.0192 -0.0317 -0.0355 -0.0176 -0.0191 -0.0379 
 (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272) 
       
Quality Management 
Practice 
-0.586***      
 (0.125)      
       
D1 -7.342*** -7.190*** -7.213*** -7.193*** -6.943*** -7.895*** 
 (0.450) (0.462) (0.463) (0.462) (0.478) (0.500) 
       
D2 -7.236*** -7.069*** -7.096*** -7.072*** -6.892*** -7.808*** 
 (0.436) (0.447) (0.448) (0.447) (0.454) (0.490) 
       
D3 -6.215*** -6.330*** -6.357*** -6.332*** -6.167*** -7.074*** 
 (0.420) (0.428) (0.430) (0.428) (0.434) (0.474) 







Table 20: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Gender Interaction Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover 
 
D4 -6.850*** -7.091*** -7.118*** -7.094*** -6.937*** -7.876*** 
 (0.457) (0.490) (0.491) (0.490) (0.494) (0.535) 
       
D5 -6.785*** -6.580*** -6.606*** -6.582*** -6.428*** -7.414*** 
 (0.468) (0.473) (0.475) (0.473) (0.477) (0.523) 
       
D6 -6.421*** -6.305*** -6.331*** -6.307*** -6.157*** -7.173*** 
 (0.481) (0.490) (0.491) (0.490) (0.493) (0.541) 
       
D7 -7.015*** -6.873*** -6.902*** -6.875*** -6.722*** -7.802*** 
 (0.577) (0.609) (0.610) (0.609) (0.612) (0.654) 
       
D8 -6.599*** -6.272*** -6.302*** -6.273*** -6.114*** -7.246*** 
 (0.572) (0.581) (0.583) (0.581) (0.584) (0.633) 
       
D9 -6.479*** -6.550*** -6.587*** -6.551*** -6.398*** -7.627*** 
 (0.607) (0.656) (0.659) (0.656) (0.658) (0.714) 
       
Age*Gender 0.0276 0.0283 0.0286 0.0281 0.0289 -0.00220 
 (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0244) 
       
Quantity*Gender 0.0000462 0.0000458 0.000000289 0.0000457 0.0000459 0.0000501 
 (0.0000990) (0.0000989) (0.000117) (0.0000988) (0.0000990) (0.0000990) 
       
Defect*Gender -0.111 -0.112 -0.112 -0.0610 -0.112 -0.111 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.0952) (0.131) (0.131) 
       
Absence 
Percentage*Gender 
1.791 1.865 1.835 1.855 1.268 1.885 
 (1.147) (1.158) (1.159) (1.158) (1.388) (1.160) 





















Table 20: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Gender Interaction Model) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








     
 (0.176)      
       
D1*Gender -1.830*** -1.524** -1.493** -1.516** -1.404* -0.839 
 (0.684) (0.707) (0.708) (0.707) (0.743) (0.777) 
       
D2*Gender -1.269** -1.173* -1.134* -1.165* -1.066 -0.453 
 (0.617) (0.637) (0.640) (0.637) (0.662) (0.722) 
       
D3*Gender -1.283** -1.594*** -1.554** -1.588*** -1.485** -0.870 
 (0.587) (0.612) (0.614) (0.612) (0.634) (0.699) 
       
D4*Gender -1.055* -0.873 -0.832 -0.868 -0.762 -0.109 
 (0.626) (0.664) (0.666) (0.664) (0.682) (0.750) 
       
D5*Gender -1.055* -1.208* -1.167* -1.202* -1.107* -0.395 
 (0.633) (0.645) (0.647) (0.645) (0.662) (0.738) 
       
D6*Gender -1.011 -0.958 -0.919 -0.956 -0.865 -0.112 
 (0.656) (0.668) (0.670) (0.668) (0.684) (0.767) 
       
D7*Gender -0.492 -0.538 -0.492 -0.533 -0.397 0.367 
 (0.763) (0.797) (0.799) (0.797) (0.815) (0.896) 
       
D8*Gender -0.461 -0.742 -0.693 -0.736 -0.664 0.206 
 (0.775) (0.800) (0.803) (0.800) (0.814) (0.906) 
       
D9*Gender -0.368 -0.0765 -0.0219 -0.0686 0.00659 0.970 
 (0.862) (0.911) (0.914) (0.911) (0.922) (1.039) 
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Table 20: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Gender Interaction Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















































































































































       
 
Table 20: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Gender Interaction Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 































































































  -0.0000881 
(0.000130) 
   
      




  0.000130 
(0.000176) 
   
      
       
Defects*Quality 
Management Practice 
   -0.284 
(0.326) 
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Table 20: The Impact of the New Quality Management Practice on Turnover (Gender Interaction Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










      




    2.869* 
(1.607) 
 
      





    0.436 
(2.444) 
 
      
       
Age*Quality Management 
Practice 
     -0.109*** 
(0.0348) 
      
       
Age*Quality Management 
Practice*Gender 
     0.107** 





















Observations 769491 769491 769491 769491 769491 769491 
 Standard errors in parentheses 






Conclusion of the Thesis 
The research provides evidence of the impact of a new quality 
management practice on various measures of worker level and firm level 
performance by using a unique data set from a large-scale garments 
manufacturer in Pakistan. 
It has often been mentioned that piece rates lead to a misallocation of 
tasks as workers concentrate on quantity rather than quality. Data on 
648 workers was used when analysing the impact of the new 
management practice on the productivity and quality defects of individual 
workers, which shows that the quality defects made by all workers were 
significantly reduced and the productivity of workers was significantly 
increased after the implementation of the new quality management 
practice. 
The results also complement the literature on good and bad management 
practices and firm productivity (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2010). After we analysed the impact of the new quality 
management practice on the production of the firm by assembly lines, we 
found that whether this new management practice turns out to be a good 
management practice or not is not straight forward as the impact of the 
new practice varies by assembly line. The impact of the new management 
practice is contingent upon the complexity of production which is in line 
with Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) and we find sizeable differences 
in the impact of the new quality management practice between complex 
and basic lines. The implementation of the new practice decreases the 
productivity of basic lines (1A, 1B and 2A) and complex lines (lines 4 and 
5). However, we find mixed results for line 2B (basic line) and line 6 
(complex line). All specifications show that the new practice increases the 
productivity of lines 3A and 3B, which produce relatively more complex 
products as compared to the rest of the basic lines. Therefore, we suggest 
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that the standard management practices seem to suffice for very basic 
lines and complex lines, while the new practice is beneficial for lines 3A 
and 3B.  
We also observe that the impact of the new quality management practice 
also varies by the change in complexity of production denoted by the 
deviation from the average standard minute value and this effect also 
differs by assembly line as some specifications show that changes in 
complexity within a line after the implementation of the new quality 
management practice has a dampening effect on productivity while some 
specifications show that this effect is insignificant. 
Worker turnover at the firm was reduced after the implementation of the 
new quality management practice. Gains in utility of workers due to 
rewards and recognition has been established in the past. This research 
provides results in line with the relationship suggested by Weiss (1984), 
such that a higher expected utility at the current job is likely to decrease 
turnover. The lack of job alternatives combined with the potential 
increase in job attachment due to the recognition and rewards provided 
by the new management practice may explain the reduction in turnover 
at the firm. 
One of the most important findings is that the impact of the new quality 
management practice varies by job tenure. The magnitude of the impact 
of the new practice is higher for short tenured workers as compared to 
workers with longer tenures. The new quality management practice may 
send positive signals about the job to workers who have only been with 
the firm for a shorter period of time. Therefore, a larger reduction in 
turnover has been observed for workers who are in the initial stages of 
the job and are in the process of accumulating information about the 
quality of the job match as compared to those workers who have 
accumulated substantial information about the quality of the job match 
and other aspects of the job.  
Most model specifications suggest that worker effort denoted by 
productivity and quality defects is not a significant predictor of turnover 
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before the implementation of the new practice. This may be explained by 
the notion that firms may not extensively use the threat of dismissal as 
it may impair the morale of the workforce. Instead of using the threat of 
dismissal, shirking behaviour may be dealt through discussions and 
verbal warnings.  Interestingly, one specification suggests that before the 
implementation of the new management practice, workers with higher 
quality defects are more likely to turnover, however, after the 
implementation of the new quality management practice, workers with 
higher quality defects are less likely to turnover. Hence, the 
implementation of the new management practice tends to reduce 
turnover of workers with a relatively lower level of performance. 
However, absenteeism is a significant determinant of turnover, as an 
increase in absenteeism increases the likelihood of turnover. 
Absenteeism seems to be a cause of concern as it is a threat to assembly 
line production. Supervisors need to find a replacement when a worker 
is absent and the replacement workers needs to have the same 
specialisation as the absent worker, otherwise the quality of production 
is compromised. After the implementation of the new quality 
management practice, shirking behaviour such as absenteeism has a 
higher impact on turnover, hence shirkers are more likley to be dismissed 
or the withdrawal process of absenteeism that leads to turnover becomes 
stronger.  
Gender differentials were found in the impact of the new quality 
management practice. Before the implementation of the new practice, 
females were less productive as compared to males and also earned less 
than their male counterparts. The implementation of the new quality 
management practice increased the productivity and earnings of females 
by a greater magnitude as compared to males. Hence, the implementation 
of the practice reduces the male-female productivity and pay gap. Before 
the implementation of the new practice, females made significantly fewer 
quality defects as compared to males. Although, the implementation of 
the new quality management practice reduces the number of quality 
defects made by both males and females but females make significantly 
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more quality defects as compared to males after the implementation of 
the new practice. The quality management practice seems to target and 
minimise the shirking behaviour of workers as it has a greater impact on 
reducing the quality defects made by males who were making more 
quality defects before the intervention as compared to females, while the 
impact of the practice is of a smaller magnitude on the relatively more 
careful and quality conscious females. 
Females were less likely to turnover as compared to their male 
counterparts in the initial years of employment, after which no significant 
difference was found. This result highlights significant gender differences 
in the job matching process, which is line with Viscusi (1980). Financial 
hardship and fewer job alternatives due to restrictions on the mobility of 
females may also be potential reasons for the lower turnover rate of 
females.  
As the data in this research is limited to one specific firm, the findings 
from this study cannot be generalised for the labour market or the 
manufacturing industry but such findings contribute to a growing body 
of firm level studies (for example Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al., 2013; Lazear, 2000; Boning, 
Ichniowski and Shaw, 2007; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005) which may later on provide general 
conclusions about various aspects of worker and firm performance. 
However, the findings of this research will be useful to other firms in the 
ready-made garments industry who want to introduce new management 
practices to improve firm and worker performance. 
One of the limitations of the study is that there is no control group. 
However, throughout the period of observation, the technology used by 
the operators, other management practices at the firm, number of hours 
worked, compensation mechanisms remained the same, hence our 
estimates are reliable. There are some other data limitations, for example, 
when analysing the impact of the new quality management practice on 
turnover, data does not allow us to distinguish between voluntary and 
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involuntary turnover. We also do not have data on the quality defects per 
assembly line so while we analysed the impact of the new quality 
management practice on the productivity per line in chapter 3, we are 
unable to comment on the quality defects per line.   
An avenue for future research could be to analyse a shorter time frame 
around the change in the management practice to run a robustness 
check that whether the change in the practice is driving the results found 
in the current research rather than something else. Another idea is to 
analyse the impact of the new quality management practice on 



















One of the important implications of the study for the firm is that 
although this study provides evidence that linking rewards for reducing 
quality defects while keeping piece rates intact does improve worker 
productivity while reducing quality defects, however this result should be 
used with caution as the overall performance of lines after the 
implementation of the new practice shows a different picture. The firm 
should further investigate reasons for the decrease in the productivity for 
all lines apart from lines 3A and 3B in order to keep the new quality 
management practice in place in the long run. 
The study provides empirical evidence that the use of such motivational 
tools which provide a combination of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives, monitoring and peer pressure may reduce the training and 
hiring costs incurred by the firm due to employee turnover. Also, as the 
results indicate that females have a lower likelihood of turnover in the 
initial period on the job, the firm may be able to benefit from further 
increasing the proportion of females as stitching operators. The firm 
should calculate the costs saved by reduced turnover and see if there are 
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